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7Abstract
This book studies the economic and investment behavior of foundations, 
as well as the general environment of non-profit governance and of equity 
investments by non-profit foundations. The book is structured as follows. 
The Introduction presents the rationale for non-profits, some basic 
characteristics of non-profits and especially of foundations, and compares 
the economic motivation of non-profit foundations with that of for-profit 
companies. Essay 1 examines the root causes of governance choices in 
foundations, and the consequences of such governance choices. Essay 2 
empirically investigates the equity portfolios of foundation investors and 
confirms typical characteristics of foundations as investors.
The governance in foundations, a wealth-endowed subset of non-
profits, differs fundamentally from the governance principles of for-profit 
corporates on three dimensions: (1) foundations do not have legal owners 
who could exert external control over the foundation; (2) without universal 
measures, such as profitability or stock market valuation, the efficient 
economic behavior of foundations is difficult to assess; and (3) most 
foundations are established to exist in perpetuity and are not subjected to 
any market for control.
Thus, Essay 1 focuses on the following questions. Firstly, (1) which 
foundation-specific characteristics explain the accumulation of power at the 
board level in the governance of foundations? A sample of 891 foundations 
in Finland is empirically investigated using data on the foundations’ 
detailed rules, financials, and other characteristics. A new index measure 
for the concentration of control in foundations is constructed. Secondly, 
(2), the first Essay examines whether governance choices may have any 
consequences on foundations’ grant-making or other charitable spending.
One of the possible drivers for governance choices include a foundation’s 
financiers. In absence of owners, the regular financiers such as donors, 
customers or the public sector may exert power over how the foundation 
is administered. In order to investigate the effect of financing, Essay 1 
classifies sample foundations into four categories, based on their main 
source of finance. The empirical results suggest that a foundation’s 
source of finance is associated with the concentration of decision powers. 
8Foundations that have to regularly approach outside sources of finance–
donors, public sector or customers– show less concentration of power 
on the board level than foundations that can finance their missions with 
capital income from an endowment. We also find that foundations with a 
less concentrated governance model spend more on charitable operations 
than foundations with concentrated governance. However, in grantmaking 
foundations this association does not emerge: governance is not related to 
the level of grantmaking. 
In our second Essay, we argue for the need to understand the investment 
behaviour of various investor types, and present empirical evidence of 
non-profits’ equity investment style, based on data on portfolios of listed 
equity owned by 530 foundations during the years 2000-2013. Overall, 
foundations are active risk-takers: they can carry concentrated equity risk 
by not diversifying their portfolios towards the industry breakdown of the 
general market index. Foundations are shown to be infrequent traders, with 
relatively low equity portfolio turnover. If they decide to own a stock for 
longer than one year, they remain owner for 3.6 years on average (in the 13-
year sample period). In addition, the majority of their single shareholdings 
stay intact from year to year. Foundations do not adjust their positions 
frequently.
Foundation age and size are related to the equity allocation of foundations’ 
portfolios: older and larger foundations diversify more along the lines of the 
market index breakdown. We also find that older foundations trade less 
frequently than younger ones.
Essays in this book present new insights into non-profit economic 
behavior. Concerning governance, Essay 1 suggests a measure (Foundation 
Governance Index) and a determinant (the source of finance of a foundation) 
for governance in non-profits. Concerning investments, Essay 2 confirms 
empirically that non-profits have a distinct equity investment style. 
Keywords: Non-profit, foundation, charity, governance, foundation 
governance index, investment style, investor activity, allocation, 
diversification, trading, long-term ownership.
9Acknowledgements
This book was a long project and I want to thank everybody who helped, 
shared or sympathized. 
My supervisor Professor Seppo Ikäheimo was a great instructor as 
well as discussant on all matters about financial accounting, finance and 
governance – and on a wide and entertaining variety of other subjects 
during many years. Professor Matti Virén provided vital help in forming the 
research questions, in logical thinking, in statistical methods, and among 
other things introduced me to Mandelbrot’s thinking on the capital markets. 
Professor Vesa Puttonen introduced me to Active Share concept and asked 
few but path-finding questions; in discussions with him I learned what 
diversification is (after having been a practitioner in finance for a quarter 
of a century). Professor Tomi Seppälä helped in finding the right statistical 
methods and with simple questions opened up what the findings actually 
mean. His good-humored support to an absolute statistics-rookie was much 
appreciated. Researcher Ville Sillanpää helped by showing interpretations 
of several regressions and how to report them in papers. Professors Matti 
Keloharju, Xavier Castaner, Katarina Olsson and Henry Hansmann also 
commented on my research ideas or my earlier and later manuscripts with 
valuable observations. 
The examiners of my thesis, Professor Steen Thomsen from the 
Copenhagen Business School and Professor Tom Berglund from Hanken 
School of Economics provided excellent remarks which improved the 
thesis significantly, while at the same time supporting me with encouraging 
reviews. 
Teachers and staff at Aalto Executive Education provided great support 
in courses and doctoral seminars. Professor Sami Kajalo taught the use of 
not only statistical programs but also many other research IT necessities. 
Professor Jaakko Aspara put a pen in my hand and showed me how to write 
an introduction. Lecturer Ken Pennington improved my English with many 
helpful rules and tips about the language. Professor Henrikki Tikkanen, 
Program Director Maarit Hursti and many others helped and encouraged 
me along the way. 
Aalto University Business School’s department of Accounting and 
10
Finance was a great working environment for two years. Professors Juhani 
Vaivio and Teemu Malmi, lecturer Katja Komulainen and many others 
were the best possible day-to-day discussion partners, supporters and 
friends. Fellow doctoral students provided empathy and understanding. 
Department parties were a lively change to research routines.
My “partner in crime” during the intensive research period at the 
department was researcher Jari Melgin. His advice on excel, governance 
science and writing kept me going steadily and his friendship was and will 
be very much valued.
I had splendid research assistants and IT help along the way. Jarkko Aalto 
worked on the huge pile of data we had in the beginning, correcting, checking 
and complementing the data manually and searching information about 
foundations in other countries. Sami Ali-Mattila helped in constructing 
methods to sort and sum data in order to build measures used in this book. 
Topi Kämäräinen solved coding problems, which saved me from going 
manually through some seventy thousand lines of foundations’ share 
ownership. Elisa Segersven at Aalto University was our solid and always 
sunny IT support who solved our IT problems in no time.
During my research time I had the opportunity to work as a visiting scholar 
at the Woodrow Wilson Center for international studies in Washington, DC 
for three months. The Center offered an unparalleled working environment 
where I could tap national and international resources and conduct 
interviews with and about American foundations. Assistance and support 
from Director Christian Osterman and the Wilson Center staff was valuable 
and kind. The Wilson alumni status will be much enjoyed in the future.  
Sari Lounasmeri, Managing Director of Finnish foundation for share 
ownership, was the reason why I became interested in foundations in the 
first place. She cast me an excellent subject for “an interesting publication” 
from which my thesis grew. Managing Director Liisa Suvikumpu 
from Council of Finnish Foundations provided excellent insights into 
foundations’ thinking and into doing research. 
This research could not have been possible without institutions that 
provided the data. Jyrki Jauhiainen and Markus Tervonen from the 
Finnish Ministry of Justice not only minutely collected information on 
more than 900 Finnish foundations, but also allowed me unique access 
to their proprietary expert data.  Juha Viertola, then director of the 
Foundation Register, complemented the ministry’s data with additional 
two years’ financials for not only the sample 900 foundations, but also for 
the whole body of Finnish registered foundations. Esa Kankkunen and 
Jarkko Heinonen in Euroclear Finland Ltd showed exceptional eagerness 
to support economic research into non-profits and offered their help in 
getting data organized for research purposes yet keeping it in anonymized 
form. Availability of unique data for research purposes would not be 
possible without such cooperation. My heartfelt thanks to all data providers 
and their organizations.
This book is also evidence of my family’s good-humored patience with 
11
my undertakings. Their attitude has been one of healthily requiring me to 
finish this rather sooner than later. Should I ever err to claim having been 
a perfect parent, my children will have this book to evidence the opposite. 
I can only take it as a compliment that my family are eager to have me back 
after some long and stressful absences. My love goes to my husband Heikki 
and my children Jaakko and Elina for supporting me.
Helsinki, 28 June, 2016
Eeva Ahdekivi

13
Contents
Abstract 7
Acknowledgements 9
List of Concepts, Abbreviations and Symbols 17
INTRODUCTION TO NON-PROFITS AND CHARITABLE 
FOUNDATIONS 19
1. Non-profits as economic agents 21
2. Rationale for non-profits 23
2.1 Foundations 25
3. Governance of non-profits 29
3.1 Non-profit characteristics, governance and moral hazard 30
4. Foundation Governance Index and foundation source of finance 35
4.1 Data on foundations and governance  37
5. Non-profits’ equity investment style 43
5.1 Foundations as owners of companies 43
5.2 Data on foundations’ equity investments 44
6. Empirical results and discussion 47
References 51
14
WHAT DETERMINES A NON-PROFIT GOVERNANCE  
MODEL - AND DOES IT MATTER? 55
1. Introduction to Essay 1 57
2. Earlier studies on non-profit governance and its consequences 59
3. How are foundations governed? 63
3.1 Time sequence, causality and effect  66
3.2 Hypotheses 68
4. Data and development of variables 71
4.1 Foundation governance index 71
4.1.1 Forming Foundation Governance Index 71
4.1.2 Relevant foundation provisions and  
factors affecting their adoption 75
4.2 Foundation source of financing 80
4.3 Competition on the mission market 83
4.4 Control variables 85
4.5 Operational model  88
5. Empirical results 91
5.1 Relation between foundation source of finance,  
competition and governance 91
5.2 Determination of governance in endowed foundations 104
5.3 Relation between governance and charitable spending 106
5.4 Summary of hypotheses and results 112
6. Conclusion and discussion 113
References 117
ARE NON-PROFITS ACTIVE EQUITY INVESTORS? 123
1. Introduction to Essay 2 125
15
2. Investor types and investment style on the equity market  129
2.1 Investor beliefs and motivations to trade 129
2.2 Agency, intermediation and short-termism  130
2.3 Investor types’ behavior and activity 134
2.3.1 Trading activity 139
2.3.2 Active portfolio allocation 142
2.3.3 Non-profits’ investor activity 146
2.3.4 Summary of previous evidence on investor activity 149
3. Data, variables and hypotheses 151
3.1 Data 151
3.2 Variables 154
3.3 Hypotheses 159
4. Empirical results 165
4.1 Active Share in allocation of equity portfolio 165
4.2 Equity portfolio turnover 171
4.3 Changes in single equity holdings: the change-in-ownership 
indicator and duration of holdings 175
4.4 Quality of governance and investment style in foundations 182
4.5 Observations on favorite stocks 183
4.6 Summary of hypotheses and results 187
5. Conclusion and discussion 191
References 195
Appendix 1. Sampling of data 203
Appendix 2. Foundation financial statements 205
Appendix 3. Data on foundations’ equity ownership and  
calculation of ratios 207

17
List of Concepts, Abbreviations 
and Symbols
Active Share Measure of deviation from market index weights in an 
investor’s portfolio, based on the Cremers & Petäjistö 
(2009) article.
Change-in-ownership –indicator or Change indicator
 Measure of an investor’s trading activity that detects 
if a single stock holding has changed by more than 10 
percent in one year.
Donative foundation
 Foundation that is mainly financed through donations 
from the general public.
Endowed foundation 
Foundation that is mainly financed through investment 
income from an endowment.
Endowment An accumulation of donations of money or property to a 
non-profit organization for the ongoing support of that 
organization. Often the endowment is structured so that 
the principal amount is kept intact while the investment 
income generated by the endowment is available for 
use, or part of the principal is released each year, which 
allows for donations to have an impact over a longer 
period. The total value of an institution’s assets is often 
referred to as the institution’s endowment. 
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FGI Foundation Governance Index, defined in first chapter, 
section 4.1. FGI is the number of provisions in a 
foundation’s rules that concentrate decision powers to 
the foundation board.
Grantmaking foundation
 Foundation which carries out its charitable work by 
granting money to charitable or societal causes. The 
opposite of operational foundation (see below). 
ICNPO International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations, 
by the United Nations
MLR Multinomial Logistic Regression
OLR Ordinal Logistic Regression
OLS Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Operative foundation
 Foundation that is mainly financed through its own 
business operations, the proceeds of which go to a 
charitable mission.
Operational foundation
Foundation that carries out its charitable work by its own 
employees, programs and presence among beneficiaries. 
Operational foundation is the opposite of a grant-making 
foundation that does not employ charity workers, 
researchers or the like, but gives grants to carry out such 
work.
19
INTRODUCTION TO NON-
PROFITS AND CHARITABLE 
FOUNDATIONS

21
Introduction to non-profits and charitable foundations
1. Non-profits as economic agents
The non-profit sector has dramatically grown in the developed world. 
Foundations controlled up to USD 715bn of the wealth in the U.S. and EUR 
494bn in Europe by the year 2012.1 Furthermore, the wealth controlled 
by non-profit foundations has been steadily increasing over the past 
decades. The accumulation of private wealth makes it possible to donate 
increasing sums to altruistic causes. Inefficiency and the scarcity of money 
in the public sector frustrate citizens and motivate philanthropists to seek 
quick solutions to current problems. Successful businessmen offer their 
management skills to the use of the third sector by setting up foundations. 
Unlike companies, non-profits seldom go bankrupt or restructure - many 
are meant to live forever. Their growth is facilitated by tax exempt status 
which accelerates the wealth accumulation in periods of high investment 
or operational returns. The third sector is growing and is by nature 
perpetual (see, e.g., Hansmann (1980), Rose-Ackerman (1996), Lakdawalla 
and Philipson (2006) and Thomsen (2013)).
Non-profits own quoted companies, hospitals, universities and cultural 
institutions. Through their investment and ownership, they represent an 
important economic agent. Hence, it is in the general interest to see that 
the third sector is reasonably well governed.
Regulators have noted that the third sector lacks the vital controlling 
element of shareholders, and that there are genuine risks of inefficiency, 
fraud or criminal activity. A lack of owners creates inherent moral hazards 
in non-profits (see, e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983)) because foundations 
possess wealth and management efforts are not observable. For this reason, 
we need to look into governance issues in non-profits, but the elements 
to do so are radically different from those in corporate governance. This 
research aims to clarify those fundamental moral hazard situations typical 
to a non-distribution, non-risk-taking world. This then allows us to identify 
plausible factors accentuating or mitigating moral hazard.
1 Grantmaking foundations for the US. Foundations data for Europe estimated from EFC 
data center. 
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2. Rationale for non-profits
Information deficiencies, agency theory and the trust between economic 
agents explains much of the existence of the third sector. The pathfinding 
understanding originated from Weisbrod (1964), who first recognized the 
economics of “collective consumption vs. individual consumption goods”, 
referring to non-chargeable goods that have positive value for the individual 
and society. The option to use a garden or a hospital has value, though an 
individual may not be willing to pay for it. It is beneficial to subsidize such 
production, especially when starting costs are high and the probability of 
use is relatively low (e.g., national parks). The Public Goods Theory suggests 
that if a firm produces a service with public-good attributes (positive 
externalities), a for-profit will produce an amount satisfying demand but 
not necessarily the socially optimal amount. Customers will typically pay 
one uniform price, whereas consumers’ marginal benefit from the public 
good varies. The amount produced will only cater for market-clearing priced 
production and not the rest2. Moreover, consumers may not fully appreciate 
their own marginal benefit from the public good. They only evaluate their 
own, current benefit and not the positive externality (e.g., value of option to 
use national parks, or the benefit of education to the society).
Weisbrod (1997) later argued along similar lines that the government 
only provides services needed to satisfy the median voter. Rare or unique 
needs are not provided for with public money, leaving part of the demand 
unsupplied. Rare needs do not represent enough voting power for the 
politicians. However, Weisbrod’s theory does not provide an answer to 
why non-profits should fill the gap in demand, and not the for-profit firms. 
This theory, as described above, is best suited for commercial non-profits: 
they operate marginal businesses that are not offered by the public or 
private sector. Examples of this would include a museum for avant-garde 
art or a hospital for rare diseases. Weisbrod concluded that non-profits 
fill the heterogeneous demand gaps not filled by government. The more 
heterogeneous the demand, the more there is room for non-profits. This 
2 Lindahl-pricing is not used.
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would predict, for example, that many European countries with their 
relatively homogenous populations would cover most of the demand with 
uniform public supply, whereas diverse nations would need more non-
profit production. 
Price discrimination theories discuss the ability to accept different 
prices for the same goods as a motive for the non-profit sector. Extracting 
consumer surplus helps keep alive producers that could otherwise not 
produce profitably (Malani, Philipson, and David (2003)).
More generally, asymmetric information has been identified as a reason 
for non-profits. This line of thinking is also called Contract Failure Theory 
(Hansmann (1980)). If consumers3 cannot verify and control the quality of 
goods or services and cannot contractually protect themselves, they prefer 
to buy from someone who cannot distribute profits4. The non-distribution 
constraint offers consumers some protection against fraud and poor quality. 
Even if this suspicion is not shared by all consumers, it has been shown to 
exist with many. Consequently, for-profit and non-profit providers may 
co-exist and share a customer base with different attitudes to the agency 
problem5.
This agency theoretic rationale has many advocates. Arrow (1963) 
recognized that uncertainty about a doctor’s motivations may be the reason 
why so many hospitals in the USA operate on a non-profit base: there is 
no motivation for the hospital to order excess examinations or expensive 
drugs. Hansmann (1980) suggests that non-profits appear in sectors 
where quality cannot be verified, or is difficult to verify, such as nurseries 
or elderly care. Fama and Jensen (1983) consider the agency problem 
between donors and residual claimants of an organization. They consider 
the wish to bequeath money to specified causes as given, and ponder on 
the problem of how to ensure the donor’s money is not claimed by residual 
claimants. As “money has no ear-mark”, this is impossible to verify6. This 
leads non-profit organizations - without residual claimants (owners) – to 
being the organization form best suited for charity, as they do not strive 
for profits. Rising interest in corporate responsibility has contributed to 
the popularity of non-profits. Earlier, the information asymmetry between 
3 For non-profits a “consumer” can also mean the donor to a charity, or a patron or member 
of a society. This could refer to anyone providing money to an organization, hoping to 
achieve an objective. “Help to the poor in Africa” may be the product, as well as “playing 
golf as cheaply as is feasible”.
4 It is also important that the information asymmetry is often not resolved ex post, as in 
cases, such as the “lemons” dilemma. Thus, sanctions do not help. Hines, Horwitz, and 
Nichols (2010).
5 Among others, Ben-Ner (2002) and Glaeser and Shleifer (2001).
6 A similar moral hazard problem also arises inside non-profits. An example is given by 
Weisbrod and Asch (2010). If one donates a sum to a specific department of a hospital 
or a university, the administrators might reduce the general budget of that department 
by a corresponding amount. The donor should be assured that his donation is “on top of 
anything that would have been given in absence of donation”. Such assurance seldom 
takes place in real life. 
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consumer and company was maybe too abstract to motivate consumer 
behavior, but this asymmetry has now become mainstream – consumers 
want to trust societies with which they deal. This has brought an important 
advantage to non-profits, which are not able to distribute profits. From the 
workers’ perspective, non-profits may appear to be more stable and their 
purpose more motivating. In addition, non-profits offer both volunteer and 
paid work, leaving ample possibilities to choose either part-time or other 
flexible means of working (Ghatak and Mueller (2011), Glaeser (2002)).
We conclude that the defining characteristic of non-profits, the absence 
of owners and the non-distribution of funds, is vital for the existence of 
non-profits. Societies have created the foundation-form to avoid certain 
moral hazard problems (as discussed above). However, the lack of owners 
causes foundations to have one control element less in their governance 
(compared to corporates) and as a result, a new moral hazard in their 
management7. This lack of control may affect the behavior of non-profits 
as economic agents: they may hoard endowment capital and/or spend too 
little money inefficiently on their charitable mission. We develop this 
proposition further in Section 3.1 and in the first essay, Section 2. 
In the following two essays, we shall investigate the forming of non-profit 
governance and its effect on non-profit economic behavior. To provide 
background to the essays, we shall first examine the general environment 
of non-profit governance.
2.1 Foundations
The main focus of our study is charitable foundations. They represent a 
sub-group of non-profits. The other non-profit forms include associations, 
unions, churches and trusts, as coded in the local legislation. The 
defining characteristic of a foundation is that capital is set aside to form 
the foundation8. Associations are a collections of members, whereas 
foundations represent chests of money that cannot be distributed to 
other causes than their specific mission9. Thus, foundations are of prime 
interest as economic agents, since they must make economic decisions. 
The terms “non-profit” and “foundation” are used interchangeably in this 
7 In order to avoid the agency costs due to information asymmetry about quality (the 
contract failure theory) by denying distribution of profits from the foundation, 
foundations forego the possibility of having a body that would have material interest to 
control the foundation. This is the paradox of foundations’ governance.   
8 Legislators do not consider the requirement of an initial capital outlay for a foundation 
to be necessary. Rather, it is the ongoing necessity to finance charitable work, combined 
with the non-distribution prohibition that causes foundations to accumulate funds. 
On the other hand, Anheier (2001) defines: “A separate, identifiable asset donated to a 
particular purpose, usually public in nature.” 
9 Hopt and Hippel (2010), page 539. 
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book10. However, the reader should note that not all results or observations 
on foundations can be generalized to other types of non-profits that do not 
possess wealth and as a consequence whose motivations clearly differ from 
those of foundations 
All foundations do not possess an abundance of money. Many have a 
small endowment to begin with and have to seek financing by operative 
work, such as selling T-shirts and sports services, or through donations. 
The endowment of some foundations is a fixed asset that can be used to 
earn money – consequently, the foundation’s financial reporting shows 
that the foundation lives off the operative income, not the endowment 
yield. Hospital or theater buildings are examples of such assets. However, 
foundations that have either accumulated a large financial endowment 
over the years, or received one from a philanthropist-entrepreneur, tend to 
be the best-known foundations.
Foundations can be eternal11 or of determinate life. In our understanding 
most of the foundations are eternal in most countries, although global 
statistics on this are not available. The eternal nature is considered one of 
the defining characteristics of the foundation sector12, even if examples of 
determinate lifetime foundations have emerged in recent years13. In this, 
foundations differ markedly from the first sector economic agents who are 
exposed to changes brought on by the market for control. 
Foundations have a mission statement that is the equivalent of the 
profit-making rationale in the corporate world. The mission statement is 
not the strategy or the method for financing the non-profit, but the reason 
why the foundation exists. The mission is defined by the founder(s), and 
it is important that the mission carefully follows the stipulations of the 
founder14. Note the difference between operations conducted in order 
to finance the mission versus those conducted to realize the charitable 
10 This vocabulary choice was adapted because much of the research literature uses the 
term non-profit. This may be for two reasons: foundations can carry different names in 
different legislations, e.g., charity, trust, endowment, and a more generic term is needed. 
Another reason may be that the word “foundation” has several meanings, leading to 
confusion with topics such as “foundations of finance” vs. “financing of foundations”. 
Non-profit has thus become the leading key-word in economic research of foundations.
11 Founded to exist for an undefined time period. Closing of a foundation is strictly 
controlled in most countries, and motivation for closing is typically scarce, especially if 
the foundation possesses an endowment.
12 A characteristic commonly mentioned by foundation administrators and lobbyists, and 
often considered an absolute virtue. We interviewed 16 largest foundations, the regulator, 
a lobbying organisation and public authorities. See Ahdekivi (2014) for further details.
13 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is an example. The foundation ceases to exist 20 years 
after the founders’ death. 
14 Our understanding is that changing a foundation’s mission or rules is made difficult 
by the authorities in order to prevent the abuse of tax exemptions. If foundations were 
a flexible tool for ever-changing operations, they might be more easily used for dubious 
purposes, with a tax benefit and almost no public reporting. Thus they have to be strictly 
followed. Furthermore, keeping strictly to the founder’s rules entices new founders to 
create new foundations, as they feel that their legacy is eternally safe. 
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mission. These may look alike or even merge, for example, in the case of 
charitable hospitals that charge low service fees. Still, the difference does 
exist in the case of a commercial hospital (operations=financing) whose 
profits are used to care for the homeless (=mission).
When assessing what is a “successful” or “large” foundation, financials 
do not provide a suitable measure. An operative foundation may employ 
thousands of persons but make zero profits, thereby accumulating a slim 
balance sheet. “Successful” must thus be assessed qualitatively: how well 
and efficiently the mission is achieved. “Large” can be measured by the size 
of the foundation’s personnel or grant-making. However, success and size 
are often confused with the size of the endowment, as argued by Weisbrod 
and Asch (2010), which accentuates the moral hazard in endowment 
building15. 
The rules of foundations correspond to the articles of association of 
a corporate. They define what the governing bodies of a foundation are, 
how these are composed and what the powers of each organ are. In this 
aspect, the rules of foundations are similar to corporate articles. However, 
of particular interest to governance researchers are the provisions that set 
out the procedures for choosing an auditor, changing the rules or dissolving 
the foundation. These three activities are strictly the business of a general 
meeting of owners in a corporate setting. In the non-profit world, they fall 
within the powers of the administrative organs, since there are no owners.
As a result, the rules of foundations can be considered more important 
in foundations than they are in corporates16. They set all the powers that 
be, due to the absence of owners. In this kind of a setting, the board of 
a foundation becomes the dominant part of the governance. But, who 
nominates the board? Who controls the board after that? And what kind 
of economic decisions do these boards tend to make? These are the salient 
questions of foundation governance.
15 Weisbrod and Asch (2010) describe this phenomenon, but also note that the endowment 
size does tell positive things, too. A large and growing endowment is a signal of successful 
selling of a non-profit cause.
16 See, e.g., Hopt and Hippel (2010) page 216 discussion about supervision in Germany, page 
243 about foundations in the Netherlands, page 324 about shortcomings of supervision 
of foundations in France, or page 946 about lack of monitoring in non-profits in Europe 
in general.
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3. Governance of non-profits
The governance of non-profit organizations, such as foundations, is 
attracting increasing interest among scholars, practitioners, and regulators 
alike (Fack and Landais (2012), Watros and Weinstock (2013)). The 
governance of foundations differs fundamentally from the governance 
principles of for-profit corporates on three dimensions: (1) foundations do 
not have legal owners who could exert external control over the foundation; 
(2) without universal measures, such as profitability or stock market 
valuation, the efficiency of foundations is difficult to assess and compare 
externally; and (3) most foundations are established to exist in perpetuity17 
and are not subjected to any market for control. As noted in previous 
economic research (e.g., Hansmann (1990), Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006)), 
these dimensions create obvious governance questions, as the guardians of 
a non-profit foundation will inevitably lack part of the external control, as 
well as checks and balances, that are enjoyed by for-profit corporates with 
legal owners. This is the source of moral hazard in foundation governance18.
However, although previous economic research has noted these 
inherent governance problems, little empirical research has focused on 
the governance of non-profit foundations, especially concerning the issue 
of what factors (if any) can mitigate the inherent lack of external control 
on foundation leadership or substitute for this control. Indeed, previous 
research on non-profit foundation governance has concentrated on 
studying the mode of governance as a predictor of foundations’ behavioral or 
financial outcomes (e.g., the foundation’s charitable giving, or the amount of 
donations it receives), rather than focusing on the mode of governance per 
se, or the factors predicting the mode of governance. For instance, Fisman 
and Hubbard (2003) studied US state-level regulation of foundations as 
a predictor of higher donations to foundations; Desai and Yetman (2005 
17 For one seasoned view on foundation lifespan, see Bill Gates’ interview at Harvard 
University in 2012.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBHJ-8Bch4E, at 34-minute 
mark about life span. At 35.20 comment on extended lifespans: “…There would be some 
weird board, God knows what they would do.”
18 See also similar justification in Hansmann and Thomsen (2013).
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and 2015) explored government regulation as a predictor of foundations’ 
higher charitable giving and lower management compensation; and Core, 
Guay, and Verdi (2006) examined the size of a foundation’s endowment 
capital as a predictor of growth of charitable work or higher management 
compensation. These studies focused on the mode of governance as an 
independent variable, while less attention has been given to the root causes 
for non-profit foundations’ governance choices. These root causes or 
factors will be the focus of our first essay.
Consequently, the first essay focuses on the following questions. Firstly, 
(1) which foundation-specific characteristics explain the accumulation of 
power at the board level in the governance of foundations? Addressing this 
question, an extensive sample of 891 foundations in Finland is empirically 
investigated using data on the foundations’ detailed rules, financials, and 
other characteristics. A new index measure for the concentration of control 
in foundations, based on our data of the foundation rules, is constructed. 
Secondly, (2), the essay examines whether governance choices may have any 
consequences on foundations’ grant-making or other charitable spending.
3.1 Non-profit characteristics, governance and 
moral hazard
The defining characteristic of a non-profit organization is that it has no 
claimants to profits or assets. For governance researchers, it is exotic to 
consider governance without owners or stock market valuation. Ownership 
provides control and motivation for monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz 
(1973), Grossman and Hart (1986)). Yet, this lack of owners is the starting 
point for governance in non-profits. Furthermore, non-profits do not have 
equity which would reflect the value of operations. Profitability is not a 
goal in itself, thus corporate profitability measures are pointless. Across 
continents and legislations, the non-distribution of income19 is the defining 
feature in non-profits. The imperative of not distributing profits limits 
possibilities of materially benefiting from a non-profit operation. There 
seems to be no direct material benefit available from non-profits, except for 
grantees and aid receivers. 
Until recent decades there has been little interest in the virtues of non-
profit governance. Non-profits are frugal and pay much attention to their 
mission; they carefully consider the wishes of the founders and are reluctant 
to spend on administration. Building up many layers of administration 
is admittedly not worth the expense in a small charity (net assets of, say, 
50,000 euros). Generally, non-profit governance is streamlined to only one 
19 E.g., Hansmann (1987).
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governance organ, the board20. However, in large non-profits this leaves 
room for moral hazard – and ownerless fortunes do attract moral hazard. 
We base our agency setting on earlier economic literature that explores 
agency problems related to cash holdings in for-profit firms. Jensen (1986) 
posits that moral hazard is severe in firms with large free cash flows— 
where there is more cash than profitable investment opportunities. In for-
profits, the agency costs may arise in form of, e.g., suboptimal investments 
caused by the hubris brought on by capital. The agency costs are thus not 
necessarily or even mainly related to an opportunity for the management 
to benefit materially from the company. In foundations, agency costs stem 
from 1) less effort in the daily work of the management21, 2) tunneling 
of funds22, and benefits23 to the management and 3) less effort to seek 
efficiencies24. This last cost is especially relevant as there is no market 
for control for non-profits25. Agency problems can be potentially larger in 
non-profits than in for-profits because there is no viable method to return 
excess cash to donors or other financiers26.
Furthermore, corporates face three levels of control or corrective 
measures to inefficient operations: first, the internal controls of the firm; 
second, the market for control; and third, bankruptcy. Foundations lack the 
20 In many countries, very small companies are excused from some company obligations. 
The legislators are pondering if the same approach should be used in the third sector: very 
large non-profits should abide by stricter standards than very small ones. These standards 
to large non-profits could be introduced in a “soft law” form, meaning recommendations 
and guidelines instead of binding, uniform legislation.
21 We include the board of directors into the overall management of a foundation.
22 The moral hazard related to money may be less significant in non-profits as the sector 
operates with altruistic motives and many work without compensation, including the 
boards of directors.
23 The benefits may include a standing in society which may be as significant as in corporate 
world. Belonging to a board of trustees of a New York museum is a case in point. 
24 The risks of fraud or inefficiency are fundamentally different in corporates and 
foundations. In corporates, efficiency is constantly measured through profitability, by 
customer surveys and the like. In foundations, profitability is not a stringent condition 
and efficiency is hardly measured. Non-profit beneficiaries are understandably not very 
vocal about the efficiency of received charity. As a consequence, non-profit efficiency is 
difficult to assess. On the other hand, the non-profit market is altruistic by nature and 
foundations’ administrators tend to have high integrity. Thus it could be said that fraud is 
a more genuine risk in corporates, whereas inefficiency is a genuine worry in non-profits.
25 In other words, foundations do not restructure or merge, which are important tools for 
seeking efficiency in companies.
26 This has not been evidenced by comparative tests between non-profits and for-profits. 
On balance, it is fair to note that for-profits probably face no less agency problems than 
non-profits. The absence of ownership rights in non-profits affects only the motivation 
of agents in the moral hazard setting. 
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second level: there are few foundation takeovers27. The third level seems 
a very distant possibility, as foundations can scale down their operations 
to match their means. Given these differences between foundations and 
corporates, we maintain that the possibilities to mitigate moral hazard in 
foundations can be more limited than in corporates. 
The endowment of a foundation can be considered similar to “excess 
cash” in corporates. Generalizing further from the corporate setting, 
we posit that the availability of cash, i.e., finance, can affect foundation 
governance decisions, similarly to Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis that excess 
cash affects corporate decisions.
It should be noted, however, that an endowment is not entirely a choice 
variable for foundations. The cash cannot be eliminated by paying it to 
shareholders. The endowment is (at least in the early years of a foundation) 
determined by the legacy and the rules imposed by the founder.28 In 
addition, the local legislation may limit the use or the reduction of the 
endowment, and foundations cannot flexibly seek new capital by means 
of issuing securities, which necessitates building up financial buffer. As 
a consequence, the existence of an endowment, and/or its size, may not 
be fully interpreted as a sign of some peculiar motivation, or indeed a 
consequence of foundation management alone.
In spite of this ambiguity about endowment exogeneity, the size of an 
endowment has mostly been considered the consequence of governance 
in earlier research. A large endowment has been assumed to result from 
meager spending on charitable mission, which the prevailing governance 
allows. State regulation has served as a proxy for foundation governance, 
instead of genuine foundation-level governance data. In other words, the 
endowment is summarily assumed to be determined by the state-level 
regulation of non-profits: poor oversight by the regulator is associated 
with excess endowments, pointing to moral hazard in capital spending 
(note, however, that the concept of “excess endowment” relates the size 
of the endowment to the scope of the foundation and its spending. A large 
endowment is not necessarily an excess endowment). The use of the quality 
of the state-level regulation as a governance measure leaves the finer details 
of governance, such as the board and auditing, out of the analysis, and the 
causality between finance (and the accumulation of the endowment) and 
27 Ikäheimo, Puttonen, and Ratilainen (2011) argue for two types of control settings: 1) The 
company management has a strong power position. The market for corporate control has 
a disciplinary effect on a company’s management, though a company’s management may 
protect itself against this takeover threat by using provisions in the company’s bylaws; 
and 2) In case of long-term ownership that is concentrated, company provisions are set 
by the current major shareholders to protect themselves against takeover activities by 
outside investors. Thus the market for control is not a simple control mechanism for 
corporates, either.
28 In Finland, where our data originates, the change of foundation rules is feasible and 
stipulated by the law. The regulator comments that rules changes do happen, although at 
longer intervals than, e.g., in corporates.
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governance remains elusive. Foundations’ excess endowments have not 
been empirically shown to have been associated with the rational reasons 
for endowment building, such as building up a buffer for growth or economic 
distress (see, e.g., Brown et al. (2014), Fisman and Hubbard (2005), Core, 
Guay, and Verdi (2006)). This would suggest a moral hazard in endowment 
accumulation. 
On the other hand, endowment building can be a result of savvy financial 
management by the foundation, or of an excellent reputation among 
donors or customers. These factors do not hint to a moral hazard, but to a 
successful foundation (see, e.g., Weisbrod and Asch (2010)). We could also 
easily formulate a hypothesis that agency problems lead to a shrinking 
endowment while a good governance leads to a successful foundation – 
and to a growing endowment. Finally, there is also a survivorship bias in 
foundation data: mismanaged foundations disappear from the data in the 
long term, leaving no evidence about probable associations between some 
suboptimal governance model and a shrinking endowment.
Generally, we note that the assumed moral hazard in large endowments 
remains polemical. The existence of large free cash flow, or endowment, 
does not cause agency problems but creates an environment where they are 
more likely to materialize.29
In summary: foundations are by definition chests of funds. They do not 
have owners and hence no owner control. This creates an environment 
where the foundation management30 may seek to benefit from the 
endowment in other ways than through distribution. Immaterial benefits 
for the management may include increased power and standing in business 
life, perks or “quiet-life”31 . These moral hazards can lead to costs of 
suboptimal management, e.g., the inefficiency of work. However, we posit 
that a non-profit’s financiers may anticipate this, and they may seek to steer 
the non-profit towards a governance structure that mitigates such moral 
hazard.
Several points for further research arise from earlier non-profit 
governance studies: we need detailed agent-level information about 
individual non-profits in order to make stronger inferences about how 
they organize their governance. Based on such conclusions, we can better 
understand a possible source of moral hazard in non-profits. Our data 
provides foundation-level information about governance, which is, to 
our knowledge, the first large data set of individual foundations’ rules 
and provisions. Non-profit research also lacks a measure for non-profit 
competition to compare outside “market” control with internal governance 
29 Glaeser (2002) observes: “Indeed, given the weak nature of corporate control in non-
profits, perhaps the most surprising thing about non-profits is that they function as well 
as they do. Widespread looting of endowments is almost unheard of.”
30 We include a foundation’s board of directors in the overall management.
31 The notion of “quiet-life” was first presented by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) in the 
context of motivation of a company’s management. See also Giroud and Mueller (2010).
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control. In our study, we use the number of foundations operating in the 
same mission market as a proxy of competition for various resources. 
Finally, we need a plausible measure for governance quality to better 
understand if and how the quality of governance is associated with the 
financing and the societal performance of a foundation. For this, we develop 
a non-profit governance index that measures the concentration of power to 
the foundation board.
There are two relations of interest: What determines governance quality, 
and where does it matter? We clarify the difference between these two in 
Figure 1.
Determinants 
of governance
(1)
Governance 
quality (2)
Consequences 
of governance 
quality (3) 
Figure 1. The assumed flow of causality stemming from determinants of 
governance choices (1) to actual governance and its quality (2), and on to the 
consequences of governance and its quality (3). 
We proceed to develop our understanding of what constitutes a 
governance model and its quality in non-profits, in particular foundations. 
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4. Foundation Governance Index 
and foundation source of 
finance
Information about non-profits has remained scarce in economic research. 
In many countries the rationale for establishing a foundation is to have less 
reporting obligations and more privacy. Regulators do not collect financial 
information on all non-profits, or collect it haphazardly32 and produce 
few aggregates of the whole sector. To our knowledge about different 
legislations, non-profits are not obligated to follow IFRS-accounting, 
so their books may show historical, and not market, values of assets. 
Furthermore, in many countries the rules of non-profits may be available 
only by request from the non-profit, whereas in most countries corporate 
articles of association tend to be publicly collected and available. Finally, 
the data about investments of non-profits is almost universally unavailable. 
To study non-profits’ governance (rules), ant to it to financial or investment 
outcome is cumbersome and rare.
We benefit from a unique dataset of foundations and set out to assess 
governance in foundations. For that purpose we develop a governance 
index for foundations (FGI, Foundation Governance Index throughout 
this book). The index applies the logic of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s 
(2003) Governance Index for companies. FGI is a sum of foundation rules’ 
provisions that concentrate power to the foundation board of directors. 
Presence of such power-concentrating clauses is noted by 1 and absence 
by 0. Accordingly, the higher the FGI score, the more concentrated the 
decision power is at the board level in the foundation. The FGI measures the 
overall quality of governance in foundations because in our consideration, 
efforts to divide decision and oversight powers to more than one body 
create a surrounding that is more conducive to good governance. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) call for a similar division on powers: decision management 
32 Non-profit accounting differs from the general corporate accounting. This causes bona 
fide confusions and mistakes if collection and storing of non-profit financials is done in 
company registrars.
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and decision control should be in separate hands in corporates. Gompers 
et al. (2003) nominate the extreme corporate governance models the 
“Dictatorship” vs. “Democracy” ends of the spectrum33. Similarly, we call 
governance in foundations that have concentrated decisions powers to 
the board as the “All-in-one-hands” governance, as opposed to the “Open 
governance” of a foundation. 
One of the possible drivers for governance choices include a foundation’s 
financiers. In absence of owners, the regular financiers, be they donors, 
customers or the public sector, may exert power over how the foundation is 
administered. In order to investigate the effect of financing, we categorize 
foundations into four categories, based on their main source of finance: 
endowment income, donations, profit from operations, and support from 
the public sector. 
An endowment is the capital legacied or accumulated in the foundation. 
It may consist of tangible or financial assets that yield a regular return. 
This investment income is the main source of finance in many foundations. 
Donations are a commonly recognized source of finance for foundations. 
Donations may come from small streams of continuous campaigns or 
from substantial long-term donors. Some foundations operate a business 
to finance the mission34. They may sell sports club T-shirts, food in soup 
kitchens, operate a country club restaurant or a hospital. The public sector 
(state, municipality, city or such) financially supports some foundations. 
This phenomenon, a mixture of the second and the third sector, is 
explained by foundations’ non-dependence of civil service legislation and 
their resulting flexibility to carry out quasi-public tasks, compared to the 
often inflexible or politically supervised civil service. Another explanation 
for public sector foundations may be the need to secure long-term public 
financing to long-term projects, or to encourage private donations with 
matching public support35. Finally, many foundations finance their mission 
work with a combination of these sources. 
Our main assumption is that a repeated contact with outside financiers 
affects and has affected control mechanisms in a non-profit. Endowed 
foundations do not have a need to repeatedly seek outside finance. The 
continuation of their endowment finance is relatively certain, whereas 
33 Gompers et al. (2003) define: “Firms in the highest decile of the index are placed in the 
“Dictatorship Portfolio” and are referred to as having the “highest management power” 
or the “weakest shareholder rights”; firms in the lowest decile of the index are placed in 
the “Democracy Portfolio” and are described as having the “lowest management power” 
or the “strongest shareholder rights.” 
34 Note the difference between finance from operations versus operations conducted to 
realize charitable mission. These may look alike or even merge, for example in case of 
charitable hospitals which charge low service fees. But the difference exists in the case 
of a commercial hospital (operations=financing) whose profits are used to care for the 
homeless (=mission).
35 Recently the U.S. government pledged finance to a non-profit, the Trust for the National 
Mall, that will renovate the Mall in Washington, DC. The Economist (2015): America’s 
front yard.
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foundations financed in other ways are subject to repeated outside 
negotiating and monitoring, how light-handed or informal they may be. 
This assumption guides our hypotheses in this book.
We also test whether competition in the charitable market affects the 
governance model of a foundation. For that purpose we adopt Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2005) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) proposition that 
product market competition substitutes for governance.
4.1 Data on foundations and governance 
Our data comes from Finland which is a developed, small, open Northern 
European economy with a relatively short history of capital accumulation. 
The oldest foundations date from the early 1800s. There has been a 
Foundation Act from the year 1930 on, and a foundation register from the 
early 1930s36. In non-profit sector comparisons Finland is categorized as 
an average country both concerning the size of the non-profit sector as 
well as the growth of the sector (Anheier (2001)).  Table 1 summarizes a 
multifaceted appraisal of several European countries’ foundation sector. 
xx
xx
Scale
Small Medium Large
Growth
Low Austria, Belgium, 
France, Ireland
Medium Greece, most other 
central and eastern 
European countries
Britain, Finland, 
Germany
Switzerland
High Hungary Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey
Italy
Table 1. Foundation sector scale and growth pattern in European countries. 
Source: Table 7 in Helmut K. Anheier: Foundations in Europe: a Comparative 
Perspective, 2001, Civil Society Working Paper, London School of Economics and 
Political Science. “Scale” is a combination of five measures: Number of foundations 
per capita, foundations’ expenditures as a percentage of GDP, employment as a 
percentage of total employment, grants as a percentage of total revenue, and 
assets per capita in a country. High “Growth” is assigned to countries in which a 
larger portion (number) of the country’s foundations have been established after 
the 1950s and especially in the 1980s and 1990s.
Anheier (2001) classifies Finland among the Medium/Large foundation 
sectors, along with Britain, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Norway. 
The size of the foundation sector is assessed with five measures: the number 
36 Later in this paper we use interchangeably the words “non-profit” and “foundation”. Our 
data consists almost entirely of foundations. However, many of our findings apply to the 
non-profit sector in a wider sense. See Appendix 1 about the sampling of our data.
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of foundations per capita, foundations’ expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP, employment in foundations as a percentage of total employment, 
grants as a percentage of total revenue, and assets per capita in a country. 
The Finnish foundation sector has also grown rapidly after the Second 
World War. Anheier notes: “Britain, Finland, Germany and Switzerland 
are high-income countries with stable political systems. We can assume 
that the foundation boom of recent years is in large measure a function 
of political stability and economic prosperity, amplified by a more self-
confident middle class.”37 
Sinani et al. (2008) examine three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, all geographically, culturally, historically and 
politically close to Finland38) and their formal and informal governance 
mechanisms. The authors have collected evidence of the Nordic corporate 
governance environment and suggest the countries have a high standard 
of living, good quality of law enforcement, absence of corruption, good 
government services and freedom of speech. According to Anheier above, 
such an environment is a fruitful platform to a well-functioning foundation 
sector.
In addition to its representative scale and growth, the Finnish foundation 
sector does not possess pronounced, country-specific foundation mission, 
wealth or operational structures. Anheier (2001, pages 2-3) discusses 
particular characteristics of countries’ foundation population. He 
maintains that the following characteristics of foundations may cause 
difficulties in capturing a common set of institutions across the different 
countries and regions: where foundations come close to markets and 
change into economic actors primarily39; where foundations become 
instrumentality of the state; and where they are dynastic means of asset 
protection and control. We maintain that none of these settings is typical, 
dominant or even common in the Finnish foundation sector. Furthermore, 
Finnish foundations operate in fields that are the most common in other 
European countries, too40. 
Generally, the third sector has a redistributive role in society. The third 
sector emerges when there is sufficient wealth in society, combined with 
trust in the legal protection of legacied wealth and trust in the long-term 
consistency of - for instance - tax legislation. All in all, foundation sectors 
are the most developed and varied in developed countries. Finland belongs 
37 Anheier (2001), page 20.
38 Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, small countries in the north of Europe, 
form together the Nordic countries, which have wide political and cultural ties and co-
operation.
39 Some Danish foundations own a single majority stake in a listed company. In Switzerland 
and Luxemburg taxation treaties are related to the growth of the foundation sector. 
40 Education and research, Social services and Culture and recreation are the most popular 
missions in Europe as well as in Finland (Hopt and Hippel (2010), page 534). For mission 
categories see Table 2. 
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to the wealthiest41, the least corrupted42 and the most open43 societies in the 
world, so we suggest that our data can be considered a good representation 
of a foundation sector in a developed country. 
There were 2836 registered foundations in Finland at the end of June 
2014. The Foundation Register collects foundations’ rules and yearly 
financial statements. It also acts as a control body in case of fraud or 
irregularity. The Foundations Act of 1930 was redrafted during the years 
2011-2014 and a new Foundations Act entered into force in December 2015.
Data on Finnish foundations’ rules was obtained from the Finnish 
Ministry of Justice. The data was minutely collected by the Ministry’s legal 
experts as a background material for redrafting foundation legislation. It 
includes detailed information about 891 foundations’ objective or “mission 
industry”44, rules, the year of registration, details about administrative 
organs’ formation and powers as registered by the end of the year 2011. 
The sample is first randomly collected, then augmented with foundations 
that have taken part in the Ministry’s surveys – such cases tend to be large 
foundations. Data collection is explained in Appendices 1 and 2.
In addition to the governance details, the Ministry also obtained the 
foundations’ financial information for the years 2010-2012 from the 
Foundation Register. Financial information includes audited Balance sheet 
and Profit & Loss statements per foundation, according to the accounting 
method that the foundation uses45. We reviewed this database and screened 
financials to catch irregularities. Mistakes were corrected by checking the 
original filings in the registrar. Each of the largest two hundred sample 
foundations were checked against their own filing details, and market values 
of investments for the largest two hundred foundations were collected by 
hand. Fourteen largest foundations were also interviewed in order to get an 
overall understanding of the total allocation of their investments, as well as 
a more nuanced view of their investment strategies and governance. After 
these, we have comfort that the data reasonably accurately depicts the true 
financial positions in the sample. 
The most interesting feature of the financial data is perhaps the 
breakdown of foundation income into different income sources. Gross and 
net income from investments, operations, donations and from the public 
sector is presented. This allows us to categorize foundations based on their 
source of financing. Comparing with Fisman and Hubbard (2003) we can 
test endowed foundations against other types without using elaborate 
endowment intensity proxies. Furthermore, we may still calculate the 
41 See, e.g., http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries.
42 See https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results.
43 See https://index.rsf.org/#!/.
44 Classification is UN classification, International Classification of Non-Profit 
Organisations, ICNPO.
45 The foundations can choose if they mark investments to market or not, in which case the 
market values must be presented in the notes. See Appendix 2.
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endowment intensity and use it in within-group analyses to see if relative 
endowment size affects endowed foundations’ actions.
Foundation industry classification is based on the United Nations’ 
International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations (ICNPO)46. It 
has 12 non-profit “industries”, areas where charitable work is aimed at, no 
matter its method, financing or fiscal status. The sample foundations have 
chosen their industry classification by themselves when registering or 
updating their filings at the Foundation Register.
ICNPO-class description ICNPO-class
Number of       
foundations
Share  
of total
Culture, recreation 1 207 23 %
Education and research 2 232 26 %
Health 3 42 5 %
Social services 4 137 15 %
Environment 5 21 2 %
Development and housing 6 68 8 %
Law, advocacy and politics 7 20 2 %
Philanthropic intermediaries, voluntarism 8 29 3 %
International 9 17 2 %
Religion 10 22 2 %
Business and professional associations 11 56 6 %
Other 12 40 4 %
Table 2. The ICNPO-classification of foundations in the sample. This United 
Nations’ classification categorizes foundations on the basis of their mission 
market: where the charity operates. N=891.
Some notes are needed to understand these classes. The first class 
includes Sports, which draws much non-profit activity in all developed 
countries. Classes 1 and 2 are typically the largest in many countries: 
culture and scientific research are favorite missions. Classes 3 and 4 are 
separate here, whereas in other classifications hospitals and daycare are 
included in the same category. Class 8 includes organizations such as Plan 
(godparenting children in developing countries) or Ronald McDonald 
foundation (funding temporary lodging for parents whose children need to 
be in a central hospital for long periods). Class 10 is not large in countries 
with a defined state religion (as in many countries in Europe) and it typically 
represents small, off-mainstream religious beliefs; in the US, religious 
46 Other classification systems include National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) in 
the US and National Survey of Charities and Social Enterprises (NSCSE) in the UK.
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entities form the largest part of charitable giving47.
The sample foundations had the following financials. The total amount 
of assets owned by Finnish foundations was some EUR20bn and net assets 
some EUR16bn at the end of 2012. This includes all holdings: real estate, 
equity, debt, cash and operational assets. Over 70 percent of all assets are 
classified as Investments on the balance sheet. Wealth is very concentrated, 
with 77 percent of assets owned by the largest 50 foundations. At the other 
end of the spectrum there are numerous tiny foundations that we would call 
“Statue in Punxsutawney”- funds: a small endowment secures the upkeep of 
a small-town memorial.  Funds are kept on a bank account and no economic 
decision making is needed, be it regarding governance, investments or 
operations48.
Descriptive statistics of 
foundation sample
Mean Median Maximum S.D. Skewness
Balance sheet total 17 942 247 1 148 448 1 251 362 277 93 847 746 10.8
Endowment 14 600 945 660 331 1 241 705 957 86 846 657 11.6
Total expenses 3 263 240 168 179 403 864 183 16 434 228 17.9
Relative endowment
(endowment/expenses)
43 8 4 875 283 13.2
Total revenue 3 892 053 211 417 440 669 996 19 158 217 15.9
Donative income 340 865 0 199 677 201 6 744 158 29.2
Financial Investments 12 033 980 16 666 1 244 936 803 80 751 355 12.3
Table 3. The descriptive statistics of the foundations in the sample. N=891. Based 
on averages in the years 2010-2012 for each foundation. Balance sheet values 
are corrected to market values. Endowment equals balance sheet total minus 
debt. Expenses are the total of operations, funding, investment and extraordinary 
expenses. Total revenue is the total of investment, donative and business income 
plus support from the public sector. Financial investments include balance 
sheet items classified as long-term or short-term financial assets plus cash. See 
Appendix 2 for information about foundation financial reporting.
47 While investigating non-profit businesses’ market shares in different US states, 
Hansmann (1984) constructed a variable reflecting the ratio of philanthropic 
expenditures to personal wealth. He found that this variable was negatively related to the 
market share of non-profit businesses in the same state. Hansmann concluded that the 
reason must be gifts to religious institutions which form a large part of charitable giving 
but were not included in data. Religious congregations are not required to register with the 
IRS, and their share in the third sector may be overlooked in some non-profit statistics. 
Blackwood, Roeger, and Pettijohn (2012) report religious non-profits’ preponderance in 
the US (page 2 and Table 5).
48 Later in this paper we consider limiting our data to foundations with some level of 
economic agency decisions. Thus we would exclude foundations below a certain level of 
income or assets as the large number of diminutive cases may dominate the data.  
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5. Non-profits’ equity investment 
style
5.1 Foundations as owners of companies
Evidence about investment behavior is needed when regulators express 
worries about the functioning of the capital markets. The increasing 
index investing and continuing rise of asset management diminish owner 
activity. Calls are made to encourage direct shareholder monitoring and 
active shareholders49. Some investor groups seem to be short-term owners, 
but with which other groups are they compared? Evidence about various 
investor types is needed for discussion about investor type behavior. 
Nevertheless, we seem to lack empirical evidence about investor groups’ 
behavior (Derrien, Kecskés, and Thesmar (2014)). 
It often emerges from the public and scientific discussion that the 
main tool for improving the functioning of the capital markets lies in 
securing direct, diverse and competent owner monitoring in companies. 
To complement asset management industry’s growing50 ownership in 
corporates, we need investors whose motivations are diverse and differ 
somewhat from asset management’s motivations. This is necessary to 
safeguard the capital markets’ functioning in short-term market failures: 
trading will cease if all investors are equally motivated51.
We set out to investigate one distinct investor group, foundation 
investors, and prejudices regarding its investment style. It is singular 
in its characteristics and nature, and has not been examined as an 
49 See e.g., Kay (2012).
50 See Wong (2010) and French (2008).
51 This proposition is discussed in detail in the second essay of this book, Section 2.1.
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equity investor52. In most western countries it is common to believe that 
foundations are long-term investors who do not trade frequently. However, 
such characterizations have not been empirically confirmed.
5.2 Data on foundations’ equity investments
We complement our data on foundation characteristics, financials and 
governance with a second dataset of listed share ownership from Euroclear 
Finland53 for 872 foundations54. Out of these, 530 turned out to have had 
direct listed equity ownership between 2000 and 2013. The data includes 
the ownership of listed shares on the NASDAQ Helsinki –exchange on 31 
December 2000-2013, share prices and the industry category of the owned 
share and the issuer. The time period includes market extremes of the 
“techno bubble” in 2000-2002 and sub-prime crisis 2008-2009 but is not 
dominated by them as the time period extends beyond those time points. 
Not one share or industry value is dominant during the whole time period.
To measure foundations’ risk-taking policies and trading activity we 
choose three measures for their equity investments portfolio: deviation 
from the overall industry sector breakdown of the stock market; turnover; 
and changes-in-ownership -indicator. 
Active risk-taking is measured with Active Share, a ratio developed by 
Cremers and Petäjistö (2009). It measures a portfolio’s deviation from 
market index weights. We use deviation from the market index industry 
breakdown as our measure, that is, we measure portfolios’ deviations from 
the industry breakdown of the market index.
Examining turnover, we want to gain an understanding of the frequency 
of trading. We first measure the turnover of the equity portfolio as in 
Barber and Odean (2001)55. Turnover is the sum of values of all sales and 
acquisitions from/to the portfolio, divided by two, and divided by the value 
of the portfolio at the beginning of the period. Thus it is a ratio that relates 
trading to values traded and owned.
Secondly, we also develop a measure that neutralizes large relative swings 
in portfolios produced by measurement in values. To answer the question 
52 Many do not have any notion of non-profits as investors. The term “non-profit” seems 
a contradiction in terms for an investor group. However, the accumulation of wealth 
in foundations, endowments, funds and associations predicates their becoming active 
economic agents on the capital markets. Once active, their special nature affects their 
investment style.
53 The keeper of the book-entry settlements infrastructure in Finland. Euroclear handles 
all share transactions on the Nasdaq Helsinki exchange, as well as on smaller competing 
market places. All shareholdings are registered in this system, both for institutions and 
individuals. 
54 Data was obtained before the final 17 additions to the sample were made (see Appendix 
3). Two consolidated foundation-groups were dissembled into subsidiary units as the 
units were known to include significant shareholdings on subsidiary level.
55 See also Appendix 3.
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whether foundations typically are a long-term shareholder in companies, 
we develop a change-in-ownership –indicator. It takes value 1, if the 
investor’s position in a single share has changed more than 10 percent from 
previous year. If not, the indicator for that year is zero. By omitting values 
as a driver of the change measure, this indicator avoids the problem of not 
identifying stability in portfolios in which a few valuable stock ownerships 
change, but whose other – possibly numerous - holdings remain intact. 
With these three main variables we are able to present findings about 
foundations’ equity investment time horizon, diversification and within-
group variation among foundations. 
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6. Empirical results and 
discussion
The findings of this book about non-profit organizations as economic 
agents, including our proposed model to assess foundation governance, 
and our empirical findings on foundations’ investment style, make 
several contributions to our understanding of the economic behavior of 
foundations. 
Examining reasons for governance choice in our first Essay, empirical 
results suggest, firstly, that a foundation’s source of finance is associated 
with the concentration of decision powers in the foundation. Specifically, 
foundations that have to regularly approach outside sources of finance–
donors, public sector or customers– enjoy more external control and show 
less concentration of power on the board level than foundations that can 
finance their missions with capital income from an endowment. We also 
find that competition in the foundation’s charitable mission market is 
associated with a more concentrated governance model in the foundation; 
this indicates that competition, as an external control mechanism, replaces 
some of the need for openness in internal governance structures. 
When examining consequences of governance, we test whether openly 
governed foundations spend more on charity. We find that foundations that 
have less concentrated governance spend statistically significantly more 
on charitable operations than foundations with concentrated governance. 
However, in grant-making foundations this association does not emerge: 
governance is not related to the level of grant-making. We discuss if – 
regardless of governance - foundations are pressured to keep up competitive 
levels of grant-making because grants are easily observed and measured by 
the public.
Our Foundation Governance Index (FGI) model has policy implications. 
In absence of owners the regulator may be the only external control of 
foundations. The regulator should first understand what factors affect 
the quality of governance in a foundation. We maintain that the source of 
finance is one factor. Consequently, we suggest the regulator pay attention 
to sources of finance of the foundation, which is easily observable from the 
financial statements. Moreover, FGI can act as a measure for governance 
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concentration: we posit that the concentration of decision powers on the 
board level accentuates the moral hazard of less efficient use of charitable 
resources in foundations. We also note that this moral hazard has the 
strongest association with endowed foundations, and that competition 
among foundations, old age and large size of the foundation seem to 
mitigate the moral hazard. In practice, the regulator could rank registered 
foundations based on these observable facts and identify “increased-risk” 
cases for inefficiency or fraud. 
Furthermore, governments may consider setting some governance 
requirements for non-profits. Currently some countries (but not all) 
require some level of charitable spending in return for tax exempt status. 
The non-profit sector has argued that income and spending cash flows 
do not necessarily concur, rendering rigid spending targets non-optimal. 
In addition, the set spending levels can either be reached with creative 
bookkeeping, or they may turn out to be too high or low when business 
cycles change. Instead of setting direct spending targets, the regulator could 
nudge non-profits towards optimal behavior by requiring open governance 
provisions. These requirements would apply only to larger non-profits, but 
they could motivate the whole sector to improve transparency. 
In our second Essay, we argue for the need to understand the investment 
behaviour of various investor types, and present empirical evidence of non-
profits’ equity investment style. Overall, foundations are active risk-takers 
in the sense that they can carry concentrated equity risk by not diversifying 
towards the industry breakdown of the market index. Foundations turn out 
to be infrequent traders, with relatively low equity portfolio turnover. If they 
decide to own a stock for longer than one year56, they remain owner for 3.6 
years on average (in our 13-year sample period). In addition, the majority of 
their single shareholdings stay intact from year to year. Foundations do not 
adjust their positions frequently.
Foundation age and size are related to the equity allocation of foundations’ 
portfolios: older and larger foundations diversify more along the lines of 
the market index breakdown. However, only foundation age is statistically 
significantly associated with trading activity and foundation size is not. 
Older foundations trade less frequently than younger ones.
Our results confirm the belief that the investment behaviour of 
foundation investors differs from other investors’ behaviour, and forms 
its own identifiable investor type. This makes foundations a valuable 
complement to the capital markets. They bring long-term investment 
capability and risk appetite to markets which increasingly seek to avoid 
short-term malfunctions due to all investors behaving in a similar manner. 
As foundations are not subject to quarterly reporting obligations, and they 
do not need to signal about their financial success, they are relatively little 
constrained or motivated by short-term interests. This underscores the 
56 Our data includes only yearly observations which does not allow us to estimate shorter 
ownership periods than a year, or longer than 13 years; see Footnotes 224-225.
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balancing role of non-profit investors on the capital markets. 
As a result of our empirical findings, one investor-owner type is now 
somewhat better known, offering a reference point to other owner types57. 
We also contribute to the general non-profit research, where the main 
research focus has been in charitable work or in the behavior of foundations 
as sole owners of businesses, while the understanding of non-profits as 
economic agents more generally, or as pure capital markets investors, has 
remained almost non-existent. 
There are several policy implications of our research. Firstly, foundation 
investors enjoy unique investment time horizons and risk preferences that 
complement those of other investor types on the capital markets58. This is 
beneficial for the resilience of the capital markets especially in times of 
short-term shocks. Thus the regulators should understand and encourage 
foundations’ investment activities. 
Secondly and following from above, governments should consider tax 
rules or – more generally - the granting of charitable status to a foundation 
independently from the foundation’s investment activity. Regulatory status 
interpretations or tax rules should not limit trading or risk diversification 
efforts in foundations. 
In practice, the regulator and foundations alike should acknowledge 
investment operations as a basic function in charities. The general public 
should pay attention to the management of foundation assets as a part of 
the overall efficiency of a foundation. 
All in all, foundations merit research as economic agents. With their 
growing assets they act as owners of businesses and portfolios. They are also 
increasingly under scrutiny concerning the efficiency of their charitable 
work. In all these areas it would be useful to adapt some ways and means 
from the corporate world: how to find donors and report to them; how to see 
investing as a core function in a foundation; and how to measure efficiency 
and avoid obsolescence by way of transformations, as on the corporate 
market for control? In the following two Essays we engage in some of these 
discussions, and produce further ideas for future research of non-profits.
57 One constant endeavour in our research has been to find evidence about other investors’ 
trading or allocation activity, in order to be able to answer the question “trades/diversifies 
much – compared to whom?”.
58 Although some attention should be paid to the concern that the third sector’s motivation 
of eternal preservation of endowed assets may decisively differ from the market economy 
first sector value-creating motivation.
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WHAT DETERMINES A NON-
PROFIT GOVERNANCE  
MODEL - AND DOES IT MATTER?
Abstract
The association between the concentration of power in foundations’ 
goverance and foundations’ main source of financing is examined with 
a sample of 891 charitable foundations. Foundations are classified into 
four categories of source of finance, and a foundation governance index is 
constructed on the basis of provisions in the detailed rules of foundations. 
Endowed foundations are less openly governed than foundations financed 
by donations, by business operations or by the public sector. Other reasons 
for foundations’ choice of governance are also tested: a foundation’s age, 
size and the competition in the mission market are also associated with the 
governance choices of a foundation. Finally, the governance of operational 
foundations is found to be associated with their charitable spending. The 
research presents previously unavailable foundation-specific empirical 
data for the assessment of the root causes of governance choices in 
foundations, and renders practical implications to foundation oversight.
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1. Introduction to Essay 1
The governance of foundations differs fundamentally from the governance 
principles of for-profit corporates on three dimensions: (1) foundations do 
not have legal owners who could exert external control over the foundation; 
(2) without universal measures, such as profitability or stock market 
valuation, the efficiency of foundations is difficult to assess and compare 
externally; and (3) most foundations are established to exist in perpetuity59 
and are not subjected to any market for control. These factors create obvious 
governance problems as the guardians of a non-profit foundation will 
inevitably lack part of the external control, as well as checks and balances 
that for-profit corporates with legal owners enjoy. This also leaves non-
profit foundation governance to suffer from ample risk of moral hazard.
This paper focuses on the following two-fold research question. Firstly, 
(1) which foundation-specific elements explain the concentration of 
control in foundation governance? Addressing this question, we empirically 
investigate an extensive sample of 891 foundations in Finland, with data on 
the foundations’ detailed rules, financials, and other characteristics. We 
construct and develop a new index measure for the concentration of control 
in foundations, based on data on the rules. We then categorize foundations 
on the basis of their main source of income, to see if financing and exposure 
to outside control by financiers has an effect on governance. Secondly, (2), 
we examine the consequences of governance choices on the level of grant-
making or charitable spending.
Our proposed model makes several contributions to our understanding 
of foundations’ role in the economy. Empirical results suggest, firstly, that 
a foundation’s source of finance is associated with the concentration of 
control at board level in foundation governance. Specifically, foundations 
that have to regularly approach outside sources of finance–donations, 
59 For one seasoned view on foundation lifespan, see Bill Gates’ interview at Harvard 
University in 2012.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBHJ-8Bch4E, at 34-minute 
mark about life span. At 35.20 comment on extended lifespans: “…There would be some 
weird board, God knows what they would do.”
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public sector support or business income from customers–feature more 
external control (and less concentration of power at the board level) than 
foundations that can finance their missions with an endowment capital 
income. Secondly, we find that competition in the foundation’s charitable 
mission market is associated with less external control of the foundation. 
Finally, we test whether the quality of governance affects a foundation’s 
grant-making or charitable expenses and find that operational foundations 
with a more concentrated governance model spend relatively less on their 
mission operations than foundations with less concentration of decision 
power at board level.
We show a statistically significant relationship between a foundation’s 
reliance on outside sources of finance and its quality of governance, with 
endowment-financed foundations opting for a more concentrated model of 
governance. Our model has policy implications: regulators should note the 
sources of finance and foundations’ competitive situation when monitoring 
non-profits. In absence of owners the regulator is the only external control 
of non-profits.
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. We discuss earlier research 
in Section 2. We then discuss salient features of foundation governance 
in Section 3, especially pointing out differences to the governance of 
corporates. In Section 4 we present our data and develop measures for 
governance quality, foundation competition and sources of finance. In 
Section 5 we formulate our test functions and present empirical findings. 
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss findings and limitations to our conclusions.
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2. Earlier studies on non-
profit governance and its 
consequences
Non-profit governance research has not been wide. Main interest has 
evolved around endowment building. 
Hansmann (1990) gives a thorough consideration to university 
endowments and comments a wide variety of arguments justifying their 
growth. Hansmann notes that the “maintenance of an endowment is often 
viewed as an objective in its own right, rather than simply as a means to 
an end.” He suggests that the preservation or use of an endowment should 
be justified by a similar analysis that companies perform to decide on 
investments: money should be spent where and when it brings the most 
return. If the rate of return of preserving an endowment is higher than 
returns of an endowment used in a project today, endowment building is 
beneficial. However, if present investment yields are low it would seem that 
the use of endowment can be justified by many fruitful mission projects 
that can show a decent financial or societal return. Furthermore, time is 
of essence: the gain of finding a “cure for cancer”60 in this decade would 
surely be higher than saving endowments to seek such inventions in later 
decades61.
Fisman and Hubbard (2003) develop a measure of excess endowment and 
relate it to the state-level regulation of foundations. They find that American 
states with a better regulatory oversight of foundations are populated 
with more donation-intensive foundations. The authors interpret this as 
evidence that a more intense regulation mitigates the risk of endowment 
60 Or any other much-anticipated invention or operation.
61 This argument is the core rationale for Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s time-
determinate existence. The foundation will be closed when 20 years have elapsed from 
the death of the spouse surviving longer. Bill Gates comments that malaria (one of the 
focal projects of the foundation) should be cured in such a time period, and that next 
philanthrophic generations will have other objectives (Gates (2013)).
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building and/or expropriation by foundations, which in turn encourages 
donations. However, Fisman and Hubbard do not detect a direct relation 
between excess endowments and state regulation. 
Desai and Yetman (2005 and 2015) develop state-level indices of the legal 
and reporting rules facing non-profits and examine their impact on non-
profit behavior. They consider public and private charities separately62 
and find that stricter non-distribution constraints and reporting rules are 
associated with greater charitable giving and lower insider compensation 
in both groups. Further, they examine how non-profits inter-temporally 
smooth their expenditures and find that well-governed non-profits’ 
expenditures are more responsive to local adverse economic conditions 
than other non-profits’.  
Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006) examine the relation of excess endowments 
to several foundation characteristics. They investigate three possible 
predictors for a large endowment: 1) Foundation faces growth opportunities 
and holds excess money for that purpose, or 2) Strict monitoring 
environment allows for a large endowment without agency problems, or 
3) Moral hazard explains the amount of excess endowment. They find that 
mission-related spending is lower and management compensation higher 
for foundations with excess endowments, consistent with the agency 
suspicion. They also find excess endowments to be persistent over time and 
not related to growth or cash flow fluctuations.
Brown et al. (2014) examine moral hazard linked to university 
endowments. They find there is an asymmetric payout behavior in university 
non-profits: pay-outs respond to negative shocks in their spending, but not 
to positive ones. The authors note that university endowments have grown 
more rapidly than university expenditures, contradicting the hypothesis 
that endowments would be used to smooth the expenditures over time.
In many of the above studies an endowment is considered parallel to 
financial slack associated with the free cash flow in companies (Jensen 
(1986). Excess endowment is assumed to produce agency costs similar 
to free cash flow slack. In foundations the agency costs may stem from 1) 
less effort in the daily work of the management63, 2) tunneling of funds and 
benefits to the management, and 3) less effort to seek efficiencies by, e.g., 
merging or joining charities. This last efficiency cost is especially relevant 
as there is no market for control for non-profits: merging non-profits is not 
62 Non-profit types and classifications vary from country to country. In the US, the third 
sector bears some of the public sector responsibilities (Clotfelter 2012) and thus 
distinction between “public” and “private” is meaningful. In Europe, charities are 
considered “private”, although no similar distinction between private and public, as in 
the US, is used in most countries (even the French “Fondation Publique” does not bear 
the same characteristics as an American public charity). Furthermore, most of the 
American private charities (=private foundations) are grant-making foundations. In 
Europe, foundations typically have many modus operandi: a foundation can be either 
operational or grant-making. 
63 Here we include the board of directors into the overall management of a foundation.
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driven by investors who seek material benefit. 
However, the determinants of an endowment are summarily taken to be 
the state-level regulation of non-profits: poor oversight by the regulator 
leads to excess endowments. State regulation has represented foundation 
governance in research, instead of genuine foundation-level governance 
data. This leaves the finer details of governance, such as the board and 
auditing, out of the analysis. 
An excess endowment has also been used as a predictor of meager 
charitable activities, that is, of lesser societal performance. We discuss the 
direction of causality between determinants of governance, governance 
and outcome of governance in more detail in Section 3.1 and Section 5.
Linking outside control to internal decisions, LeRoux and Goerdel (2009) 
find that the competition for finance or for other resources motivates non-
profit management to safeguard the non-profit’s reputation by keeping up 
the service quality, albeit at the cost of sacrificing longer term funding or 
development. The link between governance and competition originally 
stems from Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2005) who tested competition’s effect 
on a for-profit acquirer’s performance, and more specifically Giroud and 
Mueller (2010) and (2011), who tested for-profit firms’ performance and 
returns against their governance. Both studies found that product market 
competition is a substitute for governance. Absent competitive pressure 
from the product market, weak governance gives rise to agency costs. 
Weak governance does not lead to higher agency costs in firms who face 
competition, when compared to strong governance firms. The “non-profit 
competition” is a much more elusive concept: foundations do not compete 
for market share, customers or for profits64. With this caveat in mind, 
we posit that in the non-profit world, Giroud-Mueller hypothesis could 
be tested on the resource market competition (as LeRoux and Goerdel 
have done), or mission-market competition: are there many competing 
foundations working on the same problem, and thus competing for the 
donors’ mission-specific funding and volunteering?
Several points arise from earlier governance studies: detailed agent-
level information about individual non-profits is needed in order to 
make stronger inferences about how non-profits form their governance. 
Based on such conclusions we can better understand the source of moral 
hazard in non-profits. We also lack a market-based measure for non-profit 
competition to compare outside “market” control with internal governance 
control. Finally, we need a plausible measure for governance quality to 
better understand how the quality of governance is associated with the 
societal performance of non-profits.
64 See more discussion about competition in Footnote 100.
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3. How are foundations governed?
Statutes of different kinds of societies determine the industry where the 
society operates, its administrative bodies, and procedures to change the 
statutes or close down operations. So much is true for both corporates and 
foundations. The differences are to be found in detailed provisions.
We summarize the main sections and provisions of both corporate and 
foundation articles of association in Table 4 below.
Rules' section In corporates In foundations
Name and industry Name, home and business 
sector
Name, home and  
purpose/mission
Share capital
 
 
Share classes and their rights
Share transfer restrictions
Rights to distributions
Original endowment
Right to accept donations
Administration
 
 
Annual General Meeting  
elects:
(Administrative board)
Board of Directors, elects
Management
Procuration rights
(Members)
(Administrative board)
Board of Directors and its 
committees
Management
Procuration rights
Closing of accounts and audit Accounting year
(AGM elects auditor)
Accounting year 
Which body elects auditor
Change of articles (decided by AGM) Which body decides
Closing down of operations (decided by AGM) Which body decides
Table 4. The features of corporate and foundation articles of association or rules. 
Obligatory clauses are bold-typed.
There are no shares or shareholders in a foundation65. Consequently 
the corresponding elements are absent in foundations’ rules. Whereas a 
corporation’s annual meeting of shareholders decides on auditor selection, 
on board composition, on changing the articles or on dissolving the company, 
65 Desai and Yetman (2015) note that the absence of owners and ownership influence allows 
us to examine the impact of rules (governance) alone.
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a foundation must assign those decisions to other organs.  Foundations’ 
only obligatory body is the board of directors. A separate management layer 
of a foundation may not necessarily exist, and the board may take care of 
the running of operations in a less active foundation. There are no rules 
attached to distributions, ownership or shares.
Thus the central agent is the board and we must adjust our principal-
agent setting accordingly. In corporate governance research the board 
is often assumed to hold interests that are aligned with the owners66 and 
the conflict of interest exists between the management and the board/
owners. In foundation setting the conflict exists between the officers of the 
foundation, be it the board or management, and the principal, the “owner” 
of foundation activity. Who are these owners?
A non-profit’s “owners” should be the final beneficiaries of the 
foundation’s activity, just as the shareholders are the residual claimants 
of a firm’s profits. Such beneficiaries have an interest in the efficiency 
and continuity of a foundation. By this definition the grantees or objects 
of mission are “owners”. They67 are, however, often not represented in the 
board of directors of a foundation and do not use their collective voice to 
influence foundations’ operations. Absence of such influence does not 
make the principal-agent conflict any less important.
On the other hand, those who provide financing to a foundation may be 
considered owners. The uncertainty about a non-profit’s revenues is clearly 
a concern for all non-profits (see Carroll and Stater (2008)). Financiers do 
not profit from distributions from a foundation, but they control its future 
ability to operate. “Future” is critical here: the future flows of finance secure 
the foundation’s motivation to govern openly. In many countries, founder 
control (in foundations) is considered equivalent to owner control (in 
corporates). This, however, neglects the crucial set-up: a founder has already 
donated and may use a foundation’s funds inefficiently, presenting a loss to 
the society which gives the foundation tax exemptions. In contrast, there is 
more money to come in the future from outside financiers. Finance must 
be negotiated from future donors, but not from the founder. Thus founder 
control is not a guarantee against monitoring problems. The best monitors 
are the ones who will repeatedly decide on financing68 the foundation’s 
mission: they regularly expose the foundation to outside scrutiny. Donors, 
customers of the foundation’s business operations69 or the state supporting 
the foundation can be considered such financiers. 
66 Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2011) even find that the board is a substitute to the market 
for control.
67 For example, the poor, the foreign, the disaster victims or soup kitchen customers.
68 Financing may be in form of donations, buying services or granting public funds.
69 Some foundations finance themselves by business proceeds from, e.g., health care service, 
sports paraphernalia, country-club catering or such. These businesses have customers 
who often patron such services in order to support the foundation’s mission. Customers 
have a repeated commercial relation with the foundation, and are not to be confounded 
with the foundation’s charitable beneficiaries.
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Ultimately the society can be considered the owner. In return for tax 
exemption the society expects general benefits from non-profits. Tax 
exemption is a form of financing for the non-profit. 
Our interest is in examining the conflicting interests and moral 
hazard between principals and agents in foundations. Even if grantees, 
beneficiaries, financiers or the society may be considered a foundation’s 
“owners”, they do not possess a formal position of control. The shift of power 
from owners to managers is in focus in corporate setting. For foundations, 
we focus on the concentration of power to the board70 and on an inherent 
lack of control by any other body, be it financiers or beneficiaries of the 
foundation. 
In our consideration, efforts to divide decision and oversight powers to 
more than one body would create a surrounding that is conducive to good 
governance. Fama and Jensen (1983) call for similar division on powers: 
decision management and decision control should be in separate hands71. 
Hopt and Hippel (2010) note about foundations: “The auditor is appointed 
by the board. This is a questionable arrangement, given that the auditor’s 
task is to monitor the activities of the board.”72 
 Gompers et al. (2003) nominate extreme corporate governance models 
as the “Dictatorship” and “Democracy” ends of the spectrum73. Similarly, 
we call governance in foundations that have concentrated decisions powers 
to the board as the “All-in-one-hands” governance, as opposed to the “Open 
governance” of a foundation. 
We try to see how much power is vested in one governance body alone. 
Concentrated power (even without financial repercussions) gives rise 
to moral hazard of substandard effort from the agents. In foundations, 
power resides at the board level. Thus we examine whether there has 
been any effort to mitigate the concentration of power to the board. We 
suggest that such effort would come from financiers of the foundation or 
from competition on the mission market. This is the main setting in our 
hypotheses in Section 3.2, and in our empirical tests in Section 5.1.
Corporate articles of association omit many foundation-type rules 
because decision structures in corporates are based on corporate law. 
A general meeting of shareholders decides on the dissolution of the 
company, on changes of the articles and on any other important decisions 
not otherwise delegated to other organs. In foundation rules the decision 
agent for such fundamental resolutions must be stated. Most often these 
70 The board is the only foundation body required by the law.
71 Pages 303-304.
72 Page 764.
73 Gompers et al. (2003) define: “Firms in the highest decile of the index are placed in the 
“Dictatorship Portfolio” and are referred to as having the “highest management power” 
or the “weakest shareholder rights”; firms in the lowest decile of the index are placed in 
the “Democracy Portfolio” and are described as having the “lowest management power” 
or the “strongest shareholder rights.” 
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decisions fall upon the foundation board, although the board may be 
subjected to some other administrative body or even outside authority.
As a final note, we repeat our discussion in the Introduction of this book. 
The moral hazard settings in foundations are not necessarily or even mainly 
related to an opportunity to materially benefit from the foundation, and the 
agency costs are not direct cash costs, but rather costs of inefficiency or 
motivations that are not in line with the foundation’s mission. Thus moral 
hazard may exist even in the altruistically motivated world of non-profits.
3.1 Time sequence, causality and effect 
Earlier non-profit governance studies have used the state-level regulation 
as a proxy for the quality of governance in foundations. The causality has 
been straight-forward: legislation affects agents’ choices (foundations’ 
or donors’), and the relevant research question is: given governance, 
how do non-profits behave? The only other causality possible would be 
to ask if foundations select or change their home state based on their 
own circumstances, thus: do some foundation characteristics affect the 
selection of governance environment? The data available has not been 
detailed enough to allow for a more nuanced causality discussion. If we 
are able to examine individual foundations’ rules, causality becomes more 
interesting. 
A necessary condition for causality is that the cause precedes the outcome. 
What is the lifecycle of a foundation and what is the sequence of decisions 
about foundation rules, finance and scope? At first thought the rules and 
governance model are decided upon the establishment of the foundation. 
Registering a foundation necessitates registering its rules and governing 
bodies. It would seem that the governance model exists first, and other 
facts follow. But a governance model is formed on the basis of the complete 
plan of the founder. Often the endowment capital arrives at the birth of the 
foundation, defining the financing at the start. Surely the planned financing, 
scope and operations have an impact on the first rules that are chosen. Thus 
the causality, at least at the beginning, seems ambiguous.
However, the life span of a foundation can be decades, even centuries74. A 
foundation may change its rules during its lifetime when its circumstances 
change: the operations may have grown, the foundation may have 
accumulated an endowment from successful investments, it may have 
attracted a large volunteer base or its reputation may have spread wide, 
prompting larger donations. All this may cause the foundation management 
to ponder on the appropriateness of the governance model. Anecdotal 
74 The oldest operating public charitable foundation is said to be the Cathedral Foundation 
in the UK which maintains King’s College in Canterbury. The foundation was set up in 
1541, during the period of dissolution of monasteries by King Henry VIII. Older private 
funds and trusts exist in many countries. 
What determines a non-profit governance model - and does it matter?
67
evidence from the regulator suggests that rules’ changes are indeed 
regularly registered to the foundation register, albeit at long intervals 
compared to corporates.
The rarity of rules’ change is due to slow change in foundations 
themselves. There are no mergers, takeovers or growth leaps. Even if 
foundations vigilantly ponder the need for change in governance, that need 
does not arrive fast.
An opposite assumption would be that foundation characteristics follow 
foundation rules. A foundation would adjust its sources of finance or 
competitive situation on the basis of its rules. This may be the case over the 
short term, but we doubt the plausibility of this assumption on the longer 
term. A foundation has every interest to change itself to accommodate 
opportunities in financing or operations that the outside world presents. 
The rules can be altered with an internal decision, the outside world hardly 
so.
During the lifetime of a foundation, the endowment may not be entirely 
a choice variable. The accumulated or legacied cash cannot be eliminated 
by paying it to outsiders. The endowment may be (at least in the early years 
of a foundation) determined by the legacy and the rules imposed by the 
founder. In addition, the local legislation may limit the use or reduction of 
the endowment, and foundations cannot flexibly seek long-term capital by 
issuing securities. As a consequence, the existence of an endowment, and/
or its size, may not be fully interpreted as a sign of some peculiar motivation 
or as a consequence of foundation management style. Along the same lines, 
it can be discussed if the rules are a choice variable for the foundation 
management: legislation may effectively limit rule changes or closing down 
the foundation. We return to this discussion in Section 4.1.
Many researchers into non-profit governance, referred to in Section 
2, do not clearly address the question of causality. Research in corporate 
governance typically examines if governance is related to corporate valuation 
or profitability. In an untypical vein, Aggarwal et al. (2011) investigate 
association between corporate ownership and governance. They find 
that foreign institutional ownership and institutions’ good home-country 
legal systems are positively related to the better governance of companies 
outside the U.S. They also test the effect of institutional ownership on the 
most relevant75 governance components and find that foreign institutional 
shareholding is positively associated with more shareholder-friendly 
board structures. Aggarwal et al. (2011) base their findings on a governance 
sample covering 5 years (2004-2008) which in our view remains relatively 
short period for a governance overhaul. They discuss causality and test it by 
using changes in ownership as predictors for changes in governance. They 
also test the reverse regression (governance attracts foreign ownership). 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) are able to confirm causality from certain changes in 
75 Components that are most studied by researchers and policy makers. Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) p. 22.
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ownership to better governance and not vice versa. Thus governance may 
prove to be an exogenous variable in suitable time series.
Unfortunately our data does not allow us to determine changes in 
governance over our sample period, as we have rules from one point of 
time76. Our financials cover only 3 years. Thus any dynamic changes 
cannot be observed. We lean on the evidence from Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
and assume that foundations’ rules and governance follow from foundation 
characteristics. 
Finally, we note that explanatory variables may work in a fundamentally 
different manner: they may either enforce change or replace change. The 
presence or absence of some governance characteristics may be due to such 
differing effects of explanatory variables. For example, Giroud and Mueller 
(2010) find that product market competition substitutes for governance, 
with governance having less association with company valuation in 
competed markets. External competition allows for less governance inside. 
However, we may equally find that, for example, demanding financiers 
require more governance, resulting in the source of finance being associated 
with more governance provisions. This is the opposite of substitution. 
The difference between the two effects is that some variables work from 
outside the economic agent, while some variables cause change inside 
the economic agent’s organisation. We highlight this difference in our 
hypotheses 1 and 2 in the next section.
3.2 Hypotheses
Based on the above discussion we formulate our hypotheses. The first 
two relate to the reasons for governance choices, and the last one to the 
consequences of governance (see Figure 1). We present the hypotheses 
here, while clarifying their exact wording in subsequent Sections 4.1 to 4.5 
where chosen variables are defined in detail.
We start with the moral hazard situation that we outlined earlier in 
Introduction, Section 3. According to Jensen (1986) moral hazard is severe 
in firms with large free cash flows. We apply this proposition to foundations 
and suggest that the endowment of a foundation can be considered similar 
to “excess cash” in corporates. Generalizing further from the corporate 
setting, we posit that the certainty of “cash”, i.e., certainty of sources of 
finance, affects foundation governance decisions – as Jensen (1986) posits 
that the availability of excess cash affects corporate decisions. Income 
from endowment (investment income) can be considered more predictable 
and easier to negotiate than donations, business income or support from 
76 The collection of rules from the online register database for almost 900 foundations was 
ongoing in the Ministry of Justice from January 2011 to November 2011. Thus the data 
reflects the situation at the time of collection for any specific foundation. 
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the public sector77. Given this, endowed foundations face less pressure 
concerning their governance system. Outside financiers are more likely to 
demand transparency, control structures or even a say on material matters 
of the foundation. Thus we formulate our first Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Foundations who finance themselves with income from 
endowment have a more concentrated model of governance than 
foundations which need to regularly seek financing from external 
sources.
Along the lines of Giroud and Mueller (2011) we also test the effect, if 
any, of the external control provided by competition on a foundation’s 
mission market. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2005) and Giroud and Mueller 
(2010) found that product market competition acts as a substitute for 
governance. Absent competitive pressure from the product market, weak 
governance gives rise to agency costs. But weak governance does not lead 
to higher agency costs in firms who face competition, when compared to 
strong-governance firms. Even if the non-profit competition is difficult to 
define, we propose that in the foundation world, we can replace product 
market competition with the mission market competition: are there many 
competing foundations working on the same problem, and thus competing 
for the financiers’ mission-specific funding? And if so, how does the 
competition alter governance in competing foundations?78
Two opposite competition effects can be considered. Giroud and 
Mueller (2010) find that external pressures substitute for governance. 
Intuitively, competition pressures guarantee a certain level of correctness 
in foundations, thus reducing the need for top-quality governance. If this 
hypothesis holds, competition drives foundations to minimize agency costs 
and operate efficiently without open governance structures. Competition 
may also force foundations to concrete administrative cost savings and 
getting rid of internal control layers.
On the other hand, unlike corporates, foundations are not constantly 
steered on the basis of their market share or profits. Competition affects 
corporates much more directly than it affects foundations. Thus it could 
be assumed that competition intensifies the need for quality governance. 
It may be a pre-requisite from donors or customers. If this hypothesis 
holds, competition forces foundations to have open governance structures. 
Foundations which have a better reputation and public image are best 
positioned to get intensely competed resources and projects. Foundations 
77 This assumption may not hold during times of financial instability when investment 
returns fluctuate. However, income from investments does not need to be yearly 
renegotiated, and counterparties are mainly the faceless market forces, in contrast to 
donors, customers and civil servants who decide on donations, business income or public 
sector support. All in all, it is plausible that foundations financed from endowment 
income face the least uncertainty and discomfort about financing.
78 See more discussion about this in Footnote 100.
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in competitive surroundings can be more motivated to install transparent 
and high-quality governance, because it reduces the risk of moral hazard 
and thus safeguards reputation better. 
Which of these effects exists in reality will be confirmed by our empirical 
tests by the sign of coefficients of the competition variable. We formulate 
our second Hypothesis in the same direction as observed in for-profit 
empirical findings. 
Hypothesis 2: Foundations in competed mission markets have a more 
concentrated model of governance than foundations in less competed 
markets.
And finally, to see if governance matters, we will test whether governance 
quality is related to societal performance. The society is the ultimate 
beneficiary of charitable work. In return for tax exemption the society 
grants to non-profits, society expects non-profits to use their wealth 
efficiently and beneficially. If good governance improves such performance, 
it is worthwhile to encourage good governance in the third sector. 
Linking governance, charitable work and financing sources, LeRoux and 
Goerdel (2009) find that non-profits who receive more government funding, 
compared to other sources of funding, engage in more advocacy operations. 
Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006) find that mission-related spending is lower in 
foundations with excess endowments.
We measure societal performance by charitable spending. It is admittedly 
a poor measure of the efficiency and impact of charities which are generally 
challenging to measure79. For lack of better measure, we employ the 
operational expenses of foundations to estimate the benefit to the society.
We suggest that the lack of control, through poor quality governance, 
leads to higher agency costs to society. These costs appear in form of lesser 
charitable spending in foundations with poor governance. Our Hypothesis 
is:
Hypothesis 3: The relative level of charitable spending is smaller in 
foundations with a more concentrated model of governance.
We develop these three hypotheses and the needed variables in more 
detail in Section 4. 
79 We would need to assess the importance and impact of various charities in society. This 
would require wide mission-specific skills (sociological, environmental, cultural and 
so forth) because the non-profit sector does not produce financial results by which to 
evaluate success, unlike the for-profit sector.
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4. Data and development of 
variables
In this section we describe the data available to this research and sample 
characteristics. The most important contribution of this essay is the 
development of foundation governance index which is explained in detail. 
We also form categories for the foundation source of finance, based on 
foundations’ financial statements breakdown. A measure for competition 
on foundation mission industry is also defined, as well as a classification of 
foundations on the basis of their operating model. Finally, we present size, 
age and industry control variables suitable for foundations.
4.1 Foundation governance index
To differentiate a board-centric governance model from one of lesser 
concentration to the board we formulate a measure for the concentration 
of power in governance. Again, we take lead from corporate governance 
studies and discuss differences in foundation environment and their 
impact on foundation governance. We also summarize the main non-agency 
theoretic and non-economic theories about non-profits, which we do not 
attempt to cover in this essay but note as plausible and likely complements 
to our economic explanations. We finally form suitable variants of power 
indicators for foundations.
4.1.1 Forming Foundation Governance Index
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (henceforth GIM) developed a 
governance index for corporates that captured the elements of restricting 
shareholders’ rights in favor of those of the managers’. GIM examined 
whether this balance of power had any relationship to corporate valuation 
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and operating performance80. They found that corporates with more 
shareholder-powered governance earned significantly higher returns on 
the stock market and had better operational profitability. GIM established 
that managerial moral hazard leads to agency costs to shareholders. 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) investigate the relative importance 
of governance provisions. Testing the relation between sample firms’ 
stock returns and their reduced “Entrenchment Index”, they find a similar 
negative association between entrenching rules and valuation as GIM did. 
Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) show that stock returns are related to 
vulnerability to takeover, determined by the absence of certain governance 
provisions.
Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2014) studied for-profits’ governance from 
the investor’s perspective. They find that large institutions, those holding 
a large number of portfolio stocks, and those investing in growth firms 
are more likely to be sensitive to corporate governance mechanisms. The 
authors suggest that such mechanisms may be a means for decreasing 
monitoring costs and may be more essential for firms with a high level of 
growth opportunities.
There have been opposite or contradictory views about the detrimental 
role of concentrating power to the management or the board. Ikäheimo, 
Puttonen, and Ratilainen (2011) find support for differences in the 
roles of anti-takeover provisions. If ownership is widely dispersed and 
company management has a strong power position, the quality of corporate 
governance relies heavily on external corporate governance, where the 
market for corporate control has a disciplinary effect on a company’s 
management. In such a case, a company’s management may protect itself 
against this takeover threat by using provisions in the company’s bylaws. 
This corresponds to the GIM assumption that power-concentrating 
provisions are detrimental, and the authors find empirical support that 
takeover provisions are associated with lower valuation. However, if the 
ownership is concentrated and the provisions are set by the current major 
shareholders to protect themselves against takeover, the provisions offer 
current shareholders a safe corporate governance environment to assist 
and to control managers and, in extreme cases, to replace management 
without the costly mechanisms of corporate. Current shareholders gain 
the benefits of long-term investments in company performance without 
the constant threat that these benefits would be taken over by outside 
shareholders. The authors show evidence that takeover provisions 
are associated with higher operating performance, in contrast to GIM 
80 GIM did not discuss efficiency of the stock market, but assumed a one-way effect from 
governance to performance which induced large changes in firm value (p. 109). Later, 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2013) discovered that the stock market had learned to 
correctly value bad governance, and that performance still had a relation to governance. 
Others also presented alternative reasons for the abnormal stock returns (e.g., Cremers, 
Nair, and John (2009) ). We refer extensively to GIM due to their pathfinding governance 
index use.
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assumptions. Sinani et al. (2008) find indications that in small countries, 
such as Scandinavian countries, trust, information diffusion and reputation 
mechanisms are active governance mechanisms that can replace other 
controls. Underperforming companies damage their reputation and this 
spills over to the personal reputations of the top management. Bad personal 
reputation has a negative impact on their future careers (e.g., eligibility for 
new jobs or board positions). 
Concerning non-profits, Beck, Lengnick-Hall, and Lengnick-Hall (2008) 
note that small non-profit organizations cannot always apply management 
theories and techniques developed for large, private businesses but limit 
their use to specific limited problems. This creates unintended negative 
results. One possible solution to this dilemma is adoption of bundles of 
practices instead of singling out suitable methods. This resonates with 
general corporate governance bundle theories that suggest the existence of 
equifinality in governance choices: that several different combinations of 
governance provisions may lead to an equally beneficial governance system 
(see, e.g., Aguilera and Jackson (2003)). 
Finally, there are non-agency theoretic explanations for non-profit 
governance models. Kanter and Summers (1994) apply organizational 
theory to non-profits, noting that non-profits face dilemmas about how 
to monitor the “doing good”. In organizations with abstract missions 
(rather than that of the pursuit of profits), effectiveness criteria may 
become substitutes for goals. The lack of feedback from clients is another 
disadvantage for many non-profits. Additionally, financial setbacks may 
help non-profits to rally more donations, in contrast to for-profits who 
have a clear interest to avoid financial distress. Davis et al. (1997) develop 
the stewardship theory of management. They note that the application of 
control does not imply that all agents’ decisions will result in increased 
wealth for principals; it implies only that the managers are more likely to 
strive to get outcomes favoured by principals. There are many reasons other 
than poor motivation for agents’ failing to deliver this for their principals 
(e.g., low ability, lack of knowledge, and poor information). According to 
Davis et al. (1997), agency theorists are not as concerned with these failings 
as they are with those resulting from motivational (i.e., agency) problems. 
Goldschmid (1998) discusses regulating governance of non-profits. He 
argues that the tax exemption granted to non-profits is a legitimate public 
policy concern, but the society needs to avoid excessive control of non-
profits in order to encourage talented individuals to serve on the non-profit 
sector. Goldschmid calls this “fairness to those who are willing to serve”. He 
also notes that proper enforcement should improve governance practices 
more than increasing regulation. Rose-Ackerman (1996) asks what the 
links between human motivation and organizational structure are. She 
considers altruism, organizational form, and market structure affecting 
structures. Organizations may operate differently depending upon the 
motivations of employees, managers, and customers, or upon competition 
the non-profit faces. Young (2000) suggests that the model of co-existence 
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between the public and the non-profit sector explains the regulatory and 
governance environment of non-profits. He defines three separate models 
of co-existence: non-profits (a) operate independently as supplements 
to government, (b) work as complements to government in a partnership 
relationship, or (c) are engaged in an adversarial relationship of mutual 
accountability with government.  Bebchuk and Roe (1999) and Roe (2003) 
examine developed economies and their corporate governance models. They 
find that there have been various paths to the current governance models 
in different countries. Political systems, history, structure of economy and 
institutions affect the governance model. The researchers acknowledge 
that various single components can lead to an equally beneficial local 
governance models. Venable, Rose, Bush, and Gilbert (2005) conduct six 
multimethod studies of non-profit stakeholders to define the role of brand 
personality in non-profit organizations. Current and potential donors 
ascribe personality traits to non-profit organizations and differentiate 
between non-profits on the basis of the organizations’ personality. Non-
profits form their structure to gain the best personality in competition for 
donors’ time, money, and in-kind goods or services. 
It is also important to consider the effect of costs: the more organs, control 
and hierarchy a foundation has, the more it incurs costs. There may also 
be costs of information acquisition: the board has the best information to 
decide on rules changes or closing down the foundation. Placing important 
decisions in external hands may cause extra costs and increase the risk of 
unfortunate decisions. Furthermore, there may be moral hazard in external 
control, e.g., when outsiders can choose costly providers and benefit from 
such patronage. Thus the choice of concentrating power to the board may 
sometimes be optimal. The benefits of an open governance model with 
external control must be weighed against the disadvantages of such model. 
Adapting GIM method, we develop an index for foundation governance 
(Foundation Governance Index, FGI). Two main questions emerge when 
comparing with GIM: First, what are the corresponding elements for 
power-concentration in the rules of foundations?  And second, what would 
be the measure for governance outcome, comparable to the corporate 
performance81 measure? We leave the second question to be addressed in 
Section 5.3.
Most of GIM’s index elements relate to share rights, which do not exist 
in a foundation. The shift of power from owners to managers is in focus 
in the corporate setting (GIM). Following the discussion about non-profit 
“owners” in Section 3, our focus are the elements that concentrate power to 
the foundation board. In absence of owners there is no comparable shift of 
power but rather a concentration of it. Any effort by a foundation to mitigate 
the concentration of power to the board is assumed to reduce the likelihood 
of agency costs resulting from the foundation’s governance model.
81 In GIM, “performance” referred to both the company’s stock market returns and company 
profitability.
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Which are the clauses that concentrate power to the board? We continue 
by choosing relevant rules from our foundation rules data. There are no 
voting rules or clauses pertaining to a change of control. On the other hand 
there are strong powers to alter the rules and to close the foundation.
4.1.2 Relevant foundation provisions and factors affecting 
their adoption
We select provisions whose existence in some form is required by law (see 
Table 4) and that increase the board’s power and/or decrease external 
control over the board. This, we posit, is in line with the GIM motivation 
of “adding one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights 
(increases managerial power).” 82 We adopt the assumption that a limited 
number of provisions are able to convey the concentration of power to 
the board, and that we consequently do not need all detailed provisions of 
foundations’ rules in our index. We base this assumption on subsequent 
research of GIM index which originally included 24 provisions.
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) investigate the relative importance 
of GIM components and start by reducing the GIM index to six components 
that have drawn substantial opposition from institutional investors 
because of their shareholder power entrenching nature. Bebchuk et al. 
further justify this choice by their own analysis and by interviews with 
M&A practitioners. They find that the eliminated 18 GIM components 
are not correlated with stock returns. Thus the six chosen components 
largely drive the documented negative correlations that the provisions in 
the articles of association have with firm valuation and stock returns in 
1990-2003. Bebchuk et al. note that reducing the components reduces noise 
and facilitates future research into what matters in governance. Ikäheimo, 
Puttonen, and Ratilainen (2011) discuss the number and importance of 
various types of provisions in companies with or without large blockholders 
and construct a Nordic governance index with nine provisions that are 
most commonly used83. Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2014) define a model 
where all governance variables are defined so that smaller values capture 
“better” governance. Five main provisions that concentrate decision power 
82 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) p. 114.
83 Ikäheimo, Puttonen, and Ratilainen (2011) argue for two types of control motivation: 1) 
The company management has a strong power position. The market for corporate control 
has a disciplinary effect on a company’s management, but a company’s management may 
protect itself against this takeover threat by using provisions in the company’s bylaws; 
and 2) In case of concentrated long-term ownership and lesser management power, 
company provisions are set by the current major shareholders to protect themselves 
against takeover activities by outside investors.
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to foundation board level emerge84:
 Yes %
Board self-nominates 387 43 %
Board nominates auditor 578 65 %
Board decides about rule changes 629 71 %
Board decides on closing the foundation 599 67 %
No organ above the Board 690 77 %
Table 5. The prevalence of main provisions in the sample foundations’ rules. 
N=891.
It is worthwhile to consider whether there may be an internal, opposing 
efficiency rationale for the inclusion of the above power-concentrating 
provisions. We have discussed the effect of costs on these rules choices: 
the more organs, control and hierarchy a foundation has, the more it incurs 
costs. This is, in general, against the very ideal of frugality in non-profits. 
Similarly, there may be costs of information acquisition: the board has the 
best information to decide on rules changes or closing down the foundation. 
Placing such important decisions in outside hands may cause extra costs 
and increase the risk of unfortunate decisions. Having an external party 
choose the auditor but not pay the fee may be seen as a slight, new moral 
hazard: eager outside governors may enjoy patronizing the finest and the 
most expensive audit firms. All in all, we do not know which process of 
choosing external control (auditor or administrative organs) produces the 
most severe agency problems: while avoiding one agency cost a foundation 
may create another85.
84  In line with Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Ikäheimo et al. (2011), we examined if some 
components are more significant than others. Unfortunately, there are no stock returns or 
valuation variables with which to measure the importance of components in foundations. 
We rely on analyzing the components’ appearance with other rules, their association 
with our results and components’ explanatory power, and finally we consider notes from 
interviews with foundations and the regulator. After having interviewed 16 foundations 
and having studied the prevalence, the significance and co-appearance of rules, we noted 
that the use of many provisions was arbitrary: the behavior of foundations who had a 
voluntary provision and those who did not could be exactly the same. The Ministry of 
Justice collected 13 different types of provisions, including voluntary ones. Some of them 
were deemed to be insignificant to our research question, e.g., “Board can hire personnel” 
or “Board designs yearly action plans”. Three factors, “board approves the accounts”, 
“board decides on strategy” and “no limit to board tenure” had little differentiating 
power in our sample. In only 21 foundations the board decides on strategy (or, perhaps 
more accurately, it is written in only 21 foundation rules explicitly that the board decides 
on strategy). Only 48 foundations have limited the tenure (successive memberships) of 
the board members. And in more than 80 percent of foundations the board approves the 
yearly accounts. After these considerations we included the final five provisions: three 
obligatory provisions and two descriptive provisions whose effects on operations are not 
open to interpretations.
85  See also Footnote 7 about the agency paradox.
What determines a non-profit governance model - and does it matter?
77
With these caveats in mind, we maintain that in the continuous business 
of running a foundation year-on-year, and in the Finnish legal and regulatory 
environment, the lack of control on the concentrated power of the board 
presents the most common moral hazard in foundations. 
We start building a governance index by adding one point for every rule 
provision that increases the board’s powers86. All provisions may not have 
an equal impact on the power balance, but all have some impact. Thus our 
index can be considered ordinal and even a scale variable. We keep the 
additive order as “0=open, 5=concentrated” as it is intuitive if one keeps in 
mind the five power-concentrating provisions.
We obtain the following frequencies for a FGI that has values from 0 to 5:
 
Chart 1. The frequencies of the Foundation Governance Index ranks. N=891. 
We henceforth use the five-element FGI as our main dependent variable, 
unless otherwise stated. Note that FGI scores have 6 levels, from 0 to 5.
Gompers et al. (2003) nominate the extreme corporate governance models 
the “Dictatorship” vs. “Democracy” ends of the spectrum87. Similarly, we 
call governance in foundations that have concentrated decisions powers to 
the board as the “All-in-one-hands” governance, as opposed to the “Open 
governance” of a foundation. 
Another evident question about the rules choices in foundations is: are 
there any external reasons for adopting certain rules? Do laws, taxes or 
86  Which we consider here tantamount to “managerial power” in GIM.
87 Gompers et al. (2003) define: “Firms in the highest decile of the index are placed in the 
“Dictatorship Portfolio” and are referred to as having the “highest management power” 
or the “weakest shareholder rights”; firms in the lowest decile of the index are placed in 
the “Democracy Portfolio” and are described as having the “lowest management power” 
or the “strongest shareholder rights.” 
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costs dictate the choice of rules? 88 We study how Finnish foundations’ 
governance choices are associated with other foundation characteristics 
and choices. For these associations to be interesting, the choices of rules 
made by the foundations should be voluntary and not dictated by some 
overriding outside factor such as legislation or taxation. Furthermore, it 
should be possible to change the rules. Thus, it is worthwhile to discuss 
the legislation and the taxation of foundations during the period that our 
empirical data covers.89 
Finnish legislation on foundations does not limit or guide the choice of 
rules. The adoption of outside control elements is well-regarded, but the 
law requires all foundation board members to act solely in the interest of 
the foundation and its mission (and not in the interest of some outside 
party).90 Similarly, the soft code legislation, i.e., the self-regulation by the 
foundations’ association, emphasizes both the benefits of control as well 
as independence of board members. The board members’ fiduciary duty 
extends to keeping the rules and the mission updated, in case the mission 
of the foundation has become obsolete91. Changes of rules do occur and the 
regulator’s approach has been pragmatic towards justified changes92.
In order to gain tax-exempt status, a Finnish foundation has to fulfil 
three conditions: 1) it operates for a public good, 2) its beneficiaries are 
not limited to a certain group, and 3) parties involved in the operating of 
the foundation do not receive benefits in form of, e.g., distributions or 
excessive salaries. The tax-exempt status is granted by the tax authority, 
based on an overall assessment that also includes the evaluation of the 
scope of charitable expenses and accumulation of endowment over the 
long term (Suvikumpu (2016)). It is notable that there are no specific 
precedents or legal interpretations that would preclude or limit the use of 
some governance methods by the foundations. For instance, a foundation 
88 In some countries there may be more restrictive legislations concerning the choice of 
rules, rendering the governance choice more limited. There may also be laws stating that 
leaving important decision powers to other organs than the board may risk infringing 
on the autonomy and legal personality of the foundation. In such environments a more 
concentrated governance choice may clearly be optimal for foundations. In Finland no 
such risk exists, as evidenced by the 201 foundations in our sample that had an outside 
organ above the board.
89 The empirical data is from the period when the old Foundation Act was in force. The Act 
dates from 1930 and was fully renewed in the years 2011-14. The new Foundation Act 
entered into force on December 1, 2015.
90 This paragraph is based on an extensive interview with Mr. Markus Tervonen, Senior 
Adviser at the Ministry of Justice of Finland, Law Crafting Department, Private Law Unit. 
He is responsible for drafting and developing the Companies Act and the Foundation Act 
in Finland. 
91 Suvikumpu (2016), Hohti and Kilpinen (2010).
92 Discussions with the regulator and the Council of Finnish Foundations reveals that the 
typical stickiness of some rules exists in Finland, as in other developed countries: the 
change of a foundation’s purpose must be very carefully motivated and must follow the 
original charter’s lines of thought. The interpretation of the founder’s will is not easy, 
especially if one tries to assess how a benefactor might think a century later.
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may keep its board intact for decades, cede many decision powers to outside 
parties such as the founder’s relatives, or even have a determined lifetime 
without risking the tax exempt status. The only decisive factors are the 
three listed above.93 
Another factor that may affect governance choices is costs. Our All-
in-one-hands model of governance is less costly to a foundation: there is 
only one governance organ, the board, that can efficiently decide on audit, 
rules and who gets elected to the board. The Open-governance model 
would include other organs that chose board members and an auditor, and 
generally represented checks and controls over the board. It is evident that 
the direct costs (money and time) for concentrated governance model are 
the lowest. However, the financial risks can remain uncontrolled if there 
is only minimal control. The choice of governance model then becomes an 
optimization between costs and risk control. 
Ability to carry costs would seem to be a function of foundation size. Larger 
foundations have better resources to carry the costs of open governance, 
and they have more reason to invest in open governance, because larger 
scope increases risks. We will confirm in Section 5.1 that foundation size 
is statistically significantly associated with governance model, suggesting 
that larger foundations have better resources to afford a more open 
governance with several controlling bodies. We discuss this in Section 5.1, 
below Table 11. The same observation is made even within one foundation 
sub-group, the Endowed foundations, further corroborating the belief 
that regardless of a foundation’s financing base, an open and more costly 
governance structure is more justified in large foundations.94  However, 
controlling for size in all our empirical tests, we are able to maintain that 
the choice of rules is an independent choice by the foundation.
The diversity of combinations in the rules of foundations in our Finnish 
sample suggests that the legislation did not dictate foundations’ choices of 
rules and provisions. Although some pairs of rules tend to appear together, 
the majority of combinations of rules seems discretionary (see footnote 
114). We incline to think that our sample foundations can legally make 
various choices of rules, and that there are no obvious optimal choices 
of rules due to the local legislation. In order to avoid attaching too much 
importance to single rules’ choices (because they could be a result of some 
regulatory pressure), we also test our data with only extreme cases, where a 
foundation has categorically, in most of its rule choices, opted for an “open” 
governance vs. for a concentrated governance (see Section 5.1, binary 
logistic regression in Table 14).
93 Finland differed from many other European countries in the EU project to create a 
”European Foundation”. In many European countries, the charitable status is linked to 
an exhaustive list of acceptable public-good missions. In Finland, the mission does not 
affect the evaluation of a charitable, public-good status. Only the public availability of the 
mission benefits is considered when deciding about the charitable status of a foundation. 
See also Footnote 185 later in this book.
94  See Sections 4.1 and especially 4.2, Table 15 for within-group testing.
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Finally, optimal governance is a question of lawmaker’s beliefs. It can be 
argued that a merited board will have the strongest motivation to control the 
foundation and keep it focused on the mission. Having outsiders to decide 
on various matters in the foundation only complicates governance and at 
worst allows for mission drift. The basis of this thinking is that the boards 
are so carefully screened and the nomination represents such responsibility 
that the board is likely to possess, from the set-up, superior ability and 
integrity to steer the foundation, and does not need outside control. For 
instance, Sinani et al. (2008) examine three Scandinavian countries and 
their formal and informal governance mechanisms. The authors find that 
trust, information diffusion and reputation have an important governance 
role in such “small world” environments. Furthermore, they posit that 
reputation becomes even more a powerful factor in firms or industries 
where a greater relative weight is placed on reputation – as the case is for 
the non-profit sector. If these factors, such as reputation, are strong enough 
to overcome control concerns, then a simple, concentrated governance 
model may prove to be optimal.
Having defined our main dependent variable, the quality of governance, 
with our Foundation Governance Index FGI, we proceed to categorize 
foundations based on their source of financing. 
4.2 Foundation source of financing
We return to our discussion about who might be considered the owners 
of a foundation. In Section 3 we suggested that financiers are in control 
of a foundation’s continued existence. Different sources of finance may 
present varying levels of external control to the foundation, which may lead 
to differences in governance (see, e.g., LeRoux and Goerdel (2009) about 
financing a foundation with donations versus government funding). 
We posit that financiers anticipate the consequences of the lack of control 
and require mitigating structures in a foundation. According to GIM the 
agency costs95 come through some combination of inefficient investment, 
reduced operational efficiency, or self-dealing in corporates. Foundations 
may slip into decreasing grant-making or declining investment in the 
foundation’s operational capacity. A foundation’s financiers try to mitigate 
moral hazard by influencing foundation governance. Thus we assume that 
a foundation’s source of finance is associated with the governance choices 
of a foundation. 
To understand the foundation finances we examined their sources of 
income in their profit and loss accounts. According to the Finnish GAAP, 
foundations report (among other things) in their profit and loss statement 
95 GIM hypothesis I. The other hypotheses relate to other causality routes that show up in 
results or stock market valuation, and are thus not relevant to the foundations’ case. P. 
131.
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the following items: 
1. Operations: revenue, costs and net income
2. Investment activities: revenue, costs and net income
3. Donative activities: revenue, costs and net income
4. General support received (=public sector support)
5. Total net profit for the period
6. Grants made. 
We analyze all foundations based on their different sources of income: 
investment income, donations, profit from operations, or support from the 
public sector in 2010-201296.  We use the average for 2010-2012 for each 
relevant item. We then look at 
a) Net income (gross income less costs) from four main income 
sources for each foundation, and their share of the total net 
income of the foundation.
b) Gross income from four main income sources for each foundation, 
and their share of total revenues of the foundation. 
We classify each foundation after having considered both a) and b). Most 
cases show clear reliance on one main source of finance, but some have 
several sources. We emphasize the alternative a) but in our sample period 
the net income may be negative and we have to qualitatively consider both 
gross and net income streams to decide which form of income keeps the 
foundation going concern97.
We then categorize all foundations into one of four categories: Endowed, 
Donative, Operative or Public sector98.
In most cases the structure of finance is very clear: one type dominates. 
In donative foundations there is often some investment income and some 
operative foundations receive public sector support, too. Classification is in 
such cases made to the highest income category.
96 See Appendix 2 for a summary of foundation financial statements form.
97 See also illustrative example about sustaining income definition in Appendix 2.
98 “Operative” should be interpreted here as “receiving substantial positive income from 
operations”, and not to be confused with operational foundations which carry out their 
mission with own employees (that is, not through grant-making). “Donative” means 
substantial income from donations. Category “Public sector” means substantial support 
from public entities, not to be confused with the fact that all foundations are included in 
the private sector in national statistics.
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Main source of income No of foundations Share of total
Endowed 465 52 %
Donative 114 13 %
Operative 205 23 %
Public sector 107 12 %
Table 6. The main source of income for foundations in the sample. N=891. Based 
on the relative share of total income in profit and loss statement, average for 
2010-2012 (see Appendix 2).
We present median incomes from four sources of finance, as well as other 
descriptive financials, for the main four finance categories in Table 7:
Balance 
sheet, 
market 
values, euro
Investment 
net income, 
euro
Donations, 
euro
Operational  
profits, 
euro
Public 
support, 
euro
Expenses, 
euro
Endowment/
Expenses, 
avg 2010-
2012
Endowed 1 033 196 31 330 0 -26 961 0 81 599 14.68
Donative 385 348 548 21 542 -14 426 0 61 442 5.72
Operative 2 604 211 -2 469 0 72 931 0 1 287 466 0.91
Public 
support
979 815 192 0 -177 300 202 666 920 319 0.67
Table 7. Median income from different income sources in four income type 
classes, total balance sheet, expenses and relative endowment in four types of 
foundations. Balance sheet values are corrected to market values. Expenses 
include the total expenses of operations, funding and investments as well as 
extraordinary expenses. Relative endowment equals balance sheet total less 
debt, divided by total expenses. All financials are calculated from averages over 
the years 2010-12 for each foundation.
Table 7 shows average financials for our four types of foundations. 
Endowed foundations’ investment income is the highest (highlighted with 
coloring). Donative foundations have the highest donations. It is natural 
that for all other categories the operational profits are negative: mission 
work is not meant to be profitable. In operative foundations profits are, 
however, supposed to bring in financing. Operative foundations show 
large median values for balance sheet (they typically have to own tangible 
assets to carry out the mission, such as housing, theatres, hospitals or soup 
kitchens). 
The high number of small foundations can be seen in Endowed and 
Donative foundations’ expenses: the median absolute expense is lower than 
in operative and public support foundations. Expenses are high in Operative 
foundations because they run a business to finance mission; despite high 
expenses, operative foundations also carry a positive operational profit. 
Note that these figures are medians. The high skewness of the sample 
(the concentration of wealth and revenue into a handful of foundations) 
makes averages uninformative. Furthermore, our typology is not clear-cut: 
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many endowed foundations do receive donations, too, and many donative 
foundations possess a sizable endowment99. Thus there may be some 
ambiguity in income averages calculated for the whole groups.
We now come back to the moral hazard between foundation financiers 
and foundation governors. We reiterate our assumption, presented in the 
Introduction of this book, that repeated contact with outside financiers 
affects control mechanisms in a foundation. Endowed foundations do 
not need to repeatedly seek outside finance because they have “their own 
money” and receive yield to finance their operations. This can be seen 
in Table 7, where the investment net income for Endowed foundations 
is large compared to other types of foundations. Endowment per yearly 
expenses is comfortably above 14 for Endowed foundations, while it is 
close to 6 for Donative foundations and below 1 for other foundations. 
Donative foundations spend donations over a longer project period, and the 
seemingly high “endowment” may include money that is already earmarked 
to be used up. Thus donative foundations do face the need to seek financing 
regularly, if they have worthwhile charitable projects in horizon. Repeated 
outside financing is a form of outside control that affects and has affected 
the quality of governance; this assumption guides our hypotheses in this 
book. In Section 5 we will use the source of finance as the main variable 
explaining a foundation’s quality of governance. 
We now proceed to another explanatory variable for foundation 
governance: competition. 
4.3 Competition on the mission market
As discussed in Section 2 and 3.2, Giroud and Mueller (2010) suggest 
that product market competition substitutes for governance in corporate 
world. LeRoux and Goerdel (2009) extend this proposition into non-profit 
environment and suggest that competition for non-profit resources affects 
non-profit behavior. They find a nonlinear relation between the level of 
competition in the non-profit’s resource environment and the frequency of 
organizational advocacy. At lower levels of competition, non-profits reduce 
their advocacy activities and turn their attention inward to focus on the core 
mission. However, when levels of competition in the resource environment 
approach extremely high levels, non-profits increase advocacy, most 
likely in an effort to help protect the organization’s future funding base. 
LeRoux and Goerdel measure competition with a 0-to-4 scale that includes 
competition from non- and for-profit organizations in the same area. 
The non-profit competition is an elusive concept that cannot be 
99 Categorization was made on the basis of the largest income source. The hybridity of some 
foundation types (especially between endowed and donative, and then between operative 
and publicly supported) can be seen in our discussion on regression results in Tables 11 
and 12.
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conclusively defined by this essay. Previous research has taken several 
views on non-profit competitive pressures. Hines, Horwitz, and Nichols 
(2010) discuss the nature of non-profit competition. “The virtue of markets 
is that they provide a forum for competition, and as Adam Smith and every 
subsequent thoughtful observer has noted, it is the competition, rather 
than the profits, that generates the benefits we associate with markets.” 
Competition for resources such as employees, board members, capital, 
premises or raw materials, as well as for the best grantees and projects, 
affects non-profits’ behavior. Rose-Ackerman (1996) notes that “a nonprofit 
organization can survive only if it can attract money and customers”, lining 
non-profit competition closely with for-profit competition. Lakdawalla 
and Philipson (2006) identify tax exemptions as the only competitive 
difference between non-profit and for-profit producers in the so-called 
“mixed industries” (where both non- and for-profit providers compete). We 
conclude that non-profit competition is not as clear to define as for-profit 
competition, but competition can be assumed to affect non-profits in a 
similar manner as it affects for-profits. 
Money can also be competed among foundations. Donors and the public 
sector carefully choose their charities. However, there are two shortcomings 
in restricting one’s attention to only money: Firstly, competition about 
money happens only between foundations that have to seek money regularly. 
The basic setting in this thesis is that there are endowed foundations 
who do not need to compete for money. Thus a major part of our sample 
foundations would not face competition, if competition were deemed to 
be only about money100. Secondly, there is competition about employees, 
projects, grantees, raw material, board members, visibility and so forth. 
Many of these can be much more decisive competition for foundations than 
100 The number of competitors in the same mission industry is clearly a somewhat rough 
measure for real competition that a foundation faces. To test pure money measures, we 
examined how much donation and public support money was available in each ICNPO 
mission category in the years 2010-12 in total and per foundation in the category, and 
compared this measure of competition (for money) with our original measure, the number 
of competitors. There can be two philosophies about the effect of money: the more there 
is money available in total in a foundation’s mission industry, the more competition there 
will be. Or: the less there is money available per foundation in a foundation’s mission 
industry, the more competition there will be. We tested both of these only-money-
philosophies’ variables with the tests conducted in Section 5.1. We also combined them 
with our original variable, number of foundations. The first philosophy indicated that 
competition would be a complement to governance, whereas the second philosophy 
corroborated our finding that competition is a substitute for governance. Some of the 
other tested money measures did not produce statistically significant associations with 
governance. The measure that combined our original measure (competitors) with the 
total available money measure produced statistically significant results and corroborated 
our original findings about competition being a substitute for governance. In this essay 
we kept the original competition measure, the number of competitors, as our variable, 
because it can be assumed to capture not only competition for outside finance, but also 
for employees, projects or grantees. In addition, it is clear from our limited discussion 
and tests that the chosen philosophy about how money relates to competition should be 
carefully tested and justified with theory.
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competition about donations. 
We test whether the competition in the mission market has a bearing 
on foundation governance. We measure competition in the foundation’s 
industry by the number of foundations operating in the same ICNPO industry 
category101. The number of competitors in each category is presented in 
Table 2, varying between 17 and 232. The presence of many foundations 
working with a similar mission diminishes the probability of receiving 
donations, public support, volunteer work and mission-knowledgeable 
employees. In addition to this, foundations may face competition for best 
mission-related projects or best researchers as grantees. 
As discussed in Section 3.2, competition may either substitute governance 
or force foundations to have open governance structures. Reputation is 
important to all non-profits. It may be the rationale why non-profit status 
is adopted and it mitigates several costs due to information asymmetry102. 
Most non-profit treatises deal with the direct agency costs due to unknown 
service quality. In case of governance, if consumers understand the 
indirect agency costs related to poor governance, governance can be seen 
a contributor to a foundation’s reputation. Moreover, the pressure for 
impeccable reputation may be stronger for foundations as they have few 
other measures of performance or success.
We formulated our testable hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) on the basis of 
the first assumption: that competition substitutes for control. The correct 
assumption may be detected in the sign of the regression coefficient in 
Section 5.
4.4 Control variables
We add variables to our model to control for foundation-specific 
differences in governance choice. Child and Grønbjerg (2007) argument 
for the use of foundation characteristics such as field of activity, size and 
age as explanatory variables for foundation behavior. Core, Guay, and 
Verdi (2006) observe that there are differences among mission industry 
categories (ICNPO) in endowments, program expenses and compensation 
and that controlling for industry variation is important. Desai and Yetman 
(2015) control for industry effects, size and revenues. In our sample we 
observe similar differences in age, wealth, revenues and competition (see 
Table 8 below) and also deduce from anecdotal evidence that, e.g., housing 
101 A direct consequence of this definition is that industry and competition variables will 
correlate perfectly. Thus they cannot be used in the same regressions. However, industry 
is a dummy variable whereas competition is a scale measure, indicating the availability of 
alternative similar non-profit causes.
102 See discussion on rationale for third sector in Introduction, section 2. Reputation and 
non-profit status mitigate information asymmetry between customers and producers. 
See also seminal work on reputation and quality by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and on 
growing importance of reputation in Ben-Ner (2002).
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foundations have a fully different character from business advocacy 
foundations.  We believe these differences are likely to present foundation-
specific fixed effects on our independent variable, the quality of governance.
We use foundation age, industry103 and revenues104 as our control variables. 
These are expected to alter the dependent or independent variables, but 
are not of substantive interest to our hypotheses under examination. If 
excluded from the model and if they have a non-zero covariance with one or 
more of the independent variables of interest, their omission could bias our 
ordinary least square regressions’ results for the effect of our independent 
variables of interest. 
However, if our control variables are correlated with our independent 
variable they may also be a consequence of it. The inclusion of control 
variables that may be influenced by our independent variable (the quality 
of governance) may lead to endogeneity problems where the regression 
coefficient in an ordinary least squares regression is biased. However, if 
the correlation is not contemporaneous, then it may still be consistent. We 
maintain that good governance may lead to higher age and revenues, but they 
are not codetermined; governance model is formed over time (Δ age), and the 
growth of a foundation (Δ revenues) may slowly start to increase pressure 
to alter governance model (see our discussion on causality in Section 3.1). 
Our analysis is not a time series analysis so we present no structural model. 
We posit that at most, age and revenues may be endogenous over a long 
period of time, but exogenous in our one period model. Foundation industry 
variable is in our view fully exogenous: it is decided at the establishment of 
the foundation and almost never changed105.
Foundation age is calculated from the year of registration to the 
foundation register. The register was established in 1930, and many existing 
foundations registered then. However, we have corrected all known older 
cases to their correct, older establishment date. This information was 
collected from the foundations’ internet pages. 
In Section 3 we noted that either grantees or financiers can be seen as 
a foundation’s owners. Along this analogy, the mission industry can act as 
a proxy for the nature of the grantee-owner: the grantees’ characteristics 
are similar in one mission industry group. For instance, grantees (or 
beneficiaries) of Social services can be considered less vocal in a foundation’s 
governance than beneficiaries of Business foundations. Typically, research 
103 In “Industry” we adopt a term familiar from corporate world. It applies well to the third 
sector because it distinguishes between the final “customers” of the operations, not 
method of financing or other characteristics. As in Child and Gronberg we mean “…the 
field of activity the nonprofit primarily operates …”. We may refer to it also as “mission 
industry”.
104 We use foundation revenues as a size indicator because balance sheet items correlate 
strongly with the Source of financing –variable.
105 As there are no mergers or restructurings of foundations, they do not present avenues for 
changing the mission (e.g., industry clause) of a foundation. An administrative change of 
foundation rules, especially the mission clause, are typically cumbersome processes.
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grantees are represented in foundation boards, whereas international help 
recipients are not (groups 2 vs. 9). This thinking – “recipients are the true 
owners of a foundation” – would allow us to use the mission industry as 
an ownership proxy and discuss the implications of both competition and 
“ownership” to the governance of foundations.
To summarize descriptive characteristics of our data we present Table 8 
with financial, competition, governance and age characteristics of the 891 
foundations, grouped by the foundations’ mission industry.
Table 8. The descriptive statistics of the sample foundations. N=891. Age is 
measured at the end of 2012. Revenues and Market Value of Balance sheet are 
category averages of each foundation’s average for 2010-2012. The source of 
finance is determined case-by-case, based on the share of total revenues or of 
the net profit of each type of finance. These relative shares are calculated with 
the average values for 2010-2012 of each item. See Appendices 1 and 2 for 
classification and detailed foundation financial reporting. Competition is a scale 
factor obtained from the number of sample foundations in each ICNPO-category. 
FGI is Foundation Governance Index, a measure of the concentration of decision 
powers to the foundation board, as explained in Section 4.1.1. A higher FGI 
indicates governance that is concentrated to the board, instead of a more open 
control structure. FGI takes values 0 to 5.
DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS
Foun-
dation 
age
Revenues Market value of  
Balance sheet Source of finance
Com-
petition FGI
Foundation's 
mission 
industry
Mean
years
Mean Mean Median Endowed Donative Operative
Public 
sector
Number Mean
N euro euro euro Count % Count % Count % Count % of found.s
Culture and 
Recreation
207 36 3 580 110 33 712 420 403 809   106 23 36 32 30 15 35 33 207 3,34
Education and 
Research
232 39 4 976 778 21 258 143 2 357 450 152 33 27 24 27 13 26 24 232 3,40
Health 42 33 9 260 374 15 201 164 3 113 652 20 4 5 4 14 7 3 3 42 2,76
Social  
Services
137 32 5 064 959 12 893 904 2 439 150 36 8 11 10 74 36 16 15 137 3,05
Environment 21 19 627 217   2 090 113  473 032   10 2 10 9 1 0 0 0 21 3,95
Development 
and Housing
68 36 4 412 132 25 347 109 2 765 941 23 5 4 4 35 17 6 6 68 3,15
Law, advocacy 
and politics
20 35 429 271   4 466 335  369 515   14 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 20 3,00
Philanthropic 
Intermediaries
29 43 2 483 726 6 796 367  1 018 638 18 4 5 4 4 2 2 2 29 3,93
International 17 22 993 311   1 618 445  915 447   5 1 2 2 2 1 8 7 17 2,94
Religion 22 44 3 369 050 3 647 263  2 050 651 11 2 6 5 4 2 1 1 22 3,45
Business and 
Unions
56 47 339 740   4 831 526  328 793   45 10 4 4 5 2 2 2 56 3,05
Other 40 27 616 988   4 752 736  365 163   25 5 2 2 6 3 7 7 40 2,53
891
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Table 8 shows little variation in the average age of foundations. Business 
foundations have on average been founded much earlier (average age 47 
years) than environmental or international foundations (19 and 22 years). 
It seems that all types of foundations are being currently established as 
their average age does not vary much from category to another. 
The large difference between the average and median values of financials 
highlights the concentration of wealth in the third sector. At the end of 
2012, the largest 100 foundations possessed some 87 percent of the sample 
foundations’ wealth. At the other end of the spectrum there are numerous 
small foundations whose economic activities are almost insignificant. We 
use log-alterations for our financial variables to smooth the skewness of 
data.
4.5 Operational model 
In our tests investigating the effects of governance choices (Hypothesis 3) 
we need to analyze a foundation’s expenses. These are determined by the 
foundation’s operational model. 
The foundation method of accomplishing its mission is close to the “asset 
structure” used as an explanatory dummy in Cremers, Nair, and John 
(2009). A foundation’s operational model affects the nature of its expenses. 
Foundations can carry out their mission in two ways: by making grants (to 
research, arts, sports etc.); or by working on the mission with their own 
employees (helping the poor, keeping up a museum, cleaning environment 
with volunteers). 
Grant-making foundations may grant dozens of millions every year, 
but have minimal expenses to do the grantee selection (or they have a pro 
bono selection board). It could be said that grant-making foundations have 
largely “outsourced” doing good: it is done by grantees. 
Operational foundations produce their charitable services themselves: 
they employ workers and administer volunteers, they use materials and 
they incur administrative expenses to organize reporting. Thus their 
expenses are fragmented and higher on most accounts. 
The bookkeeping line “operational expenses” recorded in our data 
includes both grants and (tangible) charitable operational expenses. Project 
personnel salaries or materials, as well as monetary grants are recorded 
in a similar manner as operational costs106. Nevertheless, the amount of 
grants is also separately reported and typically highlighted in foundations’ 
106 There is debate among accounting scholars if grants should be treated in book-keeping 
as distributions, and not recorded on the profit and loss statement as expenses. This 
would however undermine the distinctive character of foundations as entities without 
distributions. Furthermore, the decision of either operating “hands-on” or through grant-
making (“outsourced hands-on”) should be administratively neutral to foundations.The 
argument does, though, correspond to our suggestions in section 3 about the beneficiaries 
being a foundation’s owners.
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communications, whereas other operational charitable costs are not, 
maybe because they are fragmented and difficult to analyse. Somewhat 
illogically, the general public seems to like a large amount of grants, but not 
a large amount of soup kitchen salaries.
To account for this difference in the nature of operations, we classified 
all sample foundations into “grant-making” or “operational”, based on 
their grant-making activity in 2010-12107 (absolute and relative to their 
net assets). The classification is used by foundations themselves108 and 
there seems to be agreement about these two foundation types being very 
different by nature. Table 9 shows the breakdown of our sample foundations 
into grant-making and operational ones. 
Method of accomplishing 
mission
Number of foundations
Endowment / Expenses 
from averages in 2010-
2012, median for the class
Grantmaking foundation 426 13.38
Operational foundation 465 1.64
Table 9. The classification of sample foundations by the foundation’s method of 
accomplishing mission, and median endowment intensity in the category. 
Assignment to either grant-making or operational foundation class was made after 
considering the foundation’s grant-making activity in 2010-12 (absolute amount 
and relative to net assets). Endowment intensity is the foundation’s average in 
2010-12 of the market value of the balance sheet less debt, divided by the average 
of expenses in 2010-12. N=891.
Grant-makers typically have a large endowment and are predominantly 
in ICNPO-categories 2, 5, 8 and 11. Table 9 reports the median endowment 
per expenses of these two types of foundations, showing that endowments 
are higher in grant-makers and that they are predominantly endowed 
foundations109. Thus our “Operational model”-variable will be somewhat 
correlated with both the source of finance and the purpose of the foundation. 
We use this variable only to test our Hypothesis 3 in Section 5.3.
107 In all our analysis, we have the sums, medians, averages and the original numbers for 2010-
12 available. This reduces the risk of extraordinary years affecting our classification. 
108 For instance, in the U.S. there are large associations and lobby groups for “Grant-
making foundations”. See http://www.geofunders.org/ or http://foundationcenter.org/
grantmakers/ .
109 The inverse of Endowment/expenses –ratio of 13.38 is 7.47 percent, suggesting 
that grantmakers would distribute approximately the returns of a moderately risky 
investment portfolio as grants. However, a small number of grant-makers has other 
income in addition to endowment income that is also distributed as grants and that does 
not accumulate into endowment funds. Our ratio of Endowment/expenses is to be taken 
as illustrative only.
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5. Empirical results
Having extensively explored the particulars of the foundation sector 
we are ready to turn to reasons of governance choice: what determines a 
foundation’s governance quality? 
Determinants 
of governance 
quality 
Governance 
quality 
Figure 2. The causality from determinants of governance to governance quality.
We formulate generally: 
Governance quality =  
β0+β1 (variables affecting governance choice) +  
βk (control variables) 
(1)
As elaborated in Section 3 and 4, the source of finance or competition 
variables may increase or mitigate governance moral hazard. The control 
variables are foundation age, size and industry. 
5.1 Relation between foundation source of finance, 
competition and governance
We first note the mean FGI for each group of foundations, based on their 
source of finance (see Section 4.2 and Footnote 98):
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Average Foundation 
Governance Index per 
foundation type FGI Mean N
Endowed 3.47 465
Donative 3.45 114
Operative 2.96 205
Public support 2.53 107
   
N  891
ANOVA F-value 9.276  
ρ <0.001  
Table 10. Average Foundation Governance Index (values 0-5) scores in four 
foundation categories, based on the source of finance. N=891. 
There seems to be a statistically significant association between sources 
of finance and governance. Endowed foundations score highest on FGI, 
indicating that Endowed foundations’ boards are on average more powerful 
than boards in foundations financed by other means. Foundations that 
receive support from the public sector are the most openly governed, 
followed by foundations financed by operations (business). Reasons for 
this may be that the public sector is by its nature more vigilant about the 
uses of public money, or that it is legally obligated to set more controls to 
the use of public money. Operational foundations must please customers 
every day, which may induce more transparency in order to build a good 
reputation. Donative foundations would seem to be in a similar position 
as operational foundations, as donative foundations must constantly keep 
donors happy. However, this may be slightly mitigated by the fact that some 
large donors have access to better information than a fragmented customer 
base in operational foundations. Donors may build their relationship to 
the foundation on personal trust, allowing thus a more concentrated and 
cost-efficient governance structure than in operational and public sector 
foundations.
To test the relation between the quality of governance, the source of 
finance and some control variables, we regress FGI as follows. The choice 
and description of these variables is detailed in Sections 4.1. - 4.4.
GI = β0+ β1 Source of finance category of a foundation + 
β2 foundation age + β3 foundation size + 
β4  (foundation mission industry  
or competition intensity in the mission industry)
(2)
The choice of suitable regression model necessitates an analysis of our 
outcome and explanatory variables. Our outcome, the level of FGI, is a 
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rank-ordered ordinal variable 110. The primary characteristic of ordinal data 
is that the numbers assigned to successive categories of the variable being 
measured represent differences in magnitude: our FGI level 1 means less 
concentrated governance than level 4, and level 5 means more concentrated 
than level 4. Numbers representing successive categories coincide with 
meaningful directional differences. 
Given the above, we apply ordinal logistic regression to our Equation (3). 
Logistic analyses for binary outcomes (in our case: “does the foundation 
have a FGI below level 3 or not?”) attempt to model the odds of an event’s 
occurrence and to estimate the effects of independent variables on these 
odds. The odds for an event is a quotient that conveniently compares the 
probability that an event occurs (“foundation has a FGI above 2”) to the 
probability that it does not occur. When the probability of event happening 
is greater than the probability of not happening, the odds are greater 
than 1.0; if the two outcomes are equally likely, the odds are 1.0; and if the 
probability of happening is less than the probability of not happening, the 
odds are less than 1.0. 
To examine the impact on the odds of an independent variable, such as 
foundation source of finance, we construct the odds ratio, which compares 
the odds of scoring at least a certain level of FGI for different categories 
of the source of finance type. An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates that the source 
of finance variable has no effect on the odds of having a certain level of 
FGI111. Small values of the odds ratio (< 1.0) indicate that the odds of having 
a higher level of FGI are smaller than the odds of other categories of that 
variable having a higher FGI. The opposite is true for values of the odds 
ratio that exceed 1.0: such categories of the explanatory variable have a 
higher probability of scoring higher levels of FGI.
The odds ratio is a measure of association that describes how the risk of 
belonging to a certain level of FGI changes with the explanatory variables. 
The regression estimation is done by maximum likelihood estimation. The 
estimates maximize the likelihood of obtaining the original data. The logistic 
model of odds ratios is developed through a nonlinear transformation of the 
outcome, meaning that the method does not require a normal distribution 
of the error terms, as does ordinary least squares estimation.
The nature of our data fits the description of ordinal outcomes and 
categorical explanatory variables, but a discussion of their ordinal nature is 
necessary.  There is a clear ordering of FGI categories (4 is less concentrated 
than 5, and 1 is less concentrated than 2 to 5). It may be discussed whether 
FGI is even interval: change from FGI level 3 to 4 is strictly as large a step 
toward concentrated model as a step from 4 to 5. In rough investigations 
this is plausible. In a more detailed analysis we note that FGI consists of 
elements that may not be equal in their effect. It may be that not only the 
110 Our description here follows main points of O’Connell (2006), pages 10-13.
111  Note that the explanatory variable’s reference category will have an odds ratio of 1.0 and 
other categories’ odds are compared to that category.
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sum of FGI elements is important, but also which components make up 
the sum. In extreme, three rules (FGI level 3) might be considered as much 
power-concentrating as a combination of four somewhat lighter rules. 
Furthermore, there may be equifinality in governance choices so that 
some provisions either substitute or complement other provisions. This 
discussion would necessitate a larger investigation into differences in the 
effect of each rule, if any, or discussion on complementarities of rules112. We 
could also discuss if any specific combination of the components affects the 
outcome. In the scope of this paper we adopt the neutral approach that all 
components of FGI are equally power-concentrating and their effects on 
the governance quality are separable113. 
Table 11 reports the results of an ordinal logistic regression (OLR), as our 
dependent variable (FGI) is an ordinal categorical variable with 6 possible 
outcomes (levels 0 to 5), and two of our independent variables are nominal 
categorical (the source of finance, mission market industry). OLR estimates 
the odds of being at or below a given FGI category, versus the categories 
above. The model simultaneously considers the effects of our independent 
variables across the possible consecutive cumulative splits of outcome: at 
or below FGI=1, at or below FGI=2, etc. It is assumed114 that the explanatory 
variables have the same effect on the odds at all levels.
112 For a discussion on complementarities in governance, see, e.g., Gillan, Hartzell, and 
Starks (2003), Aguilera et al. (2008).
113 We have, however, conducted an analysis of co-appearance of provisions in our sample 
foundations’ rules and regressed our outcome and explanatory variables on the presence 
of each provision. Although inconclusive, the analysis indicates that there are pairs 
of rules that appear together in over 90 percent of the cases (Board amends rules – No 
administrative bodies above the board; and Board amends rules – Board decides on 
closing of foundation) and a dozen pairs that appear together in 80 percent of the cases. 
Similarly, there are provisions that appear together only in 40 percent of the cases (Board 
self-nominates – Board tenure is limited). Furthermore, some individual rules have a 
stronger association with our other variables than do other rules. 
114 The proportional odds assumption, discussed later in this section.
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Determination of Governance Index  
Ordinal Logistic Regression
A B C
Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig.
Endowed 2.327 <0.001 2.271 <0.001 2.214 <0.001
Donative 2.200 0.001 1.772 0.020 1.555 0.081
Operative 1.369 0.140 1.528 0.049 1.457 0.093
Public sector 1.000  1.000  1.000  
Competition intensity   1.062 0.110  
Ln of Foundation age   0.666 <0.001 0.657 <0.001
Ln of Foundation revenues (size)   0.922 <0.001 0.911 0.001
Foundation mission industry dummy no  no  yes 0.011*
N 891  891  891  
Cox & Snell 0.029  0.087  0.108  
Nagelkerke 0.030  0.091  0.113  
Table 11. The results of an Ordinal Logistic Regression of Foundation Governance 
Index as a function of the source of finance, foundation age, foundation size 
and mission industry or competition intensity. The source of finance reference 
category is the last category: foundations financed by the public sector. The first 
column includes results from a simple regression of the source of finance on FGI. 
The next column shows the result from the regression including source of finance, 
competition intensity and natural logarithms of foundation age and foundation 
average revenues in 2010-12. Competition intensity is measured as the number 
of foundations in the same industry. In the last column, we replace the competition 
intensity with a foundation industry dummy. Industry categories are as defined 
by the United Nations’ International Categorization of Non-profit Organizations, 
ICNPO. As the competition intensity is determined by the number of foundations 
in the same industry, the competition factor and industry dummy cannot be used 
in the same regression function. *contrast Wald test result significance.
We start by examining the source of finance type as the only explanatory 
variable for FGI (first block A in Table 11). We then include Competition as 
an explanatory variable, and include some control variables in the center 
and right hand blocks noted as B and C.
We present the odds ratios for our explanatory variables at different 
levels of FGI (Exp β). In the first simple regression, the odds of Endowed 
foundations having a higher FGI score was 2.327 times that of Public sector 
foundations. The odds for Donative foundations was 2.200 times that of 
the last category, and for Operative foundations the odds were 1.369 times. 
We can conclude that Endowed foundations have a higher probability of 
scoring higher FGI, followed by Donative foundations, and then Operative 
foundations. Foundations financed mainly through public funds are the 
least likely to score high FGI. 
In block B with Competition, Age and Revenues, we confirm our 
conclusions for different types of foundations. Competition seems to 
slightly increase the FGI (odds 1.062); however, this result is not statistically 
significant (p=0.11). The odds above 1 indicate that foundations facing more 
intense competition are less openly governed. Our proposition (Hypothesis 
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2) - that outside competition substitutes for, rather than complements, 
governance - seems to hold for foundations, as it did for corporates in Giroud 
and Mueller (2010). Competition for best grantees, projects, employees, 
funding or other resources seems to act as an outside control, alleviating 
the need to have control structures inside the foundation. We incline to 
reject the opposite possibility that increased competition would induce 
reputation building among foundations, and reputation would be built by 
having open governance structures115. 
It is noteworthy that our two main explanatory variables, source of 
finance and competition, work in a fundamentally different manner: a lack 
of outside control by outside financiers is related to foundation governance 
being less open, whereas a lack of outside control by competition is related 
to foundation governance being more open. Thus, we conclude that 
outside financiers seem to require open governance, whereas competition 
necessitates reducing agency costs by some other means. 
An increase in Age was associated with a decrease in the odds of 
having a higher FGI score, with an odds ratio of 0.666. An increase in Size 
(revenues) was associated with a slight decrease in the odds of having a 
higher FGI score, with an odds ratio of 0.922. A foundation’s size and age 
show statistical significance, and their increase is related to a decrease in 
FGI. In other words, older or larger foundations are on average more openly 
governed than younger or smaller foundations. Larger foundations can 
maintain administrative structures because the relative cost of doing so is 
bearable. For a small foundation, it is not worthwhile to have a large board 
and intricate nomination procedures. Older foundations have grown larger 
and even if not large, they typically are at least well known in their local 
community. Over time, they may have gained a routine for maintaining a 
governance structure that improves their good reputation. There might 
be a “noblesse oblige” effect where foundations feel the need to improve 
their governance as the foundation becomes better known. For older 
foundations, it is likely that over time they have already experienced the 
risks of insufficient control, and have therefore improved their governance 
to limit such risks. Age brings wisdom. Finally, it has been shown that the 
corporate life cycle affects corporate governance choices (Filatotchev, 
Toms, and Wright (2006)); by the same token, it is possible that the life 
cycle, and thus age, can be associated with even the governance model 
chosen by foundations.
In block C we include a foundation mission industry dummy into OLR. We 
alternate between using either industry or competition as a control variable 
(see footnote 102). Including the industry dummy slightly increases the 
model fit (Cox & Snell, Nagelkerke ratios). The ordering and size of odds 
remains similar to those in blocks A and B.
To summarize, Endowed-category odds are statistically significant in all 
115 However, see our discussion in Footnote 100, Section 4.3, about other possible measures 
for competition among foundations. 
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regressions; the odds ratios for the Donative and Operative categories are 
statistically significant, or nearly so, in most regressions. The ordering of 
odds ratios remains the same (highest to Endowed, then declining), thus 
validating our Hypothesis that outside financing is associated with more 
open governance. Category 1 clearly shows a strong, statistically significant 
difference to other categories. It seems that foundations that must seek 
finance from outside sources must keep their governance relatively open 
and less concentrated. Such outside sources consist of donors, customers 
and the public sector. Judging from our data, the public sector emerges as 
the most demanding financier with respect to the openness of governance. 
One of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same. In other 
words, ordinal logistic regression assumes that the coefficients describing 
the relationship between, say, the lowest versus all higher categories of 
the dependent variable are the same as those describing the relationship 
between the next lowest category and all higher categories, and continuing 
to do so at all consecutive levels. Thus, the change from one FGI-level to 
another, say, from 2 to 3, is considered to be dependent on our explanatory 
variables in the same manner as a change from 4 to 5. This assumption 
of proportional odds is tested by the test of parallel lines: can one use one 
equation over all levels of FGI; that is, are the responses to explanatory 
variables equal on all levels of FGI.
We note that our assumption of proportional odds holds only for the model 
using the industry dummy (block C in Table 11). For other models (only 
source of finance as explanatory variable, or source of finance, competition, 
age and size as explanatory variables), the test of parallel lines indicates 
rejection of the proportional odds assumption. The parallel lines test is very 
sensitive to large data sets and to the use of scale independent variables116 – 
our data consists of 891 cases, with competition, age and revenues acting as 
explanatory scale variables. We tested the robustness of our ordinal logistic 
regression by estimating binary logistic regressions for all levels of FGI: 
such that the odds of belonging to “FGI=below 1” versus belonging to higher 
score groups; then odds of belonging to “FGI=below 2” versus higher score 
groups, and so forth. We do not tabulate the results here. Odds estimates 
become statistically insignificant in the middle levels of FGI (levels 2 and 
3) for source of finance categories Donative and Operative. However, on all 
levels of FGI, the statistical significance remains strong for the difference 
between the first source-of-finance category (1, Endowed foundations) and 
the others; and similarly between the fourth source-of-finance category (4, 
Public sector financed foundations) and the other categories. The ordering 
of the odds remains similar to our OLR findings on FGI levels 0-1 and 4-5, 
so that the odds of the first category (Endowed foundations) belonging to 
higher levels of FGI is clearly higher than the odds of Donative foundations, 
116 O’Connell (2006).
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which again have higher odds than operatively financed foundations. 
However, the sequence of the odds is reversed in the middle FGI levels 2 
and 3, with Donative foundations having lower odds of belonging to FGI 
level 2 or 3 than Endowed foundations. All in all, the ordering of odds in the 
middle FGI levels is inconclusive for Donative and operatively financed 
foundations. This would suggest that a binary outcome model might better 
fit the governance phenomenon, which we will revisit later in this section. 
Other variables (Competition, Age, Size and Industry) remain statistically 
significant and parallel to our OLR findings, except on FGI level 3, where the 
effect of competition or industry become insignificant. On all other levels, 
competition, age, size and industry variables remain significant and show 
similar directional associations: competition increases FGI, while age and 
size lower FGI. 
We next test the robustness of our results by using multinomial 
logistic regression (MLR). MLR allows us to avoid the proportional 
odds assumption but the model loses the explanatory power of ordered 
categories clearly shown in our data (see discussion at the beginning of this 
section). Multinomial logistic regression is used to model nominal outcome 
variables, in which the log odds of the outcomes are modeled as a linear 
combination of the predictor variables. The reported odds ratios (Exp. β) 
for each variable give the odds of belonging to a given FGI group instead of 
being at the FGI=0 level (note the difference between MLR and OLR, where 
the odds were always cumulative up to a certain level of FGI).  On each FGI 
level, we compare our categorical variable, foundation source of finance, 
against the last category, foundations financed by the public sector. The 
maximum likelihood calculation thus used to determine how much more 
likely it is, for instance, for an Endowed foundation to be in the group FGI=5 
than in the group FGI=0, compared to Public sector foundations? In Table 
12 below, we present the results of the MLR regression. 
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Determination of Governance Index 
Multinomial Logistic Regression
A B C
Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig.
Level 5 compared to level 0:
Endowed 3.672 <0.001 3.080 <0.001 2.920 0.001
Donative 2.520 0.012 1.758 0.145 1.452 0.355
Operative 1.460 0.228 1.796 0.073 1.667 0.141
Public sector 1.000  1.000  1.000  
Competition intensity   1.002 0.054   
Ln of Foundation age   0.679 0.003 0.640 0.001
Ln of Foundation revenues   0.800 <0.001 0.788 <0.001
Foundation mission industry dummy no  no  yes <0.001
For total model:
N 891 891 891
Cox & Snell 0,061 0,190 0,271
Nagelkerke 0,064 0,200 0,284
Likelihood ratio test:
Source of finance <0,001 0,001 0,003
Competition 0,085
Age <0,001 <0,001
Revenues 0,001 <0,001
Industry <0,001a
Table 12. The results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression of Foundation 
Governance Index as a function of the source of finance, foundation age, 
foundation size and mission industry or competition intensity. The probabilities of 
being on FGI levels 1-5 are tested against being on FGI level 0; the Table includes 
only level 5 compared to level 0. The source-of-finance reference category is the 
last category: foundations financed by the public sector. The first column A shows 
the results from a simple regression of the source of finance on FGI. The next 
column B includes the results from the regression including competition intensity 
and natural logarithms of foundation age and foundation’s average revenues in 
2010-12. In the last column C we replace the competition intensity with an industry 
dummy. Industry categories are as defined by the United Nations’ International 
Categorization of Non-profit Organizations, ICNPO. As the competition intensity is 
determined by the number of foundations in the same industry, the competition 
factor and industry dummy cannot be used in the same regression function. 
a=test may be invalid as many groups had zero cases.
Endowed foundations are 3.672 times more likely than the reference 
group Public sector foundations (for which odds=1) to have a FGI of 5 
instead of FGI of 0. 
We tabulate only the results for the highest level of FGI (5) compared to 
the reference category, the lowest category of FGI=0, and the overall fit and 
significance results. The findings corroborate our OLR results, even though 
the MLR does not produce significant probabilities for all of our source of 
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finance -categories on middle levels 2-4 of FGI. We refer to the discussion 
above and suggest that a binary117 outcome would fit the phenomenon better.
We also test our hypotheses with the ordinary least squares regression 
method. We make a gross simplification and assume that FGI is 
continuous variable with its 0-5 levels, and use the source of finance as a 
dummy explanatory variable. We also check for possible violations of the 
assumptions of general linear model, not relevant in our earlier logistic 
regressions. The results from this rough OLS estimation are presented in 
Table 13 below. 
Determination of Governance Index  
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
A B C
β Sig. β Sig. β Sig.
Endowed 0.936 <0.001 0.852 <0.001 0.807 >0.001
Donative 0.916 <0.001 0.671 0.007 0.539 0.033
Operative 0.429 0.056 0.535 0.015 0.468 0.039
Public sector 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Competition intensity   0.001 0.054   
Ln of Foundation age   -0.389 <0.001 -0.397 <0.001
Ln of Foundation size (revenues)   -0.090 <0.001 -0.100 <0.001
Foundation mission industry dummy no  no  yes  
Constant 2.532 <0.001 4.748 <0.001 4.200 <0.001
 
N 891  891  891  
R2 0.030  0.093  0.112  
Adj. R2 0.027  0.087  0.096  
Table 13. The results of Ordinary Least Square Regression of Foundation 
Governance index as a function of the source of finance, foundation age, 
foundation size and mission industry or competition intensity. The source-of-
finance reference category is the last category: foundations financed by the 
public sector. The first column shows the results from a simple regression of the 
source of finance -dummies on FGI. The next column includes the results from 
regression including competition intensity and natural logarithms of foundation 
age and foundation’s average revenues in 2010-12. In the last column we replace 
the competition intensity with an industry dummy. Industry categories are as 
defined by the United Nations’ International Categorization of Non-profit 
Organizations, ICNPO. As the competition intensity is determined by the number 
of foundations in the same industry, the competition factor and industry dummy 
cannot be used in the same regression function.
Again, comparing our main source-of-finance categories, the difference 
between first and last categories is statistically significant in all our 
117 The tests we conducted to investigate the ordinal logistic regression’s cumulative odds 
assumption on each level of outcome are essentially binary outcome tests. They show that 
the governance differences are clearest at the ends of the governance index spectrum.
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model specifications. Endowed foundations are more likely to belong to 
higher levels of FGI than Public sector foundations (coefficient 0.936>0). 
However, the ordering between the middle categories is unclear from our 
results, and the results are not statistically significant for all. 
The results of OLS regression for competition, foundation age, size 
and industry are all statistically significant and parallel to our earlier 
regressions. The concentration of governance decreases with age and size, 
indicating that older and larger foundations are more openly governed on 
average. Competition substitutes for governance, with more competed 
foundations being able to rely on concentrated governance models. 
Conducting OLS regression we detected heteroscedasticity in our data. 
Levene’s test implies we have to reject the assumption of homogeneity of 
variances (ρ<0.001). The modelling errors for the FGI can be correlated 
for our sample. The OLS estimator is still unbiased in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, but it is inefficient because the true variance and 
covariance are underestimated. Looking at the frequencies of FGI scores 
in our data (see Chart 2) we maintain that the choice of governance in 
foundations is dichotomous: either a foundation has an open governance 
(FGI levels 0 and 1), or then it adopts a relatively concentrated model of 
governance (FGI levels 4 and 5). Very few foundations (14 percent of our 
sample) choose the road in the middle. An OLS estimator does not capture 
efficiently the binary nature of the outcome.
Finally, to respond to our regression findings so far, we conduct a binary 
logistic regression on our data. We form two groups of FGI: the “All-in-one-
hands” group with FGI of 4 or 5, and the “Open Governance” group with FGI 
0 or 1. (Foundations who score 2 or 3 are discarded.) We then regress the 
same factors on the binary dependent variable “All-in-one-hands” in the 
reduced sample (N=769) to see whether the dependencies are clearer in 
these extreme groups. 
The use of logistic regression is appropriate due to the binary nature of 
the dependent variable. Binary logistic regression produces odds ratios 
for the likelihood of belonging to “All-in-one-hands” -group, compared to 
the reference category.  The logistic model of odds ratios does not require a 
normal distribution of the error terms. We present the results in Table 14.
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Existence of "All-in-one-
hands" Board 
Binary Logistic Regression
A B C
N Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig.
Endowed 400 2.745 <0.001 2.617 <0.001 2.465 0.001
Donative 107 2.916 0.001 2.328 0.010 1.920 0.055
Operative 168 1.558 0.092 1.814 0.031 1.658 0.083
Public sector 94 1.000  1.000  1.000  
Total sig. for source of finance 
variable
  <0.001  0.002  0.007
Competition intensity    1.002 0.017 nm  
Ln of Foundation age    0.579 <0.001 0.568 <0.001
Ln of Foundation size (revenues)    0.894 <0.001 0.872 <0.001
Foundation mission industry 
dummy
 no  no  yes 0.015
 
N  769  769  769  
R2 Cox & Snell 0.030  0.095  0.117  
 Nagelkerke 0.042  0.136  0.168  
Table 14. The results of a Binary Logistic Regression of the existence of an 
“All-in-one-hands” board as a function of the source of finance, foundation age, 
foundation size, and competition intensity. “All-in-one-hands” subgroup includes 
549 foundations and “Open governance” group 220 foundations. The categories’ 
significances relate to the eventual difference of categories to the reference 
category (Public sector), and the reported total significance depicts significance 
of the source-of-finance variable in total. The first column shows results from 
a simple regression of the source-of-finance variable on FGI. The next column 
includes the results from the regression including competition intensity, measured 
by the number of foundations in the same mission industry, and natural logarithms 
of foundation age and foundation’s average revenues in 2010-12. In the last 
column we replace the competition intensity with an industry dummy. Industry 
categories are as defined by the United Nations’ International Categorization of 
Non-profit Organizations, ICNPO.
Again, the difference in the governance of foundations financed in 
different ways is clear. The first column A shows binary logistic regression 
where only the source of finance is entered as a categorical variable 
explaining the existence of an “All-in-one-hands” board. Our earlier 
results are confirmed, with Endowed foundations having a 2.745 times 
the probability for the existence of an “All-in-one-hands” board, compared 
to the probability of the reference group, Public sector foundations. The 
odds for the existence of an “All-in-one-hands” board is also statistically 
significantly associated with a foundation’s age and size, with an increase 
in age and size lowering the odds of having a ”All-in-one-hands” board (odds 
<1). An “All-in-one-hands” board is significantly positively associated with 
competition intensity, with higher competition slightly increasing the odds 
of having an ”All-in-one-hands” board (odds>1, confirming our Hypothesis 
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2). An “All-in-one-hands” board is also statistically significantly associated 
with mission industry (odds not tabulated here for the 12 industry 
categories). 
Summing up our tests, we are able to confirm our Hypothesis 1: 
Foundations who finance themselves with income from an endowment 
have a more concentrated model of governance than foundations that need 
to regularly seek financing from external sources. Our main tests, ordinal 
logistic regression on all six levels of governance index as well as the binary 
regression between “All-in-one-hands” and “Open” governance confirm 
the existence of statistically significant association between foundation 
finance and governance. More specifically, the results showing Endowed 
foundations’ difference to other foundations are robust across various 
regression methods and assumptions.
We also confirm Hypothesis 2: Foundations in competed mission 
markets have a more concentrated model of governance than foundations 
in less competed markets. Competition intensity is positively, consistently 
and statistically significantly associated with foundation governance index 
in all our regression methods118. 
All in all, our results show that there are differences in governance 
among foundations that are financed from different sources. Endowed 
foundations which do not have to regularly seek outside financing are more 
likely to have a concentrated governance model where the foundation board 
holds extensive decision powers. Foundations which have to regularly seek 
outside financing in the form of donations from donors, operational income 
from customers or financial support from the public sector, maintain more 
open governance structures with some form of outside control layer above 
the board. 
Competition has a statistically significant association with a foundation’s 
governance model. Foundations which operate in a more competed 
environment have on average concentrated more decision powers to the 
foundation board. This finding suggests that external control, through 
competition from resources, substitutes for internal control through 
governance. 
We discussed effects that either substitute or enforce change in Section 
3.1. Our findings about the relation between the foundation source of 
finance, competition and governance quality turn out to show these 
opposing effects on the outcome. For the source of finance, outside 
financiers, in particular the public sector, seem to concretely insist on 
certain open governance practices, for example right to nominate board 
members or auditor. The financiers may directly press for or enforce 
some governance rules in foundations. Thus outside finance is related 
to open governance. In contrast, our competition intensity substitutes 
118 In our Ordered Logistic Regression (OLR), Competition intensity’s ρ=0.11, indicating 
borderline insignificance, while in three other regressions the Competition variable is 
statistically significant.
What determines a non-profit governance model - and does it matter?
104
inside governance structures: more competition is associated with more 
concentrated governance. An outside force replaces inside structure. 
The endogeneity of association between the source of finance and 
governance quality does not seem likely to us. Endogeneity would arise 
if foundations governed in a certain way would seek a certain source 
of finance; the source of finance would not lead to governance quality, 
but the association between finance and governance would come from 
this deterministic behavior of foundations. We discussed the lifecycle 
of foundations in Section 3.1; based on that discussion, we think it more 
likely that a foundation’s source of finance is planned at the time of the 
foundation’s conception, and that an opportunistic change of finance is 
not easy or possible. We believe the relatively stable source of finance has a 
bearing on foundation governance choices and not vice versa.
5.2 Determination of governance in endowed 
foundations
Having observed a relation between source of finance and governance 
quality, it is of interest to contemplate the subgroup of Endowed foundations. 
Our sample has 465 endowed foundations; they represent some 52 
percent of our mainly random119 sample and are the most common form 
of foundation in Finland. Our interest is now on the importance of other 
determinants of governance choice once the source-of-finance variable is 
given. Earlier we suggested that the moral hazard is the most accentuated 
in endowed foundations, and our findings seem to support our Hypothesis. 
But the presence of moral hazard aside, what other characteristics matter? 
We can best observe other factors by within-group tests.
We examine the differences within the Endowed foundations’ group 
by testing the existence of an “All-in-one hands” board120. In our tests in 
Section 5.1 we noted that the binary model best fits the governance choice 
phenomenon. As explanatory variables we now focus on size of endowment, 
age and competition intensity. The size of endowment now better serves 
our depiction of foundation size. Endowment is calculated as balance sheet 
total minus total debt; we use the average for 2010-12 to smooth over the 
outlier years, and take logarithms to mitigate the high skewness of the data 
(for discussion, see paragraphs following Table 8). We present the results of 
these regressions in Table 15 below.
119 See Appendix 1 about the sampling of data.
120 This concept is as explained for the Binary Logistic Regression in Table 14.
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Existence of "All-in-one-hands" Board A B
Binary logistic regression Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig.
Ln of Endowment size 0.895 0.031 0.891 0.038
Ln of Foundation age 0.525 <0.001 0.456 <0.001
Competition intensity 1.004 0.004 nm  
Constant 81.306 <0.001 31.909 <0.001
Foundation mission industry dummy no  yes <0.001
 
N 398  398  
Cox & Snell 0.075  0.149  
Nagelkerke 0.113  0.226  
Table 15. The results of a Binary Logistic Regression of the existence of an 
“All-in-one-hands” board in Endowed foundations, as a function of endowment 
size, foundation age, competition intensity and mission industry. The “All-in-one-
hands” subgroup includes 306 foundations and the “Open governance” group 92 
foundations. Cases where FGI=2 or 3 are discarded (67 cases). The first block A 
shows the result from regression of the size of endowment, competition intensity 
and natural logarithm of foundation age on the binary outcome of “existence of 
the “All-in-one-hands” board. In the second block B we replace the competition 
intensity with an industry dummy. Endowment is calculated as balance sheet 
total minus total debt; we use the average for 2010-12 to smooth over the outlier 
years, and take logarithms to mitigate the high skewness of the data. Age is the 
natural logarithm of the years of existence. Competition intensity is the number of 
foundations operating in the same ICNPO industry category.
We first note that foundation age is strongly associated with foundation 
governance within the Endowed foundations’ group. We refer to our 
earlier discussion about “noblesse oblige” after Table 11: that foundations 
voluntarily open their governance as the foundation gets older. The 
cause may be the growing positive reputation of the foundation that the 
foundation wants to keep up with open governance121, or simply that once 
the foundation has been established, the governors may have more time to 
ponder on administrative practices than at the outset of the foundation’s 
existence. With elapsing time there have been more chances to learn from 
suboptimal governance, and the possible relative costs of governance risks, 
lost reputation or money, have become higher over the years.
Endowment size has a significant relation to the governance: foundations 
with a larger endowment are slightly less likely (odds increase by 0.895 or 
0.891 with endowment log increase) to have an “All-in-one-hands” board. 
Foundations facing tough competition are more likely to have an “All-in-
one-hands” board (odds increase 1.004 times with competition intensity, 
measured by the number of competitors in same industry). Interestingly 
enough, the odds are higher here than in our earlier regressions in Tables 
121 The investment in good reputation is a “sunk cost” that will produce positives for the 
foundation: easier employment of good workers, better grant applications or constant 
flow of legacied money.
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11 to 14, suggesting that competition provides a more important external 
control to the endowed foundations than to the foundation population as a 
whole. 
5.3 Relation between governance and charitable 
spending
We return to the question presented in connection with our early discussion 
on Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (GIM) model: what is “performance” in non-
profits? Where does governance matter, if anywhere? Societal performance 
of non-profits means efficient and sufficient charitable activities (see, 
e.g., Desai and Yetman (2015) who summarize: “…measures of how well a 
private foundation is accomplishing its charitable purpose are related to 
how much, and how soon, foundations give to public charities”). We test 
the effect of concentration of decision power in a foundation’s governance 
on the foundation’s charitable expenses that should be sufficiently large in 
order to ensure achieving the foundation’s mission. 
Governance 
quality
Consequences 
of governance: 
charitable 
spending
Figure 3. The causality from the governance quality to the consequences of 
governance.
One has to note that in case of non-profits, expenses are a positive matter. 
In contrast to for-profits, who aim to minimize expenses and maximize 
profits, non-profits’ raison-d’être is to use as much money as the mission 
demands. Thus the moral hazard here is that the foundation does not use 
as much money as would be necessary. Foundations may be tempted to 
spend less on the mission and to, e.g., build a more impressive endowment, 
if the size of the endowment presents some benefit to the foundation 
administrators122. Even if the board would not derive any private utility from 
the endowment hoarding, it may prefer to limit risks to a suboptimal degree. 
We start from the assumption that the higher the charitable expenses, the 
less sign of a moral hazard in a foundation.
Before we can proceed to tests we differentiate between different kinds 
of charitable expenses that might confuse our testing. We separate grant-
122 This is in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, where we summarized earlier research 
about unnecessary endowment building as one outcome of moral hazard. For a short 
assessment of the moral hazard and possible other motivations for endowments, see 
Weisbrod and Asch (2010). Also note that the board members cannot receive any direct 
material benefit from endowment building because of the non-distribution constraint of 
non-profits. 
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making foundations and operational foundations, as discussed in Section 
4.5123. The term “operational” is not to be confused with “operative” (see 
Definitions). Operative refers to finance, as in Section 4.2 and throughout 
this book. Operational refers to the foundation’s way to carry out its mission, 
which we proceed to explain here. 
Foundations can carry out their mission in two ways: by making grants 
(to research, arts, sports etc.); or by working on the mission with their own 
employees (helping the poor, keeping up a museum, cleaning environment 
etc.). The costs structures differ markedly, with grants being clear and 
observable whereas other operational charitable expenses being fragmented 
and their efficiency being more difficult to evaluate. 
Grant-making foundations may grant dozens of millions every year, 
but have minimal expenses to do the grantee selection (or they have a pro 
bono selection board). It could be said that grant-making foundations have 
largely “outsourced” doing good: it is done by grantees. 
Operational foundations produce their charitable services themselves: 
they employ workers and administer volunteers, they use materials and they 
incur administrative expenses to organize reporting. Thus their charitable 
expenses are fragmented and higher on most accounts. 
The bookkeeping line “operational expenses” recorded in our data include 
both grants and (tangible) operational expenses. Project personnel salaries 
or materials, and on the other hand monetary grants are recorded similarly 
as operational costs124. Nevertheless, the amount of grants is also separately 
reported and typically highlighted in foundations’ communications, 
whereas other operational costs are not, maybe because they are fragmented 
and difficult to analyse. Somewhat illogically, the general public seems to 
like a large amount of grants, but not a large amount of soup kitchen salaries.
To account for this difference in operational model of foundations, we 
classified all sample foundations into grant-making or not, based on their 
grant-making activity in 2010-12125 (absolute and relative to their net assets). 
Simply: a foundation was classified as a grant-making foundation if it had 
significant spending in grants. In absence of grant-making, a foundation 
was classified as an operational foundation. This division proved to be quite 
clear-cut. In Table 16 we report selected descriptive statistics.
123 See also the list of concepts, abbreviations and symbols at the beginning of this book.
124 There is some debate among scholars if grants should be treated as distributions in 
book-keeping, and not recorded on the profit and loss statement as expenses. This 
would, however, undermine the distinctive character of foundations as entities without 
distributions. Furthermore, the decision of either operating “hands-on” or through grant-
making (“outsourced hands-on”) should be administratively neutral to foundations. The 
argument does, though, correspond to our suggestion in Section 3 about the beneficiaries 
being a foundation’s owners.
125 In all our analyses, we have the sums, medians, averages and the original numbers for 
2010-12 available. This reduces the risk of extraordinary years affecting our classification.
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Method of 
accomplishing 
mission
Number of 
foundations
Average Revenues 
2010-12
Relative operational 
costs: Operational 
costs/Revenues, avg 
2010-12
Grantmaking foundation 302 3 451 527 0.51
Operational foundation 325 7 213 984 0.80
T-test value  5.996 51.498
Significance (2-tailed)  <0.001 <0.001
Table 16. The descriptive statistics of grant-making and operational foundations. 
Revenues represent the sum of investment, donative, operative income and 
support from the public sector in a year. Average revenues are the average over 
the years 2010-12. Relative operational costs are average costs of operations in 
2010-12, divided by average total revenues in 2010-12. See Appendix 2 for 
details about operational costs and foundation profit and loss form. We reject 29 
outliers with relative spending exceeding 2 (costs exceed revenues more than two 
times on average in our 3-year sample period). Only operational foundations with 
an average yearly revenue above 20,000 euros are included (206 cases excluded, 
some of which are already rejected on the basis of relative spending). After these 
exclusions N=627. 
We start by noting the relative operational costs in our two sub-groups. 
Earlier we discussed the different nature of costs in grantmakers and 
operational foundations. Now we note that there is a difference on the 
operational cost level of grantmaking and operational foundations (even 
though grants are part of operational costs). A t-test is used to test whether 
two sets of data are significantly different from each other. As reported in 
Table 16, t-test values confirm statistically significant difference between 
grant-making and operational foundations’ operational cost level, with 
operational foundations spending on average more than grant-making 
foundations.
We continue to our main question: what is the association between 
governance and spending in foundations? For that, we run regressions 
separately for grant-making foundations, excluding operational 
foundations, and vice versa. The operational model of a foundation acts as 
a control variable. We also benefit from the separate reporting of grants, 
and use grants variable as an alternative to a grantmaker’s total operational 
expenses as a dependent variable in tests of grantmaking foundations 
sample. 
At the outset we exclude from our total sample the foundations whose 
expenses have been on average above 2 in our sample period (expenses are 
on average twice the revenue every year, in 2010-12). For a 3-year period 
and for foundations this may be a true case, but exceptional one over longer 
periods of time. Such exceptions tend to influence statistical testing heavily. 
On this ground we rejected 29 outlier cases.
In order to focus on foundations making significant economic decisions 
we also exclude foundations whose yearly total income (on average in 2010-
12) is below 20,000 euros. This excludes 206 foundations from our data, 
some of which were already discarded on the basis of the expense ratio 
explained above.
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Our sample for examining relation between governance and charitable 
spending includes now 627 foundations.
We now define our testable function for sample foundations:
Relative operational expenses= β0+β1 FGI (3)
 Relative operations expenses equal yearly operational expenses126 
(including grants) divided by yearly total revenue from operations, 
investments and donations127. We use expense and revenue averages from 
the years 2010-12 to calculate relative ratios. 
Relative operations expenses reflect the portion of all income used to 
charitable programs, as opposed to fund raising, investment services or 
extraordinary costs or income not used at all but accumulated as retained 
profits. It does not, however, catch fraudulent or inefficient use of money 
that is booked into operational expenses, which the auditor has accepted. 
As all foundations in our data must use the detailed profit and loss form 
which separates operations expenses from other expenses, we assume 
that differences in operational expenses catch differences in charitable 
spending.
Both dependent and independent variables in equation (4) are scale 
variables so we carry out our test by means of ordinary least square 
regression (we treat governance index as a scale variable). We present the 
results in Table 17 below.
Determination of charitable 
spending
All
Only 
Grantmakers
Only 
Operational
Operational expenses/Total income β Sig. β Sig. β Sig.
FGI -0.010 0.083 0.007 0.455 -0.024 <0.001
Grantmaker dummy -0.295 <0.001     
Constant 0.834 <0.001 0.485 <0.001 0.874 0.002
N 627  302  325  
R2 0.218  0.002  0.028  
Table 17. The results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of foundations’ 
relative operational costs as a function of governance quality. Relative operational 
costs are average costs of operations in 2010-12, divided by average total 
revenues in 2010-12. We reject outliers with relative spending exceeding 2 
(costs exceed revenues more than two times on average in our sample period). 
Only foundations with average yearly revenue above 20,000 euros are included. 
126 Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006) and Desai and Yetman (2015) use program expenses which 
exclude fundraising and administration costs. In our Expenses the administrative 
overheads are included. The separation of “program” and “administration” expenses may 
be biased in the foundation sector.
127 Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006) relate program expenses to total costs, whereas Desai and 
Yetman (2015) relate program expenses also to total income.
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Foundation Governance Index (FGI) is a sum of five power-concentrating provisions 
in foundation rules as set out in Section 4.1.1. Regression in the first column (All) 
includes all sample foundations. Second column shows results for a subgroup 
including only grantmakers. Third column includes only operational foundations. 
We conduct three OLS regressions, regressing Foundation Governance 
Index on dependent variable Operational expenses/Total income128. The 
first one includes the whole sample of 627 foundations129 and we include 
a dummy variable for grantmaking foundations to separate the foundation 
type effect from governance effect130. In the second column we conduct the 
same regression to grantmaking foundations only, and in the third column 
to operational foundations only. 
In the first regression including both grantmaking and operational 
foundations the coefficient for FGI is negative and statistically significant 
(ρ=0.083), indicating that the more concentrated the governance is, the less 
the foundation spends on its mission (relative to its income). This means 
that more openly governed operational foundations bring relatively more 
societal performance than less openly governed ones. The grantmaker-
dummy is negative as expected, given the relative cost level difference in 
Table 16: grant-makers spend on average less than operational foundations. 
However, when we run the regression for the grantmaker subgroup we 
find no statistically significant relation between governance and charitable 
spending. The third regression with only operational foundations shows 
again a statistically significant (ρ<0.001) and negative association between 
the governance index and charitable spending. This reveals that the original 
relation between governance and spending for the whole sample is driven 
by operational foundations’ data. 
To test grantmakers’ case further we run another testable function for 
grant-making foundations where the dependent variable is grants made, 
relative to the endowment of the foundation. 
Relative Grants= β0+β1 FGI (4)
The results in Table 18 confirm our finding that in grantmaking 
foundations governance does not seem to be associated with charitable 
spending131. 
128 Conducting OLS regression we tested for heteroscedasticity for FGI and relative 
expenses. Levene’s test implies we can assume homogeneity of variances (ρ=0.166).
129 We have excluded foundations whose average revenues 2010-12 were less than 20,000 
euros, and discarded foundations whose operational expenses/total income was on 
average more than 2 in our sample period 2010-12.
130 We also tested regressing FGI on relative operational expenses without the grantmaking-
dummy, but the explanatory power of the regression was close to zero.
131 We tested several notions of relative grantmaking: grants relative to endowment, to 
revenues and to financial investments. No significant relation emerged between such 
spending and governance. Endowment and financial investments values are market 
values.
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Determination of charitable spending Only Grantmakers
Grants made/Endowment β Sig.
FGI -0.017 0.903
Constant 0.565 0.289
N 302  
R2 0.000  
Table 18. The results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression of grantmaking 
foundations’ relative grants as a function of governance quality. Relative grants 
are the yearly average amount of grants in 2010-12, divided by average endowment 
in 2010-12. Endowment is the market value of balance sheet less debt. We reject 
outliers with relative spending exceeding 2 (costs, including grants, exceed 
revenues more than two times on average in our sample period). Only foundations 
with average yearly revenue above 20,000 euros are included. Foundation 
Governance Index (FGI) is a sum of five power-concentrating provisions in 
foundation rules as discussed in Section 4.1.1. 
The difference between operational and grantmaking foundations may 
be due to the fact that the absolute and relative amounts of grants are easily 
observable to the outside world. Grantmakers operate in a publicity and 
reputation competition in this respect. It may well be that competition 
acts again as an outside monitor to grantmaking foundations, rendering 
governance irrelevant to societal performance. 
To summarize: we find a statistically significant association between 
governance and charitable spending in operational foundations, but find 
no statistically significant association between charitable spending and 
governance in grantmaking foundations. In operational foundations less 
concentrated governance is related to higher charitable spending and thus 
better societal performance132.
A final note about charitable spending and expenses is due. We posited at 
the beginning of this section that expenses are a good thing for a foundation: 
it is working for the mission. This book does not address the issue of 
evaluating efficiency of such charitable spending. It is commonly assumed 
that charities can be assessed with some boilerplate ratio or analysis. 
However, watch-dog organizations point out that too many donors are 
paying too much attention to overheads or executive salaries in non-profits 
(see, e.g., Pallotta (2009)). Our simple variable of a foundation’s expenses 
132 We also tested our regressions with Age (ln) and Size (ln of revenues) as explanatory 
variables. This leads to a heteroscedasticity problem as our FGI variable has been shown 
to be significantly associated with both variables (see Section 5.1). Added rudimentarily 
to our OLS test in Table 17, Age was not related to charitable spending, but Size was, 
replacing our main explanatory variable FGI as the statistically significant determinant 
of charitable spending. We conclude that larger foundations spend relatively more on 
charity on average, and size seems to matter even more than governance. Size may bring 
economies of scale to foundations, allowing larger foundations to spend relatively more 
on charity. Added to our grantmaking regression in Table 18, Age or Size variables did not 
improve the regression’s statistical significance. 
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does not differentiate between types of expenses: it may avoid overly 
criticizing overheads, but on the other hand it certainly can include items 
that do not work toward the mission.
5.4 Summary of hypotheses and results
We summarize our empirical findings in Table 19 below.
Determination of charitable spending
Hypothesis Result
1
Foundations who finance themselves with income from 
endowment have a more concentrated model of governance 
than foundations which need to regularly seek financing 
from external sources.
Confirmed
2
Foundations in competed mission markets have a more 
concentrated model of governance than foundations in less 
competed markets.
Confirmed
3
The relative level of charitable spending is smaller in 
foundations with a more concentrated model of governance.
Confirmed for operational 
foundations, not confirmed 
for grant-making foundations
Table 19. Summary of hypotheses about the determinants of foundation 
governance and the consequences of governance, and empirical results.
Concerning Hypothesis 1, we find a statistically significant association 
between governance and foundation finance. Our main tests, ordinal 
logistic regression on all six levels of governance index as well as the binary 
regression between “All-in-one-hands” and open governance confirm 
the existence of statistically significant association between foundation 
finance and governance. It seems that foundations that have to seek finance 
from any outside source other than its own endowment must keep their 
governance relatively open and less concentrated. Such outside finance 
sources are donors, customers and the public sector. The latter emerges as 
the most demanding financier when it comes to openness of governance.
Our Hypothesis 2 - that outside competition substitutes for rather than 
complements governance - seems to hold for non-profits, as it did for 
corporates in Giroud and Mueller (2010). Competition for best grantees, 
projects, employees, funding or other resources acts as an outside control, 
alleviating the need to have control structures inside a foundation.
We also find relation between governance and charitable spending in 
operational foundations, but find no statistically significant association 
between charitable spending and governance in grant-making foundations 
(Hypothesis 3). However, when we added Age and Size factors to our 
regressions, Age was not related to charitable spending, but Size was, 
replacing foundation governance index as the statistically significant 
determinant of charitable spending. We conclude that larger foundations 
spend more on charity on average, and size seems to matter even more than 
governance.
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6. Conclusion and discussion
Our proposed model for assessing foundation governance makes several 
contributions to our understanding the economic behavior of foundations. 
Our first observation from the data is that the foundation governance 
choice seems to have binary outcomes: foundations either choose an open 
governance or a governance that concentrates most or all power into the 
hands of the board. Binary models thus fit this phenomenon best.
When examining the reasons for governance choice, the empirical 
results suggest, firstly, that a foundation’s source of finance is associated 
with a concentration of decision powers within foundation governance. 
Specifically, foundations which must regularly approach outside sources 
of finance – donors, public sector or customers – feature more control 
structures and less concentration of power at the board level than do 
foundations that can finance their missions with endowment capital 
income. Secondly, we also find that intense competition in the foundation’s 
charitable mission market is associated with a lack of other control 
mechanisms. Our findings concerning the relation between foundation 
source of finance, competition and governance quality show opposing 
effects on the outcome: outside financiers seem to force improvements 
in governance, whereas outside competition seems to substitute for open 
governance to some extent. 
When examining the consequences of governance, we test the 
consequences of governance choices by testing whether openly governed 
foundations spend more on charity. We find that foundations that have less 
concentrated governance (lower FGI) spend more on charitable operations 
than foundations with concentrated governance. However, this association 
does not exist in grantmaking: governance is not related to the relative level 
of grants. It seems that – regardless of the concentration of governance 
– grantmaking foundations are pressured to keep up competitive levels 
of grantmaking because grants are easily observed and measured by the 
public. However, charitable expenses are less observable. 
Our Foundation Governance Index model has policy implications. In the 
absence of owners the regulator may serve as the only external control for 
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non-profits. The regulator should first understand which rules define the 
quality of governance in a foundation, and then pay attention to sources 
of finance for the foundation. We suggest Foundation Governance Index 
(FGI) and its factors as a measure for governance power concentration, 
and posit that a high concentration of decision powers at the board level 
accentuates the moral hazard of less efficient use of charitable resources 
in foundations. We also note that this moral hazard is strongly associated 
with endowed foundations. Competition among foundations seems to 
mitigate this moral hazard. In practice, the regulator could rank registered 
foundations based on these observable facts and identify “increased-risk” 
cases for inefficiency or fraud. 
Furthermore, governments may consider governance as one element of 
the requirements imposed on the third sector. Currently, some countries 
(but not all) require some tangible level of charitable spending in return 
for tax exempt status. The non-profit sector has argued that income and 
spending cash flows do not necessarily concur, rendering rigid spending 
targets non-optimal. Furthermore, the set levels can either be achieved 
through bookkeeping choices133, or they may turn out to be too high or 
low depending on business cycles134. Instead of setting direct spending 
targets, the regulator could nudge non-profits towards optimal behavior by 
requiring open governance provisions. Although these requirements would 
apply primarily to larger non-profits135, they would still motivate the whole 
sector to improve transparency. Since non-profits tend to be altruistic and 
eager to have an impeccable reputation, self-regulation and benchmarking 
should come naturally for foundations. In summary, a well-functioning and 
vigilant board is the best means to safeguard the most efficient mission 
achievements in a wide variety of non-profits. Governments should 
encourage governance systems that support such boards. 
Some prominent foundations openly describe their governance structure 
and discuss the difficulties in setting up monitoring devices. Some create 
two administrative levels in order to have at least one group with only 
“owner-like” responsibilities. Some rely on an association, university or 
public organ to do owners’ tasks. Although the regulator may trust that 
having the founders or their descendants in a foundation would secure 
control, it does not eliminate moral hazard between the foundation and the 
society. The ultimate form of founder control is to establish a determinate-
133 For instance, foundations may choose to report either the market values or the book 
values of assets. If charitable spending requirement is linked to reported asset values, 
the chosen bookkeeping method may distort the requirement. Similarly, if spending is 
linked to yearly results, the foundation may choose not to cash in latent value gains on the 
balance sheet.
134 See Deep and Frumkin (2001).
135 For small foundations the cost of proper governance may outweigh its benefits. 
Furthermore, small foundations may have difficulties in finding good administrators 
willing to work pro bono. However, the agency costs of low control, arising from 
opportunities for fraud or inefficiency, are smaller in small foundations. 
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life foundation: by defining the life span of a foundation, the founder and 
society avoid the long-term risks of creeping inefficiency or irrelevance of 
the mission. 
Smaller foundations must optimize between external control in 
governance, and costs. The structure of the foundation sector in many 
countries reveals numerous small foundations with little economic 
activity. Small foundations may be allowed to concentrate governance at 
the board level and to assess, from time to time, the need for improvement 
as the foundation matures and/or grows. Furthermore, corporate and 
foundation board members may not differ in their motivation. Foundation 
board membership is considered an honor and is not accepted for monetary 
compensation, but rather for standing in society136. In many countries, 
there may be social pressure to be active in some sort of pro bono work. 
Foundation boards typically include merited members of the business 
community, members from the upper echelons of society in general and 
members who are knowledgeable about the mission market. They may 
be the very persons that sit in a corporate board, too. They are prone to 
seek efficiency in operations. Thus, if the personal characteristics are as 
described here, the governance in foundations may in practice resemble 
efficient corporate governance, despite the different economic nature of 
foundations and the presence of power concentration at the board level.
Overall, society should have an increasing interest in better understanding 
foundations. Great amounts of wealth are increasingly being accumulated 
in foundations, in most cases for eternity. It would seem suboptimal to 
cosset wealth which hardly grows in an environment where investment 
yields are at a low level, without requiring that it be used to accomplish 
mission objectives. Society should consider supporting foundations with 
determinate life span as well as determinate timetables for achieving 
results. 
There are numerous limitations to our study and many avenues for future 
research. A longer series of financial and governance information would 
be necessary to separate time effects from cross-sectional variation, to 
understand dynamic changes in foundations’ governance and to confirm 
the direction of causality between governance and behavior. Information 
about changes in rules could be collected and compared to changes in 
financials. Changes in foundation legislation can offer a fruitful basis for 
event studies: when state-level regulation changes, how do foundations 
change their rules or behavior?
Finally, the foundation governance index could be developed further. 
We discussed the joint appearance of some rules but did not determine the 
136  Fama and Jensen (1983a) hypothesize generally for non-profits as well as for-profits: “[ ]… 
outside directors have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision control.” 
Signaling through the board-member role is credible when compensation is low, as it 
typically is in non-profits. Hansmann and Thomsen (2013) note that such signaling is not 
needed at the end of one’s career. Board positions are typically given to already merited 
and older persons, they comment.
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joint effects of the provisions nor their substitute/complementary nature 
vis-à-vis other provisions. It is also plausible that some provisions carry 
stronger power than others. Our FGI is a simple sum of provisions that does 
not differentiate between the various compositions contributing to the 
sum. Thus, a FGI=3 may differ in governance quality from another FGI=3, 
depending on the three components present. 
More generally, the most promising future non-profit research areas 
are those in which non-profits, acting as economic agents, face partially 
similar, partially differing interests compared to corporate interests. For 
example, a stock exchange for non-profits137 may at first sound absurd 
since a stock exchange provides a market for the transferring the risk of 
future distributions, whereas a non-profit has no distributions, uncertain 
or otherwise. Nevertheless, a stock exchange is also a tool for minimizing 
transaction costs: supply meets demand efficiently. Non-profits could 
benefit from a primary market where the supply of donations would meet 
the need for finance in a facilitated manner. The benefit arises not from 
the constant transfer of risk (as in the case of corporate stock, the so-called 
secondary market) but from the efficient transfer of primary finance. 
Corporates use standardized reporting and would be aghast to receive 
demands for individually drafted reports from various interest groups. Non-
profits face such demands regularly. They would benefit from a structured 
market place where donations would be available as long as some form of 
market standard information obligations (primary and continuous) are 
met. Other examples where the corporate market mechanism would be 
needed, but should be adapted to non-profits, include the measurement of 
non-profit success or efficiency138, or mechanisms for restructurings139. As 
the economic importance of the third sector grows, the study of non-profits 
as economic agents deserves increasing attention from researchers.
137 SVX, Social Ventures Exchange, in Ontario, Canada is an example. 
138 The Economist (2015) lists tried market mechanisms to evaluate non-profits’ “bang-for-
buck” and their efficiency problems. 
139 The absence of market for control means that non-profits are not pushed to efficiency-
improving mergers or restructurings like their for-profit counterparts. 
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ARE NON-PROFITS ACTIVE 
EQUITY INVESTORS?
Abstract
We provide evidence about one investor type’s investment behavior: 
trading and allocation activity. We study a sample of 530 foundations’ listed 
equity portfolios from the years 2000-2013 to establish whether non-profit 
investors are long-term shareholders with a relatively low equity portfolio 
turnover, and whether they are risk-averse in the sense of strictly following 
the market portfolio composition of stocks. In our sample period, foundation 
equity investors retain their individual shareholdings for an average period 
of 3.6 years. Their portfolio turnover is on average 12 percent yearly, and 
they are willing to carry risk by not following the market portfolio industry 
breakdown. Endowed, Donative, larger and older foundations follow the 
market industry breakdown on average more than smaller or younger 
foundations or Operative and Public foundations. Our findings corroborate 
the widely held notion that foundations are long-term investors which can 
carry sizeable and concentrated equity risk. Our results add previously 
non-existent evidence on one investor type’s investment behavior to the 
investor typology needed for the capital markets regulation.
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1. Introduction to Essay 2
Evidence about investment behavior is needed when regulators express 
worries about the functioning of the equity capital markets. Increased 
index investing and continuing rise of asset management dilute owner 
activity. Calls are made to invite direct shareholder monitoring and active 
shareholders. In particular, investors not subject to short-termism seem 
to be in favor with the regulators. Some investor groups seem to be short-
term owners, but compared to which other groups? Evidence from various 
investor types is needed for discussion about investor type behavior.
We hold prejudices about owner types and their investment style. It seems 
plausible to believe that family owners are long-term blockholders, a state 
owner seldom engages in frequent trading, or pension funds diversify and 
actively limit their risk exposure. Ample anecdotal evidence exists about 
investor types and styles. At the same time we seem to lack statistically 
reliable empirical evidence about them (Derrien, Kecskés, and Thesmar 
(2014)). 
We set out to investigate one distinct investor group, non-profit investors, 
and prejudices regarding its equity investment style. If not the most 
weighty investor type, it is singular in its characteristics and nature and 
has not been examined as an equity investor140. In most western countries it 
is common to believe that foundations are long-term investors who do not 
trade frequently. There are also somewhat fuzzier characterizations along 
the lines of “foundations are conservative investors”.
The investment style of non-profits is influenced by three distinctive 
factors, compared to other investor types. These three characteristics affect 
non-profit investment horizon and style: (1) the ultimate goal of non-profits 
is not to produce profits from operations. A non-profit will, though, try to 
140 Many do not have any notion of non-profits as investors. The term “non-profit” seems 
a contradiction in terms for an investor group. However, the accumulation of wealth in 
foundations, endowments, funds and associations predicates that they become normal 
economic agents on the capital markets. We maintain that their special nature affects 
their investment style.
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produce funding for non-profit mission work by its investment activities. 
However, the over-arching imperative of profitable operations is absent 
as are hence many performance measures or valuation. Thus non-profits 
may not be the most apt organizations to react to substandard performance 
of investing activities. (2) Non-profits do not have owners. They lack the 
control element of someone who has a financial interest in operations. We 
discuss non-profit ownership in a separate essay and in the Introduction 
of this book, but note here only that control from financiers, donors or 
receivers of charity is often distant. Furthermore, there are no methods 
to return capital to financiers. (3) Most non-profits are established to be 
eternal, without any corrective market mechanisms over time. Non-profits 
do not merge, go bankrupt or disappear as fluently as corporates do, with 
the help of market for control. This has important implications to agency 
setting in non-profits. All in all: non-profits are by nature slow-moving long-
term institutions that are to some extent insulated from outside pressures. 
They can be patient investors that can hold large concentrated holdings and 
avoid short-term pressures on the market.
This paper firstly discusses (1) why recognizing investor type matters, 
what investor activity is, and which factors drive such activity; and 
secondly, investigates (2) whether foundations are active investors, as 
observed from their equity portfolio allocation and trading frequency. 
We examine our random141 sample as a whole to identify foundations’ 
investment activity. In addition, we categorize foundations based on their 
source of finance and governance model to see if these characteristics 
have an association with investment style within the foundation group. We 
also control for foundation age and size to see whether these are related to 
equity investment style. 
Our empirical results show, firstly, that foundations diversify relatively 
little and that many are able to carry significant risk positions. This also 
means that they allocate actively away from the market index. Secondly, we 
find that most foundations do not trade actively. Their positions, share-for-
share, stay intact for years. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. We discuss reasons for 
growing interest in investment styles of various owner types and previous 
research on investor activity in Section 2. We then present chosen measures 
for activity in diversification as well as trading activity and develop new 
ones, form testable hypotheses and present our data in Section 3. In Section 
4 we present empirical findings. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss findings 
and limitations to our conclusions.
Our research will provide evidence on one investor-type equity 
investment style. It will provide a comparison point to other investor 
types, be it pension funds, private individuals or family owners. Empirical 
141 Sample collection is based on a large random take. Foundations that are active financially 
or in business have been added. This means mostly larger or wealthier foundations. See 
Appendices 1 and 2 about our data.
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findings have practical use in development and regulation of the capital 
markets. The securities market benefits from different types of owners. In 
order for trades to take place, investors must have differing beliefs, time 
horizons, liquidity preferences, risk aversions and information. Initiatives 
to safeguard and improve the functioning of securities markets start with 
the information about market participants. Our research produces evidence 
from one investor type which is present on all developed capital markets.
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2. Investor types and investment 
style on the equity market 
In the following section we present reasons for recognizing the importance 
of identifying investor types. 
We shortly visit the importance of varied investor base for trading and 
for the functioning of the capital markets. We continue to present agency 
problems in the investment industry and discuss how agency problems are 
related to various agents, e.g., investor types. At the extreme, such agency 
problems affect the capital markets’ ability to allocate assets in the real 
economy. Finally we present earlier research on investor types’ investment 
behavior.
2.1 Investor beliefs and motivations to trade
It is necessary to have different investor types if there are to be differing 
investment views on the market and if trading is expected to occur. If all 
investors are alike, the market moves in unison, and at the extreme no 
trading takes place142. With trading, markets can price traded goods based 
on supply and demand, and with pricing, allocate resources to most efficient 
uses143.
  Reasons for trading to occur have been discussed in financial economics 
(see, e.g., Harris and Raviv (1993), Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994), Allen and 
Gale (1999)). Fisher (1930) notes that the value of future income streams 
depends on human views: “Valuation is a human process in which foresight 
enters. Coming events cast their shadows before. Our valuations are 
142 Copeland and Weston (1992), chapter 1.B refers to subjective preferences: “An individual 
will make all investments in productive opportunities that have rates of return higher 
than his or her subjective rate of time preference.” “Without the existence of the capital 
markets, individuals […] may choose completely different investments because they have 
different indifference curves.” Through borrowing and lending, the capital markets allow 
all indifference curves to find an optimal consumption pattern on the capital market line.
143 See, e.g., Copeland and Weston (1992), page 4, chapter 1.A.
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always anticipations.” Thus, uncertain valuations may differ. Furthermore, 
Fisher refers to the varying impatience of agents: “… marginal degrees of 
impatience for all individuals in the market are brought into equality with 
[…] the market rate of interest.” A seminal tenet by Aumann (1976) posits 
that economic agents’  prior beliefs must differ or their knowledge must be 
private for posterior beliefs to differ – that is, if investors share common 
views and they know what others know, they will act similarly144. Later this 
position has been expanded: whenever one investor group’s prior beliefs 
change relative to the other’s, some trading will occur. Furthermore, trade 
may be generated by uneven dissemination of public information signals, 
belief disagreement may be the result of private information, or because 
investors simply interpret commonly known data differently (Harris and 
Raviv (1993)).
Sharpe (1964) adds investors’ risk aversion and time span as reasons why 
agents trade. In equilibrium on well-functioning capital markets, capital 
asset prices adjust so that each investor is able to attain his desired point 
along the capital market line; for that, the investor chooses his preferred 
time horizon and risk level. Varying risk aversion levels and practical 
matters such as varying reporting rules, taxations, investor’s industry 
regulations and liquidity preferences affect the choice of investments. 
This forms various “clienteles” for different investment time horizons on 
a functioning capital market. Should certain time horizons lack clientele, 
the market risk would rise for investments of such time horizon. Simply: 
a wide and well-functioning market has different investor types choosing 
their position on the capital market line. 
Summarizing the above seminal theories we note that the variance in 
beliefs, in information, and in motivation to participate on the capital 
markets ensures the functioning of the markets. 
2.2 Agency, intermediation and short-termism 
Given the variety of investors’ motivations for participating on the 
capital markets, there are several possibilities for agency problems in 
the investment industry. We focus on the equity capital markets and its 
participants. 
The type of relation between owners and companies and the intensity 
of ownership has been widely examined (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Jensen (1989), Holmström (1999), Gillan and Starks (2003) and 
Holderness (2003)). The spectrum of owners begins with an owner who is 
very present in the life of a company: an entrepreneur, a manager or a family. 
A continuum of owner types then follows that includes owners more or 
less distant from the company: blockholders, industrial owners, corporate 
144 Aumann (1976): “If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event [ ] 
are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.” 
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raiders or individuals. 
A specific type of owner is the agent owner who invests other people’s 
money at the agent’s discretion: mutual or pension funds145 belong to this 
category. Having relatively little material interest in their portfolio, agent 
owners are more prone to have other motivations than increasing the 
value of the company. Agent owners may signal their skills and effort in 
investing by reporting investment returns at short intervals. If such agents 
are evaluated on the basis on these frequent signals, they have an incentive 
to produce short-term profits, sometimes at the cost of long-term returns 
(see, e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), Asker, Farre-Mensa, and 
Ljungqvist (2014), or Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). Theories of 
short-term signaling on the equity capital markets are especially relevant 
in the growing asset management industry. Intermediation of ownership by 
asset managers and resulting long ownership chains146 dilutes direct Agent-
Principal monitoring, as presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
In this paper, we draw parallels between the corporate world (as described 
above) and the financial investment world. Jensen (1989) notes that “Wall 
Street now competes directly with senior management as a steward for 
shareholder wealth”. In the corporate world, short-term signaling could be 
seen as a corrective element of the capital markets: constant information 
on the market for control encourages efficiency in companies and corrects 
inefficiencies. Signaling about efficiency – even on a short term –should 
be value enhancing. However, as suggested by Grossman and Hart (1980) 
and Miller and Rock (1985), not all shareholders can analyze short- and 
long-term prospects correctly, and not all capable managers or investors 
are willing to share their educated views. Good appearance on the capital 
markets has become important in itself, as suggested by Lakonishok et al. 
(1991), who noted that fund managers sell past poor performers regardless 
of their future outlook. Thus, opportunistic signaling for short-term 
profit seeking persists. Critics of short-termism maintain that short-term 
result seeking destroys value when forsaking long-term investments (see, 
e.g., Stein (1996) and Derrien, Kecskés, and Thesmar (2014)). Summers 
(2015) notes that “After the events of recent years, the case for relying on 
speculative markets to drive the real economy — to whatever extent it had 
validity — is surely attenuated.” 
Compensation, a partial solution to agency problems 0n the corporate 
market, may accentuate short-termism on the asset management market. 
If investment managers are incentivized on a short-term basis (yearly, 
145 State investors would fall into the agent owner category, but for the discussion that 
ensues they do not face similar agency problems. States do not compete for assets under 
management and they do not strive to show short-term profits. The agency problem faced 
by many states lies in political interests that may pressure states to forsake short- and 
long-term profits for employment or other politically motivated considerations. See, e.g., 
Shleifer (1998), Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
146 For example, a mutual fund manages pension fund assets, the ultimate owner of which is 
the employee saving his pension. The chain may also include funds-of-funds.
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even quarterly) and they have no long-term ownership incentive, the 
investment activities are geared towards short-term profit reporting. 
Investment managers may also be compensated on the basis of their 
assets under management, thereby accentuating the need for positive 
short-term signaling to attract more wealth into a fund. Cohen, Gompers, 
and Vuolteenaho (2002) note that the open-ended structure of asset 
management organizations is the reason for asset managers’ cautious 
investing behavior: signaling is needed every day when attracting new money 
into the fund. In closed-end funds, money is invested at the beginning, and 
no new signaling is therefore needed during the lifetime of the fund. The 
closed-end fund structure may be one factor contributing to private equity 
owners’ success in turning companies around (Brunzell, Liljeblom, and 
Vaihekoski (2011)). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that asset managers 
will be motivated to use short-term signaling even if they have proper long-
term incentives in place: asset managers are uncertain of their own abilities 
to benefit from market mispricing, and risk averse managers tend to lose 
their nerve when market mispricing keeps increasing instead of being 
rapidly corrected. Thus risk aversion drives asset managers towards short-
term profits. Derrien, Kecskés, and Thesmar (2014) emphasize continuous 
redemptions as a reason for short-term profit seeking. Wong (2010) notes 
that asset management fee mechanics deter long-term behavior: some large 
investors do not pay asset management fees, but allow asset managers to 
use portfolio securities for share lending. However, such lending prevents 
asset managers from voting. If this is the only source of income for asset 
managers, they will have little interest in calling back the lent shares in 
order to use shareholder say on company matters. All in all, asset managers’ 
incentive to act on short-term motives is clear.
Other investors’ ability and incentives to actively monitor companies 
vary.  For example, industrial owners may act as better monitors than 
individuals who may not have access to company management. Many 
investors (individuals, small non-profits or small institutions) do not have 
the resources or motivation for monitoring147 companies, as suggested by 
Grossman and Hart (1980), let alone to assemble a large block of shares, 
as shown by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Thus, any direct ownership is not 
capable of compensating for growing indirect agent monitoring. 
Furthermore, Summers (2015) points out that too much long-termism is 
not beneficial, either. For example, in Japan, the keiretsu system insulated 
management from all outside control. Similarly, in Silicon Valley, “market 
participants who are willingly placing high valuations on start-ups that 
lack any profits and have little revenue may be putting too much, not too 
little, weight on the distant future.” A similar worry applies to non-profits 
147 As a special case of costly monitoring and short-termism, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
suggest that in order to benefit from the mispricing of long-term securities, more 
investment capacity and knowledge acquisition is required from the investor. Thus 
investors in general prefer arbitrage on short-term mispricings.
Are non-profits active equity investors?
133
who are of “eternal nature”148: if the preserving of original endowed assets 
is considered tantamount to following the founder’s wishes, foundations 
may become rigid owners whose motives decisively differ from those of a 
normal capitalist seeking to create value149. McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 
(2015) report that 42 percent of the institutions in their survey believe 
that the threat of an institution’s exit from ownership is an effective tool 
for disciplining management. The institutions surveyed further believed 
that the exit complements an activist strategy. In such a setting, the exit 
must be a real possibility in order that the threat be convincing, and long-
term ownership must always carry with it the (even if distant) possibility 
of selling. Also, The Economist (2015) acknowledges the danger of blindly 
idealizing long-term ownership: “Rather than trying to stipulate the horizon 
over which investors and firms should think, governments should promote 
competition. That is the best way to harness capitalism’s hyperactive 
energy in the service of growth.” 
Finally, there is a fundamental difference in economic behavior that 
is not observable: Is a long ownership period the result of “laissez-faire” 
attitude towards one’s portfolio, or is the decision not to trade conscious 
and repeatedly analysed? As long as we do not know the true thinking 
behind long ownership periods, inferences about benefits of long-termism 
remain uncertain.
Still, we can safely assume that long ownership periods allow for better 
information acquisition150 by the market participants (as assumed by, 
e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Bushee (2004), McCahery, Sautner, and 
Starks (2015)). Regulators are concerned about investor engagement, 
which may manifest itself through the length of ownership. In the UK, 
The Kay Review (2012) conducted a survey among market participants 
which noted that increasing share ownership by intermediaries, such as 
asset managers and pension funds, who are judged by quarterly results, 
leads to suboptimal choices in investments. This happens notwithstanding 
ultimate beneficiaries, fund owners or future pensioners, having a long-
term investment horizon. Asset managers are motivated to act based on 
their short-term interests and not to exercise their ownership rights151. The 
review recommended that equity markets be developed so as to encourage 
more direct, active and long-term ownership. 
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed in 2010 to correct many market 
deficiencies. It contained clauses related to short-termism in many details; 
148 A characteristic commonly mentioned by foundation administrators and lobbyists, and 
often considered an absolute virtue.
149 Eternal ownership may preclude the efficiency measures provided by the market for 
control: mergers or restructurings of assets. While producing better values, they can 
disrupt the direct ownership of an asset by the original non-profit owner. 
150 Information acquisition means thorough company and industry analysis as well as 
gathering tacit information about assets held.
151 Exercising ownership rights is costly: one must invest in analysis and take part in 
corporate meetings.
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for instance the Act limits certain shareholder nomination powers to only 
those shareholders who have been owners for at least two years, as well as 
imposes new regulations for asset managers152. The long-term operational 
strength of the market in facing short-term shocks is the core rationale of 
the Act. 
More direct participation by investors has been called for, though 
what such activity should be remains obscure. The above-mentioned 
initiatives also call for a more varied investor base for the capital markets. 
Unfortunately, measures and evidence for varied investor types are lacking. 
We next discuss several types of investors, their typical behavior, and 
the benefits of diversity to the economy. We also summarize the investor 
typologies presented in current research, and describe earlier research on 
the activities of non-profit investors.
2.3 Investor types’ behavior and activity
If a diverse investor base is beneficial to the capital markets, we are 
interested in identifying the observable criteria for categorizing investors. 
In other words, which characteristics signal differences in investors’ beliefs 
and behavior on the stock market153?
Bushee (2004) argues against the use of official national taxonomy. 
According to him, the advantage of such classification schemes is that 
investors’ legal type is readily available in most databases of institutional 
investor holdings. The key disadvantage is that there is tremendous 
variation within these legal type groups in terms of investment horizons 
and sensitivity to short-term news.154 Bøhren, Priestley, and Ödegaard 
(2009) argue that different owner types have different incentives and 
abilities to monitor, and thus the relationship between ownership and firm 
value depends on owner identity.
We claim that investor groups possess similar within-group motivations 
in their investment behavior. These motivations may be the result of 
regulation, taxation, investment time horizon, expertise, use of investment 
proceeds, or typical risk aversion in the investor group. Since these 
similarities exist across geographical areas, taxation systems and legal 
regimes, the typologies thus formed will be relevant for and applicable to 
most markets. This can hold true for pension funds (investment horizon of 
several decades), mutual funds (shorter term profit seeking) and non-profits 
(independence of reporting, often eternal nature). We maintain that some 
of these investor characteristics can have some bearing on investors’ direct 
152 See, e.g., Rose (2010).
153 We concentrate on the equity market which offers a wider variability of asset returns and 
risk.
154 A vivid example of within-group heterogeneity is legal type “Financial institutions”, 
which includes banks, mutual funds, pension funds and hedge funds.
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equity holdings, which we examine in this Essay155, and generalizations 
about investment style can be made on the basis of our findings.
We posit, based on earlier literature, that there are three ways for 
an investor to be “active”: active trading, active position taking or 
diversification, and shareholder activism. 
Activity in trading and activity in asset selection are significant factors 
defining investment style (see, e.g., Wermers (2000), Sharpe (1992), 
Cremers and Petäjistö (2009)). Wermers (2000) notes that the concept 
of “investment style” actually includes both trading activity and method 
of stock selection. He emphasizes the importance of detaching trading 
activity from other factors that affect returns: trading in itself is costly 
and thus influences returns negatively, but trading can also be associated 
with changes in the outlook for the investor’s stocks, and such “speedy 
reactions” yield positive returns. Furthermore, stock selection strategies, 
such as contrarian or momentum strategies, call for trading on the basis of 
the triggers that define the strategy. 
Trading activity is usually measured by portfolio turnover156. Asset 
selection has been defined by Sharpe (1992), who decomposes it into two 
decisions: firstly, selecting a style and, secondly, selecting the stock. He 
presents twelve possible asset classes which form the basis for investment 
styles, characterized by such factors as large cap, growth, value and 
geographical focus. Cremers and Petäjistö (2009) create a model to measure 
an equity portfolio’s deviation from an index, and use it as a measure of the 
asset manager’s activity. They compare their measure of activity, Active 
Share, to tracking error, the widely used measure of portfolio position 
taking.
A third dimension of activity is shareholder activism: influencing 
corporate decisions and governance, often referred to as the use of “voice”157. 
The existing research body examines US proxy contests, activist investors’ 
returns and activists’ methods for influencing the companies (Black (1998), 
Gillan and Starks (2000), Gillan and Hartzell (2003), Becht et al. (2009), 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2015)). However, our main focus in this 
essay is not on this type of activity158.
155 We omit two well-known equity investor types, family and state owners, from our 
examination, as they are by nature not likely to trade much, and their ownership tends 
to be long. Foreign owners are often examined; in our essay, they are included in the large 
category of “institutions”, which cross-border investros are almost invariably (see, e.g., 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)). 
156 We use the measure proposed by Barber and Odean (2001) for turnover, see also Appendix 
3.
157 See, e.g., Hirschman (1970).
158 As noted by Becht et al. (2009), understanding activist shareholding would necessitate 
detailed information about activists’ methods and investments, which is not available 
publicly. McCahery et al. (2015) surveyed 143 respondents, currently the most generizable 
view of investor activism. We conducted interviews with 16 Finnish non-profits to gain 
insights into their investment philosophies and ownership strategies, but did not engage 
in gathering proper clinical data about their shareholder activism.
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Referring to our discussion in Section 2.2., we note that all types of activity 
are beneficial to the capital markets. Long-term ownership may result in 
better information acquisition and in less one-directional investor trading 
in times of market failure. In contrast, frequent trading (short-termism) 
increases liquidity159 on the market and helps to eliminate mispricing, 
which is also beneficial.160
To summarize, the behavior of equity investor groups may be characterized 
by equity trading activity, shareholder activity and portfolio allocation. In 
Figures 4 and 5, we sketch investor typology by placing different investor 
types into different brackets of behavior, measured by trading and Active 
Share, or by trading and shareholder activity (or, more accurately, widely 
held prejudices thereof ). These behaviors form the cornerstones of the 
capital markets: trading is essential for efficient price formation, and both 
active risk taking and shareholder activism are crucial for efficient capital 
allocation in corporates.
High Active Share
”Away from index” 
Low Active Share
”Index investor”
High Trading Activity
”High Turnover”
Low Trading Activity
”Shares under mattress”
Family
Industrial Owner
Foundation 2
Foundation 1
Individual 3
Private Equity
Hedge Fund
Mutual Fund
Pension Funds
International Institutions
Individual 2
Individual 1
State
Figure 4. Two meanings of “Activity” on the equity market and the typical 
prejudices concerning the activity level of different investor types. The positions 
are illustrative and not quantified. On the vertical axis, high Active Share denotes 
active risk taking in a portfolio by diverting from the market index weights. Low 
Active share signifies emulating the market index weights in a portfolio. On the 
horizontal axis, high trading activity indicates actively changing one’s position 
in the stock. Low trading activity denotes buying and keeping shares for a long 
period.
As shown in Figure 4, large professional institutions are assumed to be 
159 The liquidity provided by the frequent traders can be even considered a public good 
(see Introduction, Section 2), as trading keeps the market continuously available for all, 
infrequent traders included.
160 See McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2015) for a summary of liquidity vs. intervention 
findings in research. They confirm that separate investor types either use intervention 
(or activism,”voice”), or are concerned about stock liquidity. 
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active traders who diversify along index weights. Individuals may either 
be index followers, diversifying their portfolio, but some may hold only 1-3 
shares that are never traded. State owners typically do not trade much, nor 
do family owners. Foundations are of many types, either active risk takers 
with one large (legacy) block holding, or careful diversifiers who trade little. 
Mutual funds typically diversify, whereas hedge funds take active bets at 
regular intervals.
Low Trading Activity
”Shares under mattress”
High Trading Activity
”High Turnover”
High Shareholder Activity
”Lead Investor” 
Low Shareholder Activity
”No expertise”
Family
Industrial Owner
Foundation 2
Private Equity
Pension Funds
Foundation 1
Mutual Fund
International Institutions
Individual 1Individual 2
State
Figure 5. Two meanings of “Activity” on the equity market and typical prejudices 
concerning the activity level of different investor types. The positions are illustrative 
and not quantified. On the vertical axis, high shareholder activity denotes active 
use of shareholder voice in annual general meetings, in conversations with 
management and possibly in board work. Low shareholder activity signifies 
little partaking in corporate matters but voting by exiting the ownership. On the 
horizontal axis, high trading activity indicates actively changing one’s position 
in the stock. Low trading activity denotes buying and keeping shares for a long 
period. 
In Figure 5, we categorize pension funds as activist shareholders. In 
some countries, pension funds are not activist shareholders, whereas they 
engage in proxy fights or nominate corporate boards161 in other countries. 
It has been proposed by Halim, Miller, and Dupont (2010) that they are not 
risk-takers (e.g., they have low Active Share), and that they are active in 
trading. Non-profits may be passive shareholders who vote with their feet, 
though in some instances they do seize corporate power162, especially if they 
161 Some American pension institutions initiate votings in general meetings, whereas in 
Finland pension institutions sit in numerous corporates’ boards and board nomination 
committees.
162 Large Danish “industrial foundations” own majorities in listed companies, and 
Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation has influence on ThyssenKrupp 
conglomerate.
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have legacy block holdings. International institutions may adopt a passive 
strategy abroad but have a more active role in their home country. The list 
of possible combinations of characteristics continues.
Our view is that Figures 4 and 5 are interesting and relevant in practice, 
though there is little empirical evidence supporting these behavioural 
combinations. The combinations raise further questions. No empirical 
evidence indicates that investor types would hold assumed pairs of 
behaviours. Indeed, no studies, to the best of our knowledge, show evidence 
of both factors: individuals can hold only 1-3 shares in their portfolio, 
but do they trade them? Mutual funds may be active traders but are they 
passive in using their vote? Are any two characteristics usually correlated? 
Nevertheless, we think attempts at this kind of investor typologies should be 
developed and examined with data, because they have practical implications 
for the regulation of the capital markets, as discussed in Section 2.2.
Numerous attempts have been made to shed light on actual investor 
types. The obvious problem in separating realistic investor types is the 
lack of predefined statistical classification, and hence the lack of separate 
sets of data for such investor groups. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) 
depart from customary owner typology by categorizing owners in terms 
of their relationship with the management. They classify investors into 
three groups: (1) pressure-sensitive institutions (insurance companies, 
banks, non-bank trusts owning at least one percent of stock); (2) pressure-
resistant institutions (public pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, 
foundations owning at least one percent); and (3) pressure-indeterminate 
institutions (corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, investment 
counsel firms and unidentified institutions owning less than one percent 
of stock). Bushee (1998) argues that classifying institutional investors 
based on their investor-specific behavior yields more homogenous investor 
groups and a more accurate understanding of ownership styles. He develops 
a methodology to classify institutional investors into groups based on past 
portfolio behavior, with measures such as trading frequency or the level 
of diversification. Faccio and Lang (2002) use plausible owner categories, 
but lump non-profits, cooperatives and foreign minority holders into one 
category. Kahan and Rock (2007) consider hedge funds that can operate 
with less regulatory constraints than traditional institutions. Reflecting 
the US pension institution market, French (2008) separates institutional 
investors into defined-plan and defined-cost pension plan managers, non-
profits and public pension institutions. Bøhren, Priestley, and Ödegaard 
(2009) differentiate industrial owners from financial institutions, and 
examine this characteristic in conjunction with the investment time 
horizon. Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) divide institutions into 
two categories, active and passive, and then calculate the concentration 
of a firm’s ownership into active hands. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2009) emphasize the heterogeneity of institutional investors: activists, 
pension funds, money managers, banks and corporations and especially 
blockholders among them. Becht et al. (2009) conduct a clinical study 
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of an activist fund in the UK, further categorizing this investor type into 
three operating types: collaborative, confrontational or mixed (of the two). 
Brunzell, Liljeblom, and Vaihekoski (2011) find that among institutional 
investor types, large private equity investors shield management the most 
from short-termism. 
We now turn to investor activity research and summarize earlier findings 
by type of activity: trading activity and active portfolio allocation. We do not, 
however, focus on shareholder activism in this paper. After that, we turn 
to our main focus, non-profit organizations, and summarize the research 
describing their investment activity.
2.3.1 Trading activity
Research on asset managers’ trading frequency should differentiate pure 
trading activity from other portfolio management methods, such as stock 
picking or momentum/contrarian strategies. Pure turnover can be seen as a 
cost to the portfolio, whereas timely changes in portfolio composition may 
be a vital element for returns. However, research often treats active trading 
and stock picking skills as a combined phenomenon (Wermers (2000)). 
Lakonishok et al. (1991) examine whether pension funds engage in 
“window dressing”, trading away stocks that have underperformed before 
reporting (regardless of their future outlook).  They note that asset managers 
are evaluated on the basis of their individual stock selection and not only 
on the basis of portfolio performance. This leads to short-term reallocation 
which may not be beneficial. Ceteris paribus, such motivation to reallocate 
increases the turnover of the portfolio, with the authors reporting a yearly 
average turnover of 50 percent among pension funds. 
Seeing turnover as a cost, Carhart (1997) finds that portfolio returns are 
negatively correlated with expense levels, which are higher for actively 
managed (e.g., much traded163) mutual funds. Carhart also finds a negative 
relation between a fund’s benchmark-adjusted net return to investors and 
its trading activity. He reports that funds trade 77 percent of the value of 
their assets yearly. 
Barber and Odean (2000) find that individuals trade too frequently and 
thus forsake returns. They also report that investors tend to prefer stocks 
in companies that are headquartered near where the investor lives. Barber 
and Odean (2001) investigate differences in the investment styles of men 
and women. The authors report that women turn their portfolios over 
approximately 53 percent annually while men turn their portfolios over 
approximately 77 percent annually. They also report that the medians 
are significantly lower than averages, suggesting that among individual 
investors there are high-frequency traders, though the majority of 
163 This straight-forward definition was later challenged by Wermers (2000). Activity in 
asset selection does not necessarily mean more frequent trading. 
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individuals trade relatively little (21 percent yearly). 
Reid and Millar (2004) refer to public discussion about whether 
managers of stock mutual funds trade securities too frequently. The belief 
has taken hold that stock fund managers turn over securities so frequently 
that the average holding period is one year or less. The trading activity of 
fund managers is important because excess trading causes costs to funds 
(see also Barber and Odean (2001), Carhart (1997)). The authors dissect 
common methods to assess turnover in mutual funds, and suggest that the 
correct turnover measure for mutual funds is an “asset-weighted” average. 
This measure gives more weight to funds with large amounts of assets and, 
accordingly, indicates the average portfolio turnover actually experienced 
by the largest pool of fund owners. This turnover ratio was 51 percent in 
2004 in the US, whereas a simple average of the turnover for the funds’ was 
117 percent. 
Bushee (1998) classifies investor groups by observing trading activity 
with strategies that affect trading frequency. He defines three investor 
groups: “Transient” owners have high turnover and low use of momentum 
strategies; “Quasi-indexers” diversify but trade relatively little and their 
trading is not based on momentum; and “Dedicated” owners do not diversify 
but have a high concentration of holdings, and do not trade actively. Bushee 
notes that quasi-indexers comprise approximately 70 percent of his sample 
of 8,000+ investors, while dedicated owners account for only 4 percent. 
Using a similar investment activity classification, Koh (2007) observes a 
relation between investor type and short-termist behavior: he finds that 
only long-term institutional shareholders constrain aggressive earnings 
management, suggesting that long-term holders try to avoid losses due to 
short-termism164. 
Treating trading as a method for executing investment strategy, Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2000) study the extent to which past returns determine 
the propensity of various investor types to buy and sell. They examine 
whether the choice of momentum or contrarian investment style drives 
the performance of investor types. They note that the behavioural trading 
patterns are typically strong, suggesting that the behavior is common to 
a large proportion of the investors in each category. The authors use the 
EU classification for investor types: households, non-profits, government, 
finance and insurance institutions, nonfinancial corporations and foreign 
investors. They further divide households into small, medium and large 
portfolio holders. Grinblatt and Keloharju find that households are more 
likely to trade with a contrarian style, whereas governments and non-
profits are less contrarian than household investors but more contrarian 
than nonfinancial corporations and finance and insurance institutions. 
They show foreign investors to be momentum investors. All in all, more 
sophisticated investors tend to be less contrarian, and sophistication is also 
164 However, Koh (2007) finds that the presence of transient owners is not systematically 
associated with earnings management. 
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related to performance. However, the performance differences were found 
to be weaker than the behavioral differences165. 
Bushee (2004) classifies investors by the stability of their ownership 
in companies. He forms three distinct groups: Transient, Dedicated and 
Quasi-indexer investors. Bushee reports investors’ quarterly portfolio 
turnover and percent of portfolio stocks held continuously for the past two 
years. Transient owners’ turnover (quarterly) is 74 percent and percent of 
long-term stocks is 25 percent. For Dedicated, turnover is below 1 percent 
and long-term stock holding account for over 75 percent of portfolio. For 
Quasi-indexers, turnover is 8 percent and long-term holdings climb to 98 
percent of portfolio. The results suggest that index-followers, rather than 
block holders, are the most stable owners.  
Petersen (2006) conducts a survey of 207 Finnish foundations and 
reports that 103 foundations’ equity portfolio yearly turnover in 2004 was 
15 percent on average. 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2015) survey 142 institutional investors 
who, as a result of the sampling method, include mostly activist, long-term 
investors. The authors categorize investors into three holding periods: 
short (less than six months), medium (six months to two years) and long 
(more than two years). They find that 29 percent of the investors surveyed 
belonged to the medium holding period group and 71 percent to the long 
one. McCahery et al. find that long-term ownership includes a threat of exit, 
which is seen as a complement to active ownership.
We summarize the evidence on yearly turnover of investors’ portfolios in 
Table 20 below. 
165 Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) observe the same: institutions dilute their 
superior trading skills by reverting back to the market index. Thus, the performance 
between investor groups does not differ as much as behaviour does. 
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Evidence on investors’ average  
yearly turnover
Study Year Investor type Yearly turnover
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, 
Vishny
1991 Pension Funds 50 %
Carhart 1997 Mutual Funds 77 %
Wermers 2000 Mutual Funds 59 %
Barber and Odean 2001 Individuals
Women 53 %, Men 77 %,  
Median 21 %
Reid and Millar 2004 Mutual Funds 117 %
Bushee 2004 Transient institutions 296 %
  Dedicated below 4 %
  Quasi-indexers 32 %
Petersen 2006 Foundations 15 %
Cremers and Petäjistö 2009 Mutual Funds 95 %
Table 20. Evidence on investors’ average yearly turnover. Turnover is measured 
as half of the sum of the value of buys and sells of a portfolio, divided by the total 
value of the portfolio. See also Appendix 3.
As evidenced in Table 20, yearly turnovers are well below 100 percent 
(which would mean that the investor trades the whole value of the portfolio 
in a year). Mutual funds do trade somewhat more actively than other 
investor types. Individuals, especially the median individual, trade the least 
in a year. Available empirical evidence seems to cover only such investor 
types for whom data has been available.
2.3.2 Active portfolio allocation
An active equity portfolio manager can attempt to outperform the 
benchmark only by taking positions that are different from the benchmark. 
This deviation can be a result of either stock picking or factor timing166 
(Cremers and Petäjistö (2009)). Investor activity can be motivated by 
outperformance and measured by the portfolio’s deviation from the market 
index. 
Following the market index is not the same as diversification, and deviating 
from the market index is not necessarily risk-taking. Diversification 
means reducing non-systematic risk by investing in a variety of assets, 
the composition of which need not follow the (local, global, or otherwise 
relevant) market general index. Nevertheless, if all investors seek to 
diversify, they can only invest in available securities at market weights: 
there are fewer Hershey shares to buy than Apple or Exxon, and all investors 
166 Factor timing involves time-varying bets on systematic risk factors such as entire 
industries, sectors of the economy, or more generally any systematic risk relative to the 
benchmark index.
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cannot decide to diversify only with shares that have a small market 
capitalization. Furthermore, investing in a variety of shares unavoidably 
means investing in many (index) shares, whereas deviating from the 
market index would be achieved by investing in only a few shares, leaving 
out many index shares. Accordingly, the investment industry customarily 
refers to the following of the market index composition as “diversification”. 
For instance, the most widespread measure of portfolio’s risk-taking (and, 
roughly, diversification), the tracking error, only measures the deviation of 
a portfolio’s past returns from those of the market index portfolio. Having 
acknowledged the semantic difference between diversification and risk-
taking in a portfolio, we will occasionally refer to the general term of 
diversification when discussing findings on investors’ equity portfolios.
We summarize below previous evidence on investors’ choice of equity 
portfolio allocation and their deviation away from the market index, with 
special attention given to the trade-off between taking active risks and 
gaining returns, versus showing short-term returns or less risk.
Building on both the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and 
an additional factor capturing the one-year momentum anomaly presented 
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Carhart (1997) creates a model of factors 
contributing to the performance of mutual funds. These factors essentially 
represent various types of risks taken in order to achieve excess returns. 
Starting from CAPM167, risk is measured as a deviation from the market 
index. Carhart finds that his 4-factor model explains cross-sectional 
variations in mutual fund returns. Thus, returns are driven by the funds’ 
decisions to deviate from the market index. 
Del Guercio (1996) shows that asset managers that are more exposed to 
the US “prudent man” laws, such as banks managing pension investments, 
tend to invest more in stocks that are viewed as prudent. This may explain 
such asset managers’ poor performance compared to other asset managers, 
such as mutual funds that are less exposed to prudent man laws. Del 
Guercio notes that the legislation is counterproductive. A similar comment 
by an asset manager is reported by Wong (2010): asset managers are bound 
by fiduciary duty to their clients. This may lead them to realize short-term 
gains instead of longer-term value increase. 
Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutions are 
able to trade better than other investors, but in longer term miss out on 
this return advantage because they converge towards index weights. The 
authors discuss reasons for following the index: asset managers’ rules 
and regulations limit their risks in single positions or their instruments 
(short selling, leverage), and asset managers want to offer products that 
complement investors’ overall portfolios well. In a similar vein, Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003) note: “Institutional investors may move into styles 
with good past performance simply because such strategies are easier to 
167 Capital Asset Pricing Model, see Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965).
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justify ex-post to those monitoring their actions.” The ease of explanation is 
important in small institutions (and in non-profits where mission expertise 
often outweighs business expertise). However, this leads to lesser returns 
(see, e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1999)).
Cremers and Petäjistö (2009) start by noting that tracking error, the 
traditional measure for deviation from market index, does reflect only 
factor timing in allocation. They suggest a new measure to complement 
tracking error: the Active Share of a portfolio168. Examining mutual funds 
with both tracking error and Active Share, the authors find that a significant 
fraction of large funds are “closet indexers” and that a deviation from index 
should be defined two-dimensionally: with tracking error, which takes into 
account past return covariances, and with Active Share, which takes into 
account pure stock selection activity.  Cremers and Petäjistö discuss the 
shift from active to passive management in the 1990s, and how the short-
term behavior limits the “invisible hand” operated by mutual funds on 
the capital markets: “Part of this is due to index funds, but an even larger 
part is due to closet indexers and a general tendency of funds to mimic the 
holdings of benchmark indexes more closely. Furthermore, about half of all 
active positions at the fund level cancel out within the mutual fund sector, 
thus making the aggregate mutual fund positions even less active.” 
Cuoco and Kaniel (2009) examine how incentivization methods of 
portfolio managers affect portfolio selection. They suggest that when 
portfolio managers are symmetrically rewarded (for both profits and 
losses), they tend to follow the index more closely. 
Halim, Miller, and Dupont (2010) note that pension funds recognize the 
importance of surplus risk (mismatch between assets and liabilities), but 
they concentrate their risk management efforts to active management risks 
(tracking error policy)169. The authors note that tracking error has been only 
1.3 percent on average in their survey, for USD 2 trillion of global pension 
assets. Pension insurers seem to follow the index.
Ivković, Sialm, and Weisbenner (2008) find that household owners with 
large non-diversified equity accounts earn excess returns compared to 
diversified portfolios. They compare their results to findings showing that 
specialized mutual funds sometimes perform better than widely diversified 
funds. The authors accredit this phenomenon to superior stock-picking 
skills of these non-diversified investors. Such superior skill may be based 
on expertise acquired from professional life.
In a similar vein, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) study US individual 
stockholders’ portfolios and their diversification in 1991-1996. They found 
that while individuals’ diversification policies changed over time, evidenced 
by an increase in the mean number of stocks from four to seven in investors’ 
168 Active Share is explained in detail in Appendix 3, and it is used in Section 4.
169 This may be a result of “what you can measure is what you get”, but new practical 
measures, such as ones introduced by Cremers and Petäjistö (2009), may help alleviate 
one-sided risk measurements.
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portfolios during the sample period, diversification was not commonly used. 
In Goetzmann and Kumar’s data diversification increases with investor’s 
age, income, wealth, and education. Sophisticated investors (who, e.g., buy 
options) also diversify more on average. Furthermore, better diversified 
investors are more likely to have better returns. However, Goetzmann and 
Kumar also find that a small subset of investors consistently attains higher 
returns while diversifying little. The authors suggest such individuals have 
superior information about the issuers, or better stock picking skills. 
Keloharju, Kasanen, and Lehtinen (2015) report that most individual 
investors hold poorly diversified portfolios: in their sample, 46 percent of 
individual investors had only one stock in their portfolio and 16 percent 
held two stocks. However, individuals who had an equity portfolio worth 
more than 1 million euros owned on average 18 stocks. For small investors, 
diversification may be a function of diversification costs170.
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2015) survey 142 institutional investors 
who, as a result of the sampling method, include mostly activist, long-term 
investors. They find that the respondents held most of their investments – 
75 percent on average – in active rather than purely passive (index-weighed) 
positions. The median for active investments’ share was 90 percent.  
We collect previous evidence about investors’ average diversification, 
active allocation and deviation from the market index in Table 21 below.
Evidence on average tracking error,  
Active Share or diversification
Study Year Investor type Measure
Barber and Odean 2000 Individuals Average 4 stocks
Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho 2002 Institutions Tracking error 1.6 % 
Ivkovic, Sialm, Weisbrenner 2008 Individuals Average 3.9 stocks 
Goetzmann and Kumar 2008 Individuals Average 6.3 stocks
Cremers and Petäjistö 2009 Mutual Funds 60 % Active Share
Halim, Miller and Dupont 2010 Pension Funds Tracking error 1.3 %
McCahery, Sautner and Starks 2015 Long-term institutions Active Share 90 %
Keloharju, Kasanen and Lehtinen 2015 Individuals
62 % of individuals hold 
1-2 stocks
Table 21. Evidence on investors’ active allocation and index-following. Tracking 
error is the standard deviation of the difference between the portfolio and index 
returns. Active Share is the deviation of the portfolio holdings’ weights from the 
index weights, see Appendix 3.
170 Keloharju, Kasanen, and Lehtinen (2015) note that their paper does not cover indirect 
holdings like mutual funds. For small investors it is more cost efficient to diversify by 
owning mutual funds.
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The existing empirical findings on investor active risk taking (away from 
index weights) are rather clear. Individuals diversify very little: they hold 
just a handful of shares. Institutions appear to be index investors, whereas 
mutual funds seem to be fairly active in weighing their bets away from the 
index.
2.3.3 Non-profits’ investor activity
The main body of research about non-profit owners examines the 
association of non-profit ownership and company performance. In these 
studies we find indications to the ownership styles of non-profits, as well 
as specific reasons why non-profits behave differently from institutional or 
individual investors. However, empirical evidence on non-profits as equity 
portfolio investors is lacking, even though this is the most common type of 
non-profit investor in the world.
Hansmann (1990) provides a first structured review of various 
justifications for university endowments and their spending levels. 
His treatise is an excellent basis for defining intertemporal investment 
objectives and spending rules of non-profits. Hansmann applies common 
business investment calculations to the problem of defining how much 
should be spent now, versus invested for future use. He notes that the 
demand for intergenerational equity, the often cited reason for endowment 
accumulation, is justified only if financial investment returns are higher 
than consumer income growth. In such a case, a university could offer 
more purchasing power to future generations than to the present one by 
investing most of its proceeds and accumulating its endowment. However, 
if investment returns are not higher than income growth, or higher than 
other yields that one could get from the use of money today (such as a faster 
invented cure for cancer), university endowments should not limit spending 
and invest in eternity, but spend confidently today. Hansmann provides 
an intellectually sound basis for deciding between non-profit spending or 
saving (=investing), but he does not enter a more detailed discussion about 
investment strategy choices. 
Merton (1993) takes a step further and discusses university endowments 
as investors. Merton derives optimal investment and expenditure policy 
for university endowments in a context which takes account of overall 
university objectives and the availability of other sources of revenue 
besides the endowment. Thus Merton nods to Hansmann’s reminder that 
the endowment is not the only form of wealth universities possess. He 
considers the wealth effect as well as the substitution effect of various asset 
types with different riskiness of cash flow: all nominal wealth is not equally 
valuable. For instance, if donations vary in line with stock markets, the 
future cash flows from donations can be considered to include a “shadow” 
stock market risk. If the conservative investment policies of universities 
have seemed a paradox, it is resolved once the endowment is recognized 
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as representing only a part of the wealth of the university. The riskiness of 
all assets defines the investment policy of the endowment asset. Merton 
expands his discussion to include not only assets but also the cost base of 
a university, and the use of endowment as a hedge against cost inflation 
(in, e.g., rent or heating expenses). Merton’s theses are in line with the 
recommendation made by Carroll and Stater (2008) that a diversified 
revenue structure for non-profit organizations consists of relatively equal 
reliance on revenue generated from donative income, earned income, and 
investment income.
Herrmann and Franke (2002) compared the performance and 
investment171 of 65 foundation-owned German firms’ with those of 
306 listed German corporations over the years 1990-92. They found no 
significant difference in performance in foundation-owned firms and in 
listed non-foundation-owned firms. The authors hypothesize that control 
has been overall weak in German listed companies (until 1995, when capital 
markets laws were amended). The profit volatility is lower in foundation-
owned firms. The authors also compare results with Thomsen’s (1999) 
Danish findings and discuss implications that foundation-owned firms 
in both countries integrate more operations into themselves, signaling 
perhaps empire-building.
Thomsen and Rose (2002) compare the stock performance and return-
on-assets in foundation-owned Danish corporates to those in other listed 
companies. They study all listed companies in the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange between 1996 and 1999, all in all 171 firms. Of them, 20 were 
majority-controlled by a foundation. They find no significant difference 
in performance between foundation-owned and other companies172. The 
authors posit that absence of short-termism may contribute to the success 
of foundation ownership173. They also note that mainstream explanations 
for foundations’ success do not explain their result: creditor control is 
not significant for these companies, management turnover is low, and 
competition is not instantly correcting, as shown by high profitability of 
the corporates174. The authors discuss reputation as a strong motive for 
foundation administrators. They also note the often-quoted advantage 
of foundation-owners: absence of short-termism. Finally, they suggest 
171 As well as many other characteristics such as payout, depreciation or use of raw material.
172 For stock performance this finding is somewhat self-perpetuating. If foundations 
are poor owners, this would be reflected already in the share price. However, the ROA 
measure shows that foundation-owned corporates fare a little better, but not significantly 
so.Thomsen and Rose (2002), p. 26.
173 Thomsen and Rose suggest, however, that ownership factor may be endogeneous on the 
Danish market. 
174 Thomsen and Rose (2002), p. 27.
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the companies’ ownership may be endogenous175, given the long-standing 
ownership patterns on the Danish market. 
Eldenburg et al. (2004) study American hospital ownership data in 
1980-1996, including 486 hospitals, and compare ownership by for-profit 
and non-profit owners. They analyze board composition, CEO turnover, 
ownership type change against performance by several measures. They find 
that differences between for-profit and non-profit hospitals’ performance 
are not large. Rather, the largest differences are within the non-profit sector, 
between communal, charitable, religious and other non-profit owners. 
Klick and Sitkoff (2008) study the event of attempted sale of Hershey 
Foods by its controlling non-profit shareholder, the Milton Hershey School 
Trust, in 2002 in the US. The trust owns some 30 percent of the listed 
company. On announcement of the sale the share price of Hershey showed 
a 25 percent abnormal daily return, reflecting improved prospects for 
governance and possibility of a future takeover. However, the Pennsylvania 
Attorney General prohibited the sale, and Hershey price slid by 12 percent. 
The authors consider this event a robust signal of the value-destroying 
nature of non-diversified foundation owners, who also face the political risk 
of being regulated by politically motivated officials, in absence of economic 
owners. 
Klick and Sitkoff (2008) conclude that the benefit of a controlling 
blockholder depends on the blockholder’s incentives and the quality of the 
blockholder’s own governance. Benefits from active blockholders are not 
automatic but depend on the quality and actions of the blockholder. The 
authors note that among non-profit owners the Milton Hershey School 
Trust is non-diversified and lacking in its own governance, leading to poor 
performance as a blockholder176.
French (2008) estimates the ownership of American listed shares by non-
profit organizations in 1980 as 8.3 percent and in 2007 as 6.0 percent of the 
market capitalization. He combines statistics with anecdotal evidence and 
concludes that non-profits still have a large part of their wealth in direct 
equity holdings (34 percent) and that the well-known shift from equity to 
alternatives has been smaller than believed. Non-profits seem to continue 
to own legacy shares and direct, easily-understandable holdings.
Hansmann and Thomsen (2013) examine a special situation where 
foundations are majority-owners of listed companies. There were 117 
companies on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that have a foundation 
as the majority owner. The authors do not address “investment style” as 
Danish foundations typically own just one (or a few) stocks for the long term. 
175 Thomsen and Rose (2002) quote, e.g., Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998), Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001). However, endogenuity is in contrast with a discussion in a more 
extensive study on Danish foundations (Hansmann and Thomsen (2013)). Thomsen and 
Rose suggest ownership structures are historic and random, and do not change in an agile 
way.
176 Klick and Sitkoff (2008) in, e.g., describing the volatile reactions of the trustees when 
receiving proper bids.   
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Hansmann and Thomsen form an overall concept of “Managerial Distance” 
consisting of six factors perceived to assess separation of foundation 
owners from companies they own. The components improving the Distance 
are Board separation from owners, portion of outside ownership, listing, 
the foundation owning multiple companies, physical separation between 
foundation and company headquarters, and the existence of a charitable 
purpose in the foundation. Observations for 96 foundation-owned 
companies’ financial performance vs. Distance index was tested against 
listed non-foundation owned companies over a five-year period. The 
authors find statistically significant, positive association between Distance 
and performance. The Separation and Outside-ownership components are 
found to be non-linear: while Distance is good, too much of a good thing 
is not. Company performance is highest for low but non-zero separation 
from the foundation owner, suggesting that 1-2 owner’s representatives – 
and not more – in the company board is beneficial. For Outside ownership, 
performance peaks when foundation ownership is between 50 and 75 
percent. This is a level where a foundation gets most of the benefits from 
its owner’s activity.
Hansmann and Thomsen (2013) conclude that material incentives do 
not drive foundations’ motivation. The explanation for foundations’ good 
performance as owners must come from behavioral incentives such as 
influence, identity, cognitive biases177 or foundations’ insulation from 
short-termism. 
It emerges from previous empirical evidence that non-profits have been 
examined as owners of business, but less so as portfolio investors (only to 
some extent by Merton (1993), French (2008)). As owners of businesses, 
foundations are found to be long-term holders, non-diversified and not 
active in changing their holdings. Their level and style of activity as owners 
varies, which is shown, e.g., by Hansmann and Thomsen’s (2013) Distance-
measure.
2.3.4 Summary of previous evidence on investor activity
There have been several attempts to understand institutions beyond 
official statistics typology. “Institutions” is a somewhat controversial 
owner category: largely speaking all investors are institutions178, bar living 
persons. We adopt the philosophy that “institutions” equals professional 
177 The authors refer to, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Akerlof and Kranton (2005).
178 If limited liability company form is an institution, all kinds of ultimate owners can be 
behind such façade. Families and states can organize their holdings through investment 
companies. Industrial owners operate through another company. Pension funds can 
be mutuals, foundations or cooperatives. “Financial institutions” can include asset 
managers, but ownership of industry by large banks has decreased in developed countries. 
Carving out a convincing definition of “an institution” is challenging.
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investors who wish and can179 optimize their portfolio composition on the 
basis of portfolio theories. According to this logic, we maintain that asset 
managers, pension funds and investment companies fall into institutions-
category. They have, nevertheless, different equity ownership patterns, 
according to the existent empirical evidence.
Pension fund investors are often assumed to converge towards some 
reference index. This convergence can be considered to decrease investment 
risks, especially if index-following is seen as diversification. However, 
diligent index-following may diminish these institutions’ excess returns 
that they would attain with their superior stock selection capability. Their 
ownership in company stocks changes actively and most have so far not, in 
aggregate, taken an active owner role. If they wished to exercise long-term 
shareholder rights and defer trading, they would need to invest in owner 
activities and to build proprietary owner capabilities. Activism might also 
cause limitations to their capability to buy and sell shares, presenting a cost 
of illiquidity180. 
Hedge funds and institutions that are not subject to strict regulations do 
not need to consider short-term signaling in their operations and can thus 
attain higher returns from their investments.
Mutual funds often loosely follow index diversification but can move 
more or less away from it, depending from their stated strategy.  The 
evidence about mutual funds’ trading frequency suggests that on average, 
mutual funds trade from half to all of the portfolio asset value in a year. 
Households and individuals are found not to be as sophisticated investors 
as other types of investors: they under-diversify and exhibit overconfident 
investment behavior, which leads to costs and decreased returns. A large 
majority of individuals trades relatively infrequently, although variance 
among low and high traders is very high (investors’ average turnover is 
clearly higher than median turnover).
Previous research body presents an interesting take on non-profits as 
company owners; however, only one researcher studies how non-profits 
behave as portfolio investors – a role they commonly and increasingly have 
across the world. We continue by presenting our data that allows us to 
examine foundations’ equity portfolio investment style. 
179 Ability comes from being a large enough investor to carry the necessary information 
acquisition and transaction costs. 
180 Gillan and Starks (2003) presents a summary of the costs of activism.
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3. Data, variables and hypotheses
3.1 Data
We set out to examine empirically non-profit foundations’ investment 
style. Our data is from Finland, northern Europe. Finland is a developed, 
small, open economy with a relatively short history of capital accumulation. 
In non-profit comparisons Finland is categorized to be an average country 
both by the size of the non-profit sector as well as by the growth of the 
sector, according to Anheier (2001). It can be considered as a laboratory for 
non-profit research, because it possesses the typical mission, wealth, and 
operational structures of European foundations.
The holdings of Finnish non-profit investors have been documented by 
Keloharju, Kasanen, and Lehtinen (2015). Their data is a full population of 
direct, listed securities holdings between January 1, 1995 and January 1, 
2015 on the NASDAQ Helsinki Exchange. They report that at the beginning 
of 2015, non-profit institutions held on average 4.9 listed shares in their 
(listed) portfolio, whose median value was 295.000 euros. The number of 
non-profit investors was 5600181 and they held a total of 3.9 percent of the 
market capitalisation of listed securities. However, Keloharju et al. do not 
report details such as trading or diversification activities of investor groups.
Our data on Finnish foundations was obtained from the Finnish Ministry 
of Justice. There were 2836 registered foundations in Finland at the end of 
June 2014 and our sample includes 891 of those foundations. The data was 
collected minutely by the Ministry as a background material for redrafting 
foundation legislation. It includes detailed information about foundations’ 
objective or “mission industry”182, rules, year of registration, details about 
administrative organ formation, and powers, as registered by the end of 
181 The number includes not only foundations but also several other types of non-profits, such 
as associations, trade unions and churches.
182 What the charitable mission of the foundation is. The classification is UN classification, 
International Classification of Non-Profit Organisations, ICNPO.
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year 2011, as well as the foundations’ financial information for the years 
2010-2012. The sample is at first randomly collected, then augmented with 
foundations that have taken part in the Ministry’s surveys – such cases 
tend to be large and/or active foundations. Data collection and content are 
explained in Appendices 1 and 2. 
Our second dataset includes direct, listed share ownership data from 
Euroclear Finland183 for 872 foundations184. Out of these, 530 turned out 
to have had direct listed equity ownership between 2000 and 2013. The 
data includes their ownership of listed shares on the NASDAQ Helsinki –
exchange on 31 December in the years 2000-2013, the corresponding share 
price, and the industry category of each owned share. The time period 
includes market extremes of the “techno bubble” in the years 2000-2002 
and sub-prime crisis in the years 2008-2009, but is not dominated by such 
events, as the time period extends beyond those time points. Not one share 
or industry value is dominant during the whole time period.
The old Foundations Act of 1930 was in force during our data period. The 
Act required foundations to invest in a “secure and profitable manner”, 
which was generally agreed to be contradictory, and which did not guide 
investment activities of foundations. This guideline was deleted from 
the new Foundation Act of 2015, and currently foundations are expected 
to “define an investment plan”. It is our belief that the old legislation did 
not limit or guide the equity investment decisions of foundations, which 
are studied in this Essay. Similarly, the taxation in force in Finland during 
our data sample period did not guide the equity trading or diversification 
decisions of foundations185.
Our data is limited to direct, listed, domestic186 shareholdings, excluding 
thus other equity instruments such as equity funds, private equity 
investments and direct shareholdings in non-listed companies. In addition, 
other asset classes such as fixed income, real estate, or cash are not in the 
data. As a result, we cannot analyse the success of allocation between asset 
classes. We limit our attention to the change and diversification of direct 
equity holdings, and draw conclusions about investment style from those. 
Admittedly, equity investment style is not necessarily representative of 
the investor’s overall investment philosophy. In euro values, the portion 
183 Keeper of the book-entry settlements infrastructure in Finland. Euroclear handles all 
share transactions on the Nasdaq Helsinki exchange, as well as on smaller competing 
market places. All shareholdings are registered in this system, both those of institutions 
and of individuals. 
184 Data was obtained before the final 17 additions to the sample were made (see Appendix 
2). Two foundation-conglomerates were dissembled into subsidiary units as they were 
known to include significant shareholdings on subsidiary level.
185 See Section 4.1.2 of the first Essay of this book for a more detailed discussion about 
the regulatory environment of foundations. Verotoimisto The Finnish Tax Authority 
(2002) shows guidelines about charities’ investment operations not being interpreted as 
competitive, market-based business operations.
186 Here, domestic means shares that are listed in Finland. Such companies may be domiciled 
in other countries, such as TeliaSonera and Nordea in Sweden.
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invested by sample foundations into equity is estimated to be some 62 
percent of their aggregate portfolio value, and of that, over 70 percent is 
invested in direct equity holdings, and 68 percent is invested in the home 
market (according to Ahdekivi (2014), based on interviews). The sample 
population is skewed, with largest foundations representing a majority of 
investment value. If we take the average of equity-portfolio-to-total-assets 
ratio for all sample foundations, the direct domestic equity portfolio is 
39 percent of total assets on average.  Consequently, our sample of direct, 
listed, domestic equity holdings may represent a significant part of sample 
foundations overall investments. 
A potential limitation of our analysis is that we cannot convincingly 
establish a causal relation between hypothesized causes of investment 
behaviour on one hand, and the trading or allocation decision on the other 
hand. Our foundation characteristics data is from one point of time (the 
year 2012, see Appendix 2), and our share ownership data is a time-series 
from the years 2010-12. The first and necessary condition for causality is 
that the cause preceeds the result. Given our data, we cannot observe the 
time sequence of establishment of foundation type (or source of finance or 
governance) and portfolio choices or trading decisions. However, the more 
permanent nature of finance base and governance model suggest that the 
causality may run as we have modelled187. We can only measure correlations 
and, whenever appropriate, we use economic reasoning about and anecdotal 
evidence from foundations, regulators and auditors to conjecture about the 
potential causal relation.
Another shortcoming of examining foundations’ investment style is the 
absence of comparable empirical research in Finland, in the Nordic countries 
and in the developed world. Firstly, non-profit investors have not been a 
focus of research based on finance or investment theories, probably because 
of their very “non-profit” status, which is seen as an oxymoron for investors. 
Perhaps due to their alleged conservative-passive behavior, non-profits have 
not been deemed to be interesting economic agents on the capital markets. 
Secondly, most of the investor type empiria relies on public statistical 
classification based on legal status that bundles “financial institutions” or 
“corporates” into one bracket, while we know that there are vital differences 
within such groupings (for instance, in the behavior of mutual funds versus 
activist funds. See, e.g., Bushee (2004)). The classifications available are 
most often irrelevant to many behavioral research questions. Thirdly, some 
investor groups are not regulated and not liable to report in a similar way 
as institutions, banks or corporates: the state and family owners are such 
unregulated owners, and reliable, representative and relevant empirical 
information about them is scarce. Indeed, the overall scarcity of investment 
behavior empiria has motivated our attempt to form empirical comparison 
points between genuine investor types.
187 For a more detailed discussion see Section 3.1 in the first Essay of this book.
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3.2 Variables
To measure the allocation policies and trading activity of foundations, we 
choose three measures for their equity investments portfolio: deviation 
from the overall industry sector breakdown of the stock market as a 
measure for activity in portfolio allocation; the euro-value turnover and the 
single-stock-based change-in-ownership as measures for trading activity. 
Deviation is measured with Active Share, a ratio developed by Cremers 
and Petäjistö (2009) and explained in Appendix 3. It is the deviation of a 
portfolio from market index value weights. We calculated Active Share on 
the industry level: how much a portfolio deviates from the overall industry 
breakdown of the market index.
We also want to gain an understanding of frequency of trading. For that, 
we first employ the measure of turnover of the equity portfolio as in Barber 
and Odean (2001)188. Turnover is calculated as the number of shares sold 
or purchased during a year, times the beginning-of-year price per share, 
divided by the total beginning-of-year market value of the foundation’s 
portfolio. This ratio is then divided by two to get an intuitive measure 
for change relative to portfolio value. It should be noted that turnover is 
inherently a value-weighted concept, where valuable holdings and their 
changes drive the ratio.
However, the turnover measure does not answer our questions about 
investor activity fully. Firstly, unlike most other institutional investors 
who remain invested rather steadily, there are foundations that seem to 
have a “love/hate-relationship” with the equity market. Our sample period 
includes subperiods that may invite extreme behavior from investors who 
are not bound by investment regulation: hubris during the techno-bubble 
in 2000-2002, disappointment in 2002-2003 due to rapid decline of the 
market, new optimism during 2004-2007, collapse of the whole market 
in 2008 and upturn for most shares in 2009-2013, although 2011 included 
a smaller market downturn, too (Chart 3a and 3b). Our data includes 
foundations who have either left the market at several points (50 percent 
turnover in that year), or have increased their equity investments manifold 
in one year (typically during 2006)189. Their ratios, while rebuilding 
positions, show, e.g., 1300 percent turnover. These swings tend to influence 
turnover averages, but the phenomenon is limited to a small number of 
foundations. 
Secondly, if a foundation is a long-term owner in one company, owning 
typically a large, valuable block, its activity in other smaller (less valuable) 
holdings produces a relatively modest turnover ratio. We would like to 
understand foundations’ ownership style in those non-legacy stocks as well.
188  See also Appendix 3.
189  Foundations are not bound by any industry law, code or recommendation about how to 
invest their assets, other than the general guideline in the Foundation Act about “planned 
and diligent investment management”.
Are non-profits active equity investors?
155
To the best of our knowledge, few researchers have investigated the 
holding periods of particular, single shareholdings over time. Bushee 
(2004) classifies investors by the stability of their ownership in companies. 
He forms three distinct groups: Transient, Dedicated and Quasi-indexer 
investors. Bushee reports investors’ quarterly portfolio turnover and 
percent of portfolio stocks held continuously for the past two years. 
Transient owners’ turnover (quarterly) is 74 percent and percent of long-
term stocks is 25 percent. For Dedicated investors, turnover is below 
1 percent and long-term stock holding account for over 75 percent of 
portfolio. For Quasi-indexers, turnover is 8 percent and long-term holdings 
climb to 98 percent of portfolio. Bøhren, Priestley, and Ödegaard (2009) 
separate industrial owners from financial institutions, and examine this 
characteristic in conjunction with investment time horizon. They report 
that the largest owners of the companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
held their block holdings on average 1.8 years, and stayed among the five 
largest shareholders for 2.6 years on average (over a sample period of 1989-
99). They note that financial and foreign owners stay the shortest, whereas 
individuals and industrial firms stay the longest. Cheng, Elyasiani, and Jia 
(2011) define a “nonzero-points duration” which is the number of quarters in 
which an institutional investor has nonzero holdings out of the 12 quarters 
over the 3-year sample period. They also define “maintain-stake-points 
duration” which is the average number of quarters in which institutional 
investors maintain their stake. Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) divide 
institutions into two categories, active and passive, and then calculate 
the concentration of a firm’s ownership into active hands. Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2009) emphasize the heterogeneity of institutional investors: 
activists, pension funds, money managers, banks and corporations and 
especially blockholders among them.
We simply inquire whether foundations typically can be considered a 
long-term shareholder in companies included their equity portfolio.  We do 
not want to measure this only by the relative change in the portfolio, as the 
turnover ratio does. Turnover considers the activity from the point of view 
of the investor, whereas we would like to see activity as seen from the owned 
company: will this owner own our stock for long? To get an understanding 
of the propensity to change in any of the share positions, we develop an 
indicator for change in ownership. 
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Chart 2 Nasdaq Helsinki Exchange Price index and CAP Price index in 2000-
2013. Price index is used for comparability, because our data includes equity 
portfolios held at year end and their values, but no dividend and other yield items. 
CAP index limits the weight of one stock to a maximum of 10 percent in the index. 
The poor performance of the non-capped index (blue line) is largely explained by 
the decline in value of Nokia plc during the sample period.
Change-in-ownership indicator takes value 1, if the investor’s position in 
one share has changed more than 10 percent from previous year. If not, the 
indicator for that year is zero. In our data we have strings of timelines such 
as shown by Table 22: 
Table 22. Example of share ownership data by year, by investor and by each 
series of shares held. One investor’s holdings are separated by a horizontal line. 
Investors are anonymized with investor code numbers. 
                                Number of shares held
Investor Share 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
573 Company 1 6521 6521 6521 6521 6521
638 Company 1 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
822 Company 1 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
822 Company 2 1160 1160 1160
822 Company 3 720 720 720
1019 Company 1 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 245 245 245 245 245
1019 Company 2 4500
1019 Company 3 1800 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 800
1019 Company 4 24000 24000 12000 8000 8000 8000 8000 6000 6000 6000 3000 3000 3000 2400
1019 Company 5 9600 9600 6000 6000 6000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 2400
1019 Company 6 3500
1019 Company 7 2400 2400 1500 1500
1019 Company 8 4000 4000 3000 3000 3000 2500 2500 2500 2500 2000
1019 Company 9 1000 1250
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There are 9817 share ownership rows such as these (by 530 non-profit 
investors in 2000-2013). They specify the timeline of ownership of each 
share owned by each foundation in our data. We identify changes of more 
than 10 percent change of previous year’s ownership. If such change has 
occurred, the indicator for that investor and for that stock is 1, otherwise 0. 
Acquisition of shares not previously held is considered a change, thus a 1. 
Sale of all shares is also considered a change, thus a 1. However, years when 
the investor has not been owning one specific share are not interpreted as a 
zero but are considered to be non-events (empty data)190.  
Table 23. Occurrence of share ownership change by year, by investor and by each 
series of shares held. Example of data. One investor’s holdings are separated by 
a horizontal line. Investors are anonymized with investor code numbers. 
The change-in-ownership indicator omits the relative weights of changes 
in ownership. A 100 percent change is as relevant as a 10 percent change, 
and a 10 million euro change is as relevant as a 10,000 euro change. Given 
that, we note that our change indicator is quite strict: most companies 
would not consider it a drastic change if an owner sold 10 percent of his 
shares. However, the change indicator is suited for our purpose of looking 
into passiveness and long-term involvement of foundations as investor: it 
will detect any small change (at or above 10 percent). 
190 Absence of investment in some shares (as on rows showing blanks in Table 23, and 
in shares that the investor has never owned) cannot be interpreted as “stability” of 
investment strategy. Only years where the investor has either acquired, owned or sold 
shares count in our change-data.
                                Change-in-ownership -indicator
Investor Share 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
573 Company 1 0 0 0 0 1
638 Company 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
822 Company 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
822 Company 2 1 0 0
822 Company 3 1 0 0
1019 Company 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1019 Company 2 1 1
1019 Company 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1019 Company 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1019 Company 5 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1019 Company 6 1 1
1019 Company 7 0 1 1 0 1
1019 Company 8 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1019 Company 9 1 1
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Furthermore, the change-in-ownership indicator detects changes in 
situations where a foundation is a long-term owner in one company, owning 
typically a large, valuable block, but is an active trader in other stocks. As 
block holdings’ values tend to form a large part of the whole portfolio’s 
value, turnover statistics would not detect such investors’ other activity.
With the change-in-ownership indicator, we calculate ratios of yearly 
changes in an investor’s portfolio between 2000 and 2013191. 
The descriptive statistics of our data are presented in Table 24 and 
Table 25.  
Table 24. Descriptive statistics of those sample foundations that had equity 
investments in any year between 2000 and 2013, categorized by mission industry. 
N=530, except for turnover figures N=343 where outliers with an average turnover 
of more than 200 percent or turnover of more than 1000 percent in any given 
year were excluded. All statistics in the Table have been first calculated for each 
investor (=foundation) and each year. Then an average and a median over 2000-
2013, for each investor, has been calculated. The averages presented here 
are the averages of investors’ averages over years. Turnover is calculated from 
the value of yearly sales and purchases divided by the value of portfolio at the 
end of the year, divided by two. Turnover1 adjusts only stock splits and bonus 
issues, Turnover2 adjusts splits, bonus issues and share issues with pre-emptive 
rights (see Appendix 3). Active Share is deviation from the market index industry 
191 Note that the first change is from year 2000 to year 2001. Thus we have change indicators 
for years 2001 to 2013, meaning 13 points of time. We still refer to the sample period as 
2000-2013 for the change indicator.
Descriptive statistics of 
equity portfolios owned by 
sample foundations
Average 
equity 
portfolio 
value  
2000-13 
Average 
Number 
of 
shares    
2000-13 
Average 
Active 
Share,     
2000-13
Median 
Active 
Share,     
2000-13
Turnover1 
2000-13
Turnover2 
2000-13
Average of 
changed 
positions 
in portfolio 
2000-13
Foundation's mission industry
N Euros  % % % % %
Culture and Recreation 110 19 770 983  10   60 % 60 % 24 % 24 % 22 %
Education and Research 171 7 636 209   12   53 % 54 % 23 % 23 % 21 %
Health 31 3 703 737   10   57 % 63 % 17 % 17 % 17 %
Social Services 64 4 469 217   6   65 % 69 % 18 % 18 % 17 %
Environment 7 728 137   8   54 % 53 % 55 % 54 % 19 %
Development and Housing 32 4 819 802   9   57 % 58 % 27 % 26 % 25 %
Law, advocacy and politics 15 1 282 083   7   64 % 66 % 27 % 28 % 24 %
Philanthropic Intermediaries 18 5 909 548   11   63 % 65 % 13 % 13 % 21 %
International 4 205 916   7   48 % 50 % 24 % 24 % 29 %
Religion 13 854 647   9   54 % 56 % 28 % 35 % 16 %
Business and Unions 39 2 913 192   8   66 % 68 % 12 % 11 % 15 %
Other 26 2 528 961   5   77 % 78 % 20 % 22 % 15 %
Total 530        
Average (weighted)   9,5   59 % 61 % 22 % 22 % 20 %
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breakdown. A high Active Share means higher deviation from the market portfolio. 
See also Appendix 3. 
Table 25. Descriptive statistics of those sample foundations that had equity 
investments in any year between 2000 and 2013, categorized by source of 
finance. N=530, except for turnover figures N=343 where outliers with an average 
turnover of more than 200 percent or turnover of more than 1000 percent in any 
given year were rejected. All statistics in the Table have been first calculated 
for each investor (=foundation) and each year. Then an average and a median 
over 2000-2013, for each investor, has been calculated. The averages presented 
here are the averages of investors’ averages over years. Turnover is calculated 
from the value of yearly sales and purchases divided by the value of portfolio 
at the end of the year, divided by two. Turnover1 adjusts only stock splits and 
bonus issues, Turnover2 adjusts splits, bonus issues and share issues with pre-
emptive rights (see Appendix 3). Active Share is deviation from the market index 
industry breakdown. A high Active Share means higher deviation from the market 
portfolio. See also Appendix 3. Turnover averages deviate from the previous Table 
24 because near-outliers in various categories have more impact on category-
averages and thus to the average of averages in Table 24.
3.3 Hypotheses
We refer to earlier research about motivations for various investment 
styles, as well as to research about the investments of non-profit investors, 
as described in Section 2.3. 
Foundations have few incentives for short-term signaling. They do not try 
to attract customers or investors by showing excellent investment results 
quarterly, so they do not need to trade or window-dress192 their portfolios 
at short intervals. They are not subject to industry193 regulations about 
allocation or risks, and as a result of this, they do not need to balance their 
192 Lakonishok et al. (1991).
193 Service industries such as asset management industry or pension fund management 
industry are subject to strict regulations in most countries. This may limit their ability to 
allocate freely or to keep lucrative positions. Non-profits face no such limitations.
Descriptive statistics of 
equity portfolios owned by 
sample foundations
Average 
equity 
portfolio 
value  
2000-13 
Average 
Number 
of 
shares    
2000-12 
Average 
Active 
Share,     
2000-13
Median 
Active 
Share,     
2000-13
Turnover1 
2000-13
Turnover2 
2000-13
Average of 
changed 
positions 
in portfolio 
2000-13
Foundation's source of finance
N Euros  % % % % %
Endowed 349 12 237 463  12 55 % 56 % 13 % 13 % 20 %
Donative 52 572 609   6 63 % 66 % 12 % 12 % 21 %
Operative 81 490 082   4 69 % 71 % 8 % 8 % 22 %
Public sector 48 361 127   4 66 % 71 % 9 % 9 % 17 %
Total sample 530 8 222 039   9 59 % 61 % 12 % 12 % 20 %
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portfolio every year. They can carry active risk in their equity portfolio. They 
are also impacted by tax regimes which may discourage active trading194. 
Furthermore, many foundations receive legacy donations, for instance 
large blocks of stocks that they feel they must hold a certain time195. Finally, 
most foundations do not consider investment activities as their core 
activity. 
Based on the above, we hypothesize that more often than with other 
investor types, foundations’ equity portfolios may be concentrated into 
only a few holdings.
Hypothesis 1  
Foundations allocate their equity portfolio actively and do not diversify 
their equity portfolios on the basis of market index. 
Coming back to the view of trading as a cost, we consider the yearly 
portfolio turnover of foundations. Foundations are frugal by nature and 
do not consider investment activity as their core activity196. They are cost-
conscious and given their limited resources for stock analysis, they tend 
to “bet” on stocks based on long-term factors. They have little need for 
trading for window-dressing. Consequently, we assume that foundations 
are not active traders, and that their individual shareholdings remain in the 
portfolio for several years on average197. 
Hypothesis 2 
Foundations are, on average, relatively passive traders, with a yearly 
equity portfolio turnover significantly below one.
Hypothesis 3 
Foundations are, on average, relatively long-term shareholders, with an 
average holding period of stock longer than one year. 
After these basic findings about investment style, we aim to link the 
observed investment styles to specific foundation characteristics. Below 
we form hypotheses for such associations between investment style and 
foundation characteristics. 
194 In Finland, extremely active trading may be considered a business undertaking by the 
taxman, in which case the normally tax-exempt investment income would be taxed. 
However, rules as to how much is too much are unclear. As a general rule, trading by 
foundations does not constitute taxable business undertaking. See Verotoimisto The 
Finnish Tax Authority (2002).
195 See, e.g., Wiklund (2015), Ahdekivi (2014) for anecdotal and historical evidence.
196 Foundation interviews confirm this view. List of interviewees available from the author.
197 We form our Hypothesis based on the previous empirical research showing that mutual 
funds’ turnover has been between 59 – 117 percent. We expect foundations’ turnover to 
be significantly below those levels. See Table 20 in Section 2.3.1.
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We start from the assumption that the source of financing of a foundation 
is related to the investment style of the foundation. Foundations finance 
their operations through four often separate but sometimes concurrent 
sources198: yield from an endowment; donations; income from business 
operations; or support from the public sector. These various income cash 
flows represent different risks to foundations (see Merton (1993) who 
discusses all assets’ riskiness and their influence of endowment investment 
style). Endowed foundations are the most dependent on investment income 
and they have most to lose if capital is unprofessionally managed: losses of 
income and reputation, because large endowed foundations are likely to be 
known in the investment community. Managing financial investments can 
be seen as a core operation in endowed foundations, whereas it may attract 
less professional attention in other foundations199.
This characteristic sets endowed foundations apart from other types 
of foundations, and it is crucial while discussing the investment style 
of foundations. Having been on the investment market for decades (the 
average age of endowed foundations in our data is 47 years and median age 
is 52 years), endowed foundations would be the best candidates to have a 
sophisticated equity investment style. 
The size of an investment portfolio is known to affect investment style 
(see, e.g., Keloharju, Kasanen, and Lehtinen (2015). Endowed foundations 
have (by definition) larger investment assets relative to their balance 
sheet than other types of foundations have. However, non-endowed200 
foundations may have large investments in absolute terms, too: donations 
are not spent in the same year they are received, but over a period of several 
years, and operative and public sector foundations usually have some 
“savings” investments for a rainy day. We wish to control for the investor’s 
size in our tests, and to separate the effect of foundation size from the 
effect of how the foundation is financed. For this reason, investments and 
investment income are observed as relative to the total size of balance sheet 
and yearly revenues when defining the source of finance of the foundation, 
whereas simply the overall absolute financial investments are used to 
control for size (see Appendices 1 and 2 for further details).  
We formulate our fourth Hypothesis as follows:
198 See a more detailed discussion in the Introduction, in Section 4.2 of the previous Essay 
“What determines a non-profit’s governance” and in Appendix 2 of this book.
199 A similar argumentation about the sophistication of larger investors can be found in, e.g., 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000): “Institutional investors generally take larger positions 
than individuals, have more resources to expend on research, and in many cases, view 
investment as a full-time career.”, and evidenced in Keloharju, Kasanen, and Lehtinen 
(2015).
200 We use the term “non-endowed” here only in reference to our typology: endowed vs. 
foundations with some other source of finance. As discussed, other types of foundations 
can have some endowment income, too.
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Hypothesis 4 
Endowed foundations diversify more and trade more frequently than 
foundations financed by other sources. 
We include Age and Size as control variables in our tests in order to 
separate their effects from the effects of our main regressors. We also 
hypothesize about their impact on investor activity.
As a foundation grows older, it may have had time to fine-tune its 
investment operations – a part of foundation administration that is typically 
not the center of focus in the early years of a foundation201. Furthermore, 
an older foundation has a higher opportunity cost if it squanders its 
investments: more money is lost, and probably reputation is tarnished. 
Finally, age is likely to correlate with asset size, as foundations are set up 
for eternity, and they rather accumulate funds than deplete them202 as their 
charitable work expands. We suggest that age may be associated with the 
investment style of a foundation in such a manner that older foundations 
are more likely to spread investment risk by not concentrating their 
equity portfolio heavily away from the market index. We also suggest older 
foundations are more vigilant in managing their equity portfolio, which is 
seen in their more active trading.
Hypothesis 5 
Old foundations have a less active share allocation in their portfolio, and 
their portfolio turnover is higher than in young foundations. 
The most common traditional explanation for portfolio under-
diversification posits that investors fail to diversify appropriately because 
they hold small portfolios203. Moreover, high transaction costs would 
prevent small investors from diversifying. A foundation’s size may be a 
factor contributing to its investment style. 
The question about foundation size is: what makes a foundation “large”? 
The likely measures are revenues, balance sheet total, number of personnel 
201 See, Wiklund (2015) for anecdotal evidence about a billion-euro foundation’s coming-of-
age.
202 This may be a prerogative in legislation: careful management of foundation capital 
has been interpreted to mean preserving and even accumulating foundation capital as 
a fiduciary duty of the foundation board, unless expressly otherwise stipulated in the 
foundation rules. Little attention is paid to the most effective and timely use of capital in 
this philosophy. Lately, this interpretaion has been questioned by the UK charities and 
regulator alike (see, e.g., Jenkins (2012)). A seminal contribution to this discussion has 
been Hansmann (1990).
203 See, e.g., Keloharju, Kasanen, and Lehtinen (2015).
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or number of projects. None of them is perfect204; we have used revenues as a 
measure for size in our earlier study (Essay 2 in this book). It brings various 
kinds of foundations on an equal footing (e.g., foundations which do not 
have a large balance sheet but a steady flow of donations or business income 
that is used rapidly, versus foundations living off the yield from a large asset 
base). However, revenues signal the size of the charitable operation of the 
foundation. We have discussed how a larger size of investments justifies 
more spending on managing the portfolio professionally. Thus we use the 
absolute amount of financial investments as a measure for investor size in 
this Essay. 
We discussed above how older foundations may have a higher opportunity 
cost in reputation, if they mismanage their equity portfolio. We also suggest 
that larger foundations are better known to the public, and thus their 
financial operations are better followed. This motivates them to follow the 
conservative allocation choice of diversifying along the market index. Large 
foundations can also carry costs of trading.
Hypothesis 6 
Large foundations have a less active share allocation in their portfolio, 
and their portfolio turnover is higher than in small foundations. 
Finally, we propose there is an association between foundation 
governance and its investment style. In Essay 1 of this book we created 
a measure of concentration of foundation governance, which we call 
Foundation Governance Index (FGI). It consists of the sum of provisions in 
foundation rules that concentrate power to the foundation board, and their 
presence (leading to concentration of power on one level) is considered 
likely to increase agency costs in foundation governance205. With this 
measure we are able to measure the openness of foundation governance. 
A wide research body suggests that poor possibilities to control an 
agent lead to agency costs in form of inefficiency and lesser effort (see 
204 In many countries, foundations are not required to use market value bookkeeping. As 
a result, balance sheet items may not be representative of the financial scope of the 
foundation, especially for old foundations. In most foundation bookkeeping standards, 
revenues include only cash income and not, for example, latent capital gains. Number 
of personnel is not available in many national registers that collect only financials and 
legal information. Furthermore, the personnel measure inflates the size of operational 
foundations vis-à-vis grantmaking foundations. The number of projects is difficult to 
verify and many charities do not classify operations into projects. In Essay 1, we chose 
revenues as the measure of size because the yearly flows of financial income, donations, 
business income or public support are all reported in revenues, which brings different 
types of foundations to a comparable footing regardless of the source of income. Revenues 
are also reasonably representative of a foundation’s scope of operations from year to year. 
We used a foundation’s average revenue from years 2010-2012 to smoothe the volatility 
in revenue and any exceptional years.
205 About the development of foundation FGI and our terminology about “open” and 
“concentrated” governance, see Essay 1 “What determines a non-profit’s governance?”, 
Section 4.1.
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e.g., Holmström (1979)). We propose to test if the presence of oversight 
in an investor’s organization has any relation to investment style. More 
specifically, we test whether a foundation’s governance index is associated 
with active position taking or trading activity of the foundation’s equity 
portfolio. We hypothesize that a less concentrated governance leads to 
efficient financial management, which manifests itself – among other 
things – in risk minimization through more diversification (i.e., following 
the index) and more timely and active trading.
Hypothesis 7 
Openly206 governed foundations tend to follow the index in their 
allocation and their portfolio turnover is higher than in foundations that 
are less openly governed. 
It must be noted that in the first Essay of this book, we document a 
statistically significant association between foundation source of finance, 
age, size and its governance. Thus our Hypotheses 4, 5, 6 and 7 are somewhat 
parallel.
We next present the empirical results of tests on our Hypotheses. 
206 See Section 4.1 in the first Essay of this book. We build a non-profit governance index 
by adding one point for every rule provision that increases the non-profit board’s 
powers. In absence of owners, this means concentration of power to the board level. The 
concentration of the power is a scale variable where 5 points means concentrated power 
and 0 points signifies an open governance with several outside controls to the board.
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4. Empirical results
4.1 Active Share in allocation of equity portfolio
We start by presenting the overall Active Share level for our sample 
foundations, by foundation type, in our sample period 2000-2013. In this 
section we refer to the activity in allocation also as “diversification” even 
though the terms are not completely synonymous207. Strictly speaking, 
Active Share reflects deviation from the market portfolio. Such a portfolio 
can be somewhat diversified: it includes numerous shares, but with different 
weights compared to the market index. However, a high Active Share is best 
achieved by concentrating into a few stocks, because the high weight of a 
few shares, combined with the absence of many other index shares, leads 
to a strong deviation from the market index weights208. Concentrating a 
portfolio on a small number of shares is equivalent to lesser diversification.
Our first Hypothesis was already confirmed by the descriptive statistics 
in Table 24: Average Active Share for all foundations is 59 percent. We cite 
Cremers and Petäjistö (2009) on reference levels for Active Share: “Funds 
with an Active Share less than 20% consist of pure index funds. When we 
refer to “closet indexers” […], we generally mean non-index funds with 
relatively low Active Share, […] of only 20%-60%. […] A fund with an Active 
Share less than 50% is always a hybrid between a purely active and purely 
207 See Section 2.3.2. Following the market index is not a synonym for diversification and 
deviating from the market index is not necessarily risk-taking. Diversification means 
reducing non-systematic risk by investing in a variety of assets, which variety does 
not need to follow the (local or otherwise relevant) market general index. However, it 
has been argued that if all investors seek to diversify, they can only invest in available 
securities and with market weights. It has become customary to refer to diversification 
and to the following the market index in a same sentence.
208 This is especially true for our method of calculating Active Share based on market 
industry breakdown: if an investor has a high Active Share, he is deviating from the 
market industry breakdown instead of only disregarding some shares by weighing some 
other shares. To us this seems an even higher deviation from diversification.
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passive portfolio.” It would seem that our sample foundations are not index 
trackers. In Table 26 we present the yearly evolution of Active Share during 
our sample period for our sample foundations, categorized on the basis of 
their source of finance. 
Yearly Active Share -measures of foundations' 
average equity portfolio allocation
year Endowed Donative Operative
Public 
Sector
2000 56 % 54 % 54 % 44 %
2001 56 % 57 % 58 % 48 %
2002 58 % 61 % 62 % 54 %
2003 62 % 61 % 64 % 57 %
2004 61 % 64 % 67 % 61 %
2005 60 % 70 % 73 % 78 %
2006 59 % 70 % 73 % 75 %
2007 60 % 71 % 74 % 82 %
2008 58 % 70 % 74 % 78 %
2009 54 % 64 % 73 % 74 %
2010 49 % 62 % 72 % 73 %
2011 48 % 59 % 71 % 71 %
2012 46 % 56 % 70 % 69 %
2013 47 % 56 % 68 % 68 %
Average 55 % 62 % 68 % 67 %
Table 26. The yearly average Active Share of sample foundations’ equity 
portfolios. Active Share is the portfolio’s deviation from the market index weights, 
see Appendix 3. Active Share is calculated here on the basis of industry deviation: 
how much the portfolio’s industry breakdown deviates from the industry sector 
breakdown of the stock market. The higher the Active Share ratio, the less the 
portfolio follows the market in general. Active Share takes values between 0 and 1 
and can roughly be interpreted as a percentage of portfolio deviating from market 
industry breakdown. The source of finance is defined from foundations’ financial 
statements, based on their main source of income, see Appendix 2. Number of 
portfolios (investors who invest in equities) in a given year varies from 390 to 470, 
with a total number of investors appearing at some point during the years 2000-
13 being 530.
We notice that active allocation policies have evolved differently over 
time. In the early 2000’s all types of foundations had almost similar 
concentration levels, with Public sector foundations actually taking least 
active positions. During the turbulent 2000s policies diverged: Public 
sector and Operative foundations markedly increased their Active Share 
(i.e., decreased their diversification), whereas Endowed foundations 
moved towards greater diversification (i.e., lower Active Share). Donative 
foundations’ diversification level has remained between these groups since 
2005, and has also increased. We present our findings visually in Chart 3a 
and 3b.
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Chart 3a and 3b. The evolution of sample foundations’ equity portfolio 
concentration, 2000-2013. N=530 in a, and N=371 in b where only portfolios 
larger than 250,000 euros are included. The deviation from market industry 
breakdown is measured by Active Share, see Appendix 3. The higher the Active 
Share ratio, the more concentration (less diversification) in a portfolio. Active 
Share is calculated on the basis of industry deviation: how much the portfolio’s 
industry breakdown deviates from the industry sector breakdown of the stock 
market. Active Share takes values between 0 and 1 and can roughly be interpreted 
as a percentage of portfolio deviating from market industry breakdown. The 
source of finance is defined from foundations’ financial statements, based on their 
main source of income, see Appendix 2. 
Our main finding from Chart 3a and 3b is that Endowed foundations have 
increased their diversification the most after the techno-bubble in the early 
2000s. Their Active Share started decreasing in 2004 and went down to 40 
percent by 2010 (when including only equity portfolios over 250,000 euros). 
This agile adaptation of investment style may be a sign of sophistication: 
seasoned investors are more likely to learn from stock market downturns 
and adjust their investment style after negative experiences. Other 
foundations started to diminish their portfolio concentration only after 
2008, with Donative foundations proceeding more rapidly than Operative 
and Public sector foundations, whose diversification effort still remains 
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modest (Active Share is above 60 percent). 
Filtering out foundations that have less than 250,000 euros in equities 
(as in Chart 3b) does not change our finding about differing evolution 
of portfolios. Now foundations’ diversification behavior is even more 
pronouncedly uniform at the beginning of the decade. Policies of wealthy 
foundations diverge in a similar way after 2004 (3b) as for foundations of 
all levels of wealth (3a). For larger foundations’ sample (3b) the level of 
diversification increases – i.e., Active Share decreases – for all foundations 
towards 2013 (the lines on right-hand graph are on a lower level). This 
suggests that small foundations typically own only a few shares that stay in 
the portfolio for a long time209.
We proceed to test the association between foundation source of finance, 
age, size and diversification. The averages for different types of foundations 
show a typical allocation policy, but we do not know if the relation is 
consistent over the whole sample. For that, we test the existence with an 
ordinary least squares regression where the Active Share is the dependent 
variable, defined by independent variables (source of finance type, age and 
size). Table 27 summarizes the regressions210. 
Foundation source of finance and 
equity diversification  
(Active Share)
A B
β Sig. β Sig. St. Dev.
Endowed 0.000  0.000   
Donative 0.075 0.016 0.061 0.047  
Operative 0.133 <0.001 0.117 <0.001  
Public sector 0.104 0.001 0.096 0.002  
Foundation age   -0.076 0.075 23
Foundation size (financial investments) 0.000 <0.001 63 170 816
Constant 0.555 <0.001 0.603 <0.001  
 
Method OLS  OLS   
N 529  529   
R2 0.062  0.096   
Adj. R2 0.057  0.087   
Table 27. Active Share of a foundation’s equity portfolio as a function of the 
209 Reasons for this may be that the foundation inherits a block of shares but does not 
engage in equity investments otherwise; a local foundation may invest in local companies 
(telephone, sports companies), or when large mutual societies are de-mutualized and 
turned into limited liability companies, a foundation becomes a shareholder even if it 
does not invest in listed stock.
210 Our dependent variable is a scale variable, our independent variable is categorical and 
our control variables are scale. We use ordinary least squares regression with a dummy 
variable for foundation categories. 
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foundation’s source of finance, age and size. Ordinary least squares regression 
with a foundation type dummy and two scale control variables. Active Share is the 
portfolio’s deviation from the market index weights, see Appendix 3. Active Share 
is calculated on the basis of industry deviation: how much the portfolio’s industry 
breakdown deviates from the industry sector breakdown of the stock market. 
The higher the Active Share ratio, the more concentration (less diversification) 
in a portfolio. Active Share takes values between 0 and 1 and can roughly be 
interpreted as a percentage of portfolio deviating from market industry breakdown. 
The source of finance is defined from foundations’ financial statements, based on 
their main source of income, see Appendix 2. Foundation age and size are control 
variables, with size measured as the average value of the foundation’s financial 
investments on its balance sheet in the years 2010-2012. Note that financial 
investments include all asset classes, not only equity. Values are corrected to 
market values. For foundation financial statements, see Appendix 2. In the second 
regression B, we report standardized Betas as our control variables’ scales differ 
much. Foundation size variable takes large values, so the coefficient is positive 
but very small.
First we note the positive constant: 0.555 in column A and 0.603 in 
column B. This is close to the Endowed foundations’ average in Table 26 (55 
percent). The constant is interpreted as the starting level for all foundations’ 
Active Share, above which other foundation types’ Active Share seems to 
be (β coefficients are above zero for other foundation types in column A). 
This level of Active Share, approximately 56-60 percent, is considered to be 
on the side of an active risk-taker and not an index tracker211. The constant 
is statistically significant (ρ below 0.01 level). We are able to confirm our 
Hypothesis 1. 
A foundation’s source of finance is statistically significantly associated 
with the foundation’s diversification level (measured by Active Share). 
Looking at column A, we note that Endowed foundations’ Active Share is 
lower than that of the others (the coefficients for other foundation types 
are positive, with Endowed being the reference group). Thus Endowed 
foundations are on average more diversified than other types of foundations. 
Their financial investment assets are – by definition – relatively larger than 
other types’ financial investments. 
In column B212 we include age and size as control variables to investigate 
whether the differences between foundation types persists, controlling for 
age and size. They do: the measure for statistical significance, ρ, remains 
below 0.05 level for all foundation types, and the effect of foundation type 
remains similar to column A, with Operative foundations diversifying the 
least. 
Concerning our Hypotheses 5 and 6 about the effect of foundation age 
and size, we note from the negative coefficients that Active Share decreases 
as age and size grow; thus older and larger foundations concentrate their 
211 See Cremers and Petäjistö (2009) and the beginning of this section.
212 In column B we report standardized β because our size variable has a wide scope. Now 
the coefficients show the size of the change in the predicted variable when the predictor 
changes one standard deviation. Standardized betas are comparable to each other in the 
regression and illustrate the influence of different variables on the outcome. 
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holdings less than younger and smaller foundations. In other words, older 
and larger foundations allocate their equity holdings closer to the index 
breakdown than younger and smaller foundations. 
Thus we can confirm part of our Hypothesis 4: Endowed foundations 
diversify more than foundations financed with other sources. Endowed 
foundations have learned from financial crises and have adjusted their 
investment style more than other foundations during the years 2000-
2013. Based on the above coefficients of our control variables, we can also 
confirm part of our Hypotheses 6 and 7: Larger and older foundations have 
less Active Share allocation in their portfolios than smaller and younger 
foundations. 
Our results are interesting on many accounts. We noted earlier that 
Endowed foundations often own “legacy shares” that they may be reluctant 
to sell. Our finding shows that Endowed foundations diversify more. Given 
the existence of legacy blocks, Endowed foundations must perform even 
more assiduous diversification in their remaining portfolio. The stickiness 
of blockholdings may be related to the age of the foundation: legacy shares 
are not sold soon after acquisition, but over time there may be more 
acceptance to the idea213. Thus older foundations may have more freedom 
to let go of legacy blocks and reduce their risk level through diversification. 
Similarly, if a foundation has superior understanding of the issuer’s 
business (as suggested by Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)), such advantage 
is likely to disappear in the long run and the share becomes an ordinary 
stock in the portfolio214.
At the start of this Essay we ask whether foundations are conservative 
investors. Regardless of our evidence there may be opposing answers to 
this. Mainstream financiers consider diversification as conservative (that 
is, not deviating much from an index), but for a foundation, “conservative” 
may be tantamount to conserving legacy portfolio intact (and disregarding 
any notion of diversification). Conservative may also mean reflective, 
careful and slow-moving to foundations, whereas for financiers carefulness 
might mean more presence on the day-to-day stock market and trading. 
Thus, characterization of foundations as investors requires more nuances 
and understanding of the capital markets than a casual discussion allows. 
We return to this questions in our concluding remarks in Section 5.
One of the limitations to our findings is that our data does not capture 
all asset classes, only equity listed domestically. Other elements than listed 
213 Wiklund (2015) presents evidence from a 150 year-old foundation. A donor may stipulate 
that he/she will receive cash yield from a block of shares during his/her lifetime. This, 
of course, limits a foundation’s capability to sell shares. On the other hand, when such 
limitations are no longer valid, rapid action may be taken to change positions in blocks 
(e.g., p. 308 about Nokia share sales). Nowadays few foundations accept eternal legacies 
from other than the founder of the foundation.
214 For instance, superior knowledge may be vested in people who have worked in the 
company or its industry. Experts grow old, or their expertise becomes obsolete, and the 
superior knowledge is no more.
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equity in a foundation’s portfolio may balance the whole, when it comes 
to diversification. Another explanation for our results may be that many 
larger foundations have typically received legacy stakes in companies 
that they are reluctant to sell. At the same time, larger foundations are on 
average better governed than smaller ones215. Thus it is possible that low 
diversification and open governance co-exist (see Section 4.4 below). 
4.2 Equity portfolio turnover
We proceed to examine empirical findings about our second research 
interest: are foundations active traders? On a general level, our first 
Hypothesis is confirmed by the descriptive statistics in Table 25, which 
shows the average turnover for all sample foundations to be 12 percent. 
Furthermore, on average only a fifth of positions is changed in any given 
year (rightmost column presenting our change-in-ownership indicator). 
Comparing to studies of turnover for other investor types (see Table 20), 
this seems a relatively low trading frequency.
Proceeding to more detailed analyses on turnover, we present yearly 
equity portfolio turnover ratios, by foundation type, for our sample period 
2000-2013 in Chart 4.
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Chart 4. The average turnover of sample foundations’ equity portfolio, by 
foundation type, in 2000-2013. N=343. Outliers whose yearly average turnover is 
above 200 percent for the sample period, or whose turnover for any year is above 
1000 percent are rejected. We correct splits and share issues on the basis of 
philosophy 1 as described in Appendix 3.
215  See the first Essay in this book: “What determines a foundation’s governance”, section 
5.1.
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Foundations’ yearly portfolio turnover has mostly been low in our sample 
period 2000-2013: at or below 20 percent for most years and foundations, 
except for one year. The overall average for all sample foundations’ 
average turnovers and over all the sample years is 12 percent216. Endowed 
foundations have changed their trading activity level relatively less than 
other foundations, and their trading activity is higher on most years of our 
data. It appears that Endowed and Operative foundations fared though the 
sub-prime crisis of the years 2008-2009 without blinking an eye, keeping 
to the same trading levels as in the last several years. Donative foundations 
have changed their positions more actively than other foundation types in 
post-subprime crisis years. Their activity seems to rise after stock market 
crashes (after techno bubble 2001, subprime crisis 2009 and market 
downturn 2011). This finding would suggest that donors are the most 
vigilant, opinionated or critical followers of the investment policies of the 
foundations they finance.
Table 28 presents the average turnover levels for each foundation type in 
several of the sub-periods of the sample time period.
N
Average 
turnover 
2000-2013
Average 
turnover 
2000-2005
Average 
turnover 
2006-2010
Average 
turnover 
2011-2013
Endowed 237 13 % 15 % 12 % 10 %
Donative 28 12 % 10 % 9 % 16 %
Operative 46 8 % 10 % 5 % 9 %
Public support 32 9 % 7 % 9 % 11 %
All foundations 343 12 % 13 % 11 % 11 %
One-sample T-test  
significance  
(two-sided) ρ <0.001
Table 28. Foundations’ average turnover in the years 2000-2013, for foundations 
with different sources of finance. N=343. For the test if turnover = 1, a one-sided 
t-test was conducted. The statistical significance of value different from 1 is 
<0.001 (the average shown by our data is 0.12). For means test between groups 
ANOVA ρ=0.087. Outliers whose yearly average turnover is above 200 percent 
for the sample period, or whose turnover for any year is above 1000 percent are 
excluded. We correct splits and share issues on the basis of philosophy 1 as 
described in Appendix 3. 
Firstly we note from Table 28 that t-test confirms that foundations’ 
average turnover for the years 2000-2013 is below one: the average across 
all foundations is 12 percent. T-test significance for this obtained average 
is high, with ρ<0.001. Our Hypothesis 2 is confirmed: foundations’ average 
yearly turnover is clearly below one.
We can see from Chart 4 that on average, Donative and Endowed 
216 We exclude outliers whose turnover average over the sample period is above 200 percent 
or whose turnover for any year is above 1000 percent, disregarding thus 186 foundations.
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foundations have been more active traders than other foundations. In Table 
28 the group means are statistically significant with ANOVA ρ below 0.1 
level. Endowed foundations were the most active traders in the early part 
of the 2000s, and they have not radically changed their trading frequency in 
our sample period. Operative and public sector foundations have increased 
their trading activity during our sample period to match that of Endowed 
and Donative foundations. Donative foundations change their trading 
activity level the most. However, all foundations are relatively passive 
traders, when compared to other investor types (see Table 20). 
Finally, we test our Hypotheses 2 and 4 with an ordinary least squares 
regression that separates Endowed foundations against other types of 
foundations when explaining equity turnover (Table 29)217. 
Foundation source of finance and equity turnover
 β Sig.
Endowed  <0.001
Donative -0.010 0.710
Operative -0.050 0.022
Public support -0.041 0.099
Foundation age -0.001 0.020
Foundation size (financial investments) 0.000 0.692
Constant 0.169 <0.001
Method OLS  
N 342  
R2 0.035  
Adj. R2 0.021  
Table 29. The results of Ordinary least squares regression of foundations’ average 
yearly equity turnover as a function of a foundation’s source of finance. N=262. 
Outliers whose average yearly turnover is above 200 percent for the sample 
period, or whose turnover for any year is above 1000 percent are excluded. We 
correct splits and share issues on the basis of philosophy 1 as described in 
Appendix 3. Foundation size variable takes large values, so the coefficient is 
positive but very small. 
First we note from Table 29 that the constant, 0.169, is significantly below 
one. This is the starting level of portfolio turnover in Endowed foundations, 
to which we compare the turnover level in the other types of foundations. 
The constant is statistically significant with a ρ below 0.01. We can confirm 
our Hypothesis 2: foundations’ basic turnover level, 16.9 percent, is clearly 
217 When regressing all foundation-type dummies (for each source of finance) on turnover 
no statistically significant associations emerged for donative, operative or public sector 
foundations.
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below one. 
Endowed foundations have a statistically higher turnover that other 
types of foundations (other foundations’ coefficients are negative)218. Based 
on the above, we are able to confirm the latter parts of our Hypothesis 4: 
Endowed foundations are more active traders than other foundations. 
Foundation age seems to reduce (minimally, coefficient negative and close 
to zero) turnover, whereas foundation size is not associated with trading 
frequency. Thus we confirm Hypothesis 5 concerning foundation age, and 
reject Hypothesis 6 concerning size.
Our regression result is important because Endowed foundations are 
often receivers of “legacy stock”, large blocks of shares in one company. 
Blocks are not sold soon: blockholders typically reduce liquidity in that 
stock as they do not trade (Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009)). Until 
recently, foundations kept these blocks intact in portfolio. The size of 
holding prevents foundations from unloading blocks rapidly, even if they 
would prefer to reduce the risk of the position. Foundations who own blocks 
also try to avoid “overhang” (anticipation by the market of price pressure 
due to large block sales) and choose to reduce their holdings slowly over 
time219, which does not cause price pressure. The high weight of such slow-
moving or non-moving blocks in portfolio reduces the turnover of Endowed 
foundations’ equity portfolios. 
Generally for all foundations, tax treatment may lead to a relatively 
passive investment style. Finnish tax authorities may assess the tax position 
of a charity by its trading activity: very active trading may be deemed as 
professional investment operation, which is not exempt from taxes (unlike 
non-profits in general). Taxmen also typically pay attention to realized 
gains, not latent ones220, when they compare the charitable spending with 
the accumulated wealth of a foundation. These facts may cause foundations 
to be careful, even passive in their trading. However, the levels of trading 
activities found in our Essay are low even for the standards of the taxman, 
suggesting that taxing is not a boundary constraint. In addition, general 
cost avoidance in foundations leads to a passive style, because foundations 
want to save on trading costs. This passivity may be detrimental to portfolio 
management, if foundations’ true investment view is not reflected in their 
portfolios. 
 As discussed in Section 3.2, turnover can be a wildly volatile measure for 
investors who are not bound by investment regulations or by the necessity 
to stay invested in all asset classes. Foundations may exit and enter the 
218 We also tested endowed foundations as a separate group from all other foundations and 
the resulting coefficient 0.047 was statistically significant (ρ=0.015). When regressing 
all foundation-type dummies (for each source of finance) on turnover the statistically 
significant difference to donative foundations disappears but remains for other types.
219 Anecdotal evidence from interviews with foundations that own or owned blocks of 2 to 
20 percent of listed companies. 
220 See also French (2008) on taxes and trading costs.
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equity market in radical steps, which results in very high relative turnover 
levels. To understand trading and long-termism in foundations’ investment 
strategies we turn our focus to ownership of single stocks and their change 
over time.
4.3 Changes in single equity holdings: the change-
in-ownership indicator and duration of holdings
Given our change-in-ownership indicator, we are able to construct various 
averages and statistics of the change in share ownership. We start by 
examining the changes that took place in all single shareholding time series, 
in different single stocks held by different investors. It emerges from Chart 
5 below that changes in foundations’ single equity holdings are relatively 
rare. A majority of shareholdings in any given year does not change in 
sample foundations’ portfolios (non-changed holdings amount to over 50 
percent of all holdings in all our sample years). 
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Chart 5. The portion of shareholdings where the ownership change was zero, 
of total holdings that year. N=9817, which are rows of shareholding time-series 
in 2000-2013 of different single stocks owned by different investors. We identify 
change as a more than 10 percent change of previous year’s ownership. If such 
change has occurred, the indicator for that investor and for that stock is 1, 
otherwise 0. Only years where the investor has either acquired, owned or sold 
shares count in our change-data (non-ownership of a share is not recorded as a 
0). See Section 3.2. We correct splits and share issues on the basis of philosophy 
1 as described in Appendix 3.
The average of change-in-ownership indicator for each stock held in 
period 2000-2013 is shown in Chart 6 below. We recall that the indicator 
takes value 1 if there has been a change of more than 10 percent in a 
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single stockholding in a year, and otherwise the indicator is zero. For each 
stockholding we calculate the average over 2000-2013; average is calculated 
simply from the zeroes and ones in the time series of holding for each stock. 
Over the total of all stocks held, the change took place in the following 
frequency221.  
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Chart 6. The occurrence of change in each shareholding in the 13-year period 
of 2000-2013. N=9817, which are rows of shareholding time-series of different 
single stocks owned by different investors. Our change-in-ownership indicator 
takes value 1 if there has been a change of more than 10 percent in a single 
stockholding (number of shares) in a year, otherwise the indicator is zero. Only 
years where the investor has either acquired, owned or sold shares count in our 
change-data (non-ownership of a share is not recorded as a 0). See Section 
3.2. For each stockholding, we calculate the average over 2000-2013; average 
is calculated simply from the zeroes and ones in the time series of holding for 
each stock. See our example of single shareholdings, per investor and per year, 
in Table 23. Change is defined as a more than 10 percent change in the number 
of shares from the previous year. Changes reported in the chart can occur in any 
year, the average frequency refers to the number of years when change occurred, 
not the timing. We correct splits and share issues on the basis of philosophy 1 as 
described in Appendix 3.
The average change falls into 6-7 years (over 13 years), indicating that on 
average in half of the years in our sample period, any single shareholding 
stayed intact. 
We also aggregate the indicator to investor level. We calculate, for each 
year, the number of stocks held by the investor. We then sum this investor’s 
221 We have divided the change averages into quintiles: at or below 0.2 of years, above 0.2 to 
0.4, above 0.4 to 0.6, above 0.6 to 0.8 and above 0.8. But these quintiles do not tell us much 
as such, so we interpret them. If the indicator average is, say, 0.33, it means that a change 
occurred in a third of years in our period of 13 years, in one single stock holding. This 
means on average 4.29 times during the 13 years. Thus this average falls into our category 
“change occurred in 3-5 years” out of 13 years. 
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indicator values, and compare the sum to the total number of stock held by 
the investor. Intuitively, this ratio tells us how many stocks the investor 
has traded in his portfolio, in one year222. Such ratio may be, for instance, 
0.33 meaning that the investor has made a change in a third of items in his 
equity portfolio, and two thirds of his stock holdings have remained on the 
previous year’s level. We have these ratios for all years 2001-2013. We can 
then calculate investors’ averages over our sample period.
Chart 7 below shows these investor averages over years 2000-2013, for 
all our 530 sample foundations. Foundations are given an identity number 
in the order of their entry to the Euroclear securities’ clearing system. 
We have ordered our data from smallest to largest identity codes. Thus 
foundations that have come to the market only in later years of our sample 
period are the last foundations in our ordering (right hand side of Chart 7). 
A dot on the level 0.5 tells us that this particular foundation made a change 
in (on average) half of his shareholdings every year when he owned shares 
during our sample period 2000-2013. It may be that he did not own shares 
in all the years, in which case our average counts only years when there 
was ownership or change. One illustrative example could be an investor 
who owned 6 stocks and during one year bought more shares in one stock 
and sold some shares of two stocks; there was change of numbers of three 
stocks, which represents half the items in his equity portfolio. 
Among the latecomers (right hand side) the average propensity to trade is 
higher: there are less foundations which do not trade at all or very little, and 
there are more foundations whose average change is more than 0.5. This 
may be a sign of a learning curve: new foundations learn by trial and error 
(trading more frequently), whereas older foundations have settled their 
portfolio to a tested composition (trading less frequently).
Towards the right hand end there are more foundations that have “come 
and gone” from the market, showing an average change of 100 percent 
(=1 on our scale) every year. This may be a sign of overconfidence among 
younger investors as suggested by Barber and Odean (2000). 
222 Our 10 percent threshold applies to the discussion here: a change is defined as a change 
on or above 10 percent.
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Chart 7. The average of the change-in-ownership –indicator for the years 2000-
2013. N=530. The change-in-ownership -indicator takes value 1, if the investor’s 
position has changed more than 10 percent from the previous year. If not, the 
indicator for that year is zero. Foundations (dots) are in the order of their entry 
to the Euroclear securities’ clearing system: the earlier come, the more left hand 
side a foundation is. On the right hand side are new-comers. A dot on the level 
0.5 signifies that this particular foundation made a change in (on average) half of 
his shareholdings every year when he owned shares during our sample period 
2000-2013. On the left hand side (“oldies”, most of whom existed and invested 
for the whole period of 2000-13), there are many dots on the zero level, indicating 
those foundations who did not trade at all. Among the latecomers (right hand side) 
the average propensity to trade is higher: there are less foundations which do not 
trade at all or very little, and there are more foundations whose average change 
is more than 0.5. 
It is clear that on average the majority of foundations do not change 
their ownership in most of their stocks in any given year. Most of our 
sample foundations fall below 0.2 indicator level, and indeed the average 
of all investor averages is 20.2 percent. This can be interpreted that most 
foundations trade in only every fifth stock in their portfolio in a given year, 
or less. Most of their holdings (item-wise, not necessarily value-wise) stay 
intact in any given year. This finding tells us that foundations are stable 
owners in companies in whose equity they choose to invest. 
The simple, most interesting question to companies and regulators, 
who are keen on having long-term shareholders, reads “how long do 
foundations own a stock on average?” or, especially for companies and their 
management, “how long will this foundation own our stock?” With our 
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change-in-ownership indicator we can calculate a strict measure for this223. 
Change-in-ownership indicator takes value 1, if the investor’s position has 
changed more than 10 percent from the previous year. If not, the indicator 
for that year is zero. We collect the positions “0” showing no change over at 
least two consecutive year-ends and calculate the durations in years of such 
positions (“unbroken series of zeroes”). 
Some positions have remained unchanged for 2 years, some for 13 years. 
The average duration of such long-term holdings in our data is 3.6 years 
and the median is 3 years, within our sample period where the maximum 
holding period is 13 years224. We can say that in the 2000s, if a foundation 
remains an owner for longer than one year, it will typically own the stock 
for 3.6 years. Considering that we only include positions which have not 
changed225, we estimate that the average term of (some level of ) ownership 
is likely to be longer than this.
All in all, from our statistics we can already conclude that foundations are 
not frequent traders but long-term holders of stock, which is in line with the 
previous evidence about investors’ turnover (Section 2.3.1, Table 20). Our 
Hypothesis 3 is corroborated. 
We finally test the relation between the source of finance of foundations, 
and their average change-in-ownership indicator. The higher the indicator 
average, the more the investor changes his positions during our sample 
period (measured by the number of stock positions he has changed in this 
portfolio). Table 30 presents the regression results. We divide the sample 
period into two sub-periods: from the year 2000 to 2008 (column A), and 
from the year 2009 to 2013 (column B).
223 The indicator signals “change” when the investor changes a position by more than 10 
percent. Thus we avoid LIFO/FIFO bookkeeping discussions and situations that would 
be open to questions such as: is an investor a long-term owner if he buys minimal numbers 
over several years, then suddenly acquires a large block, and finally sells the block next 
year? In the data, the investor would be considered a long-term owner as long as it has 
owned one share in the company. In our data, a “new” stable ownership period begins 
once the investor “is fully in”. Our method catches only ownership levels which are likely 
to be meaningful to the investor’s portfolio size. Our method also disregards position-
building over a longer time (time-diversification). However, if a position is a long-term 
part of the portfolio, it will appear in our data once the position is “built”.
224 Many foundations have owned the same stock from early 1900s, so in any time series data 
of foundation equity portfolios a significant problem will persist: averages do not catch 
the longest ownership periods. In our data, there were 324 holdings that remained intact 
for the whole sample period 2000-2013.
225 Excluding thus positions that have increased by, say, 15 percent each year, or that have 
been halved but have nevertheless remained substantial. These too are long-term 
holdings, and thus our findings are biased downwards.
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Foundations’ source of finance 
and their average change- 
in-ownership indicator)
A
2000-2008
B 
2009-2013
β Sig. β Sig.
Endowed     
Donative -0.043 0.018 -0.030 0.234
Operative -0.037 0.014 -0.058 0.007
Public sector -0.065 0.001 -0.083 0.002
Foundation age -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.001
Foundation size (financial investments) 0.000 <0.001 0.000 0.217
Constant 0.186 <0.001 0.261 <0.001
 
Method OLS  OLS  
N 442  462  
R2 0.084  0.057  
Adj. R2 0.074  0.046  
Table 30. The results of Ordinary Least Squares regression of foundations’ 
average change-in-ownership –indicator portfolio as a function of a foundation’s 
source of finance. Change-in-ownership -indicator takes value 1, if the investor’s 
position has changed more than 10 percent from the previous year. If not, the 
indicator for that year is zero. We calculate the average over the years indicated 
in columns A and B: an average of 0 means that no stock holding was changed 
in the investor’s portfolio in that period; an average of 1 means that all positions 
were changed by more than 10 percent every year. The higher the average, the 
more active trader the investor is. A 100 percent change in a stock is as relevant 
as a 10 percent change, and a 10 million euro change in a portfolio is as relevant 
as a 10,000 euro change. Only years where the investor has either acquired, 
owned or sold shares count in our change-data (non-ownership of a share is not 
recorded as a 0). See Section 3.2 and Appendix 3. Foundation size variable takes 
large values, thus the coefficient is positive but very small. Investors with only 1 
or 2 yearly observations in sample periods were discarded, N=442 and 462 in 
the later period. 
The equity markets had, during our sample period, two distinct sub-
periods: 2000-2008, which we call the pre-subprime crisis market, 
and 2009-2013, which we call post subprime crisis market. Regressing 
foundation types on change indicator produces statistically significant 
coefficient estimates for those sub-periods. Endowed foundations change 
their direct shareholdings more than foundations financed by other 
means (coefficients for other types of foundations are negative) in both 
periods. Our Hypothesis 4 is further corroborated: Endowed foundations 
change their stock holdings more frequently than other foundation types 
(coefficients in Table 30 are negative). However, the coefficient difference 
of Donative foundations, compared to Endowed foundations, is decreasing 
in regression B (2009-2013), suggesting that on average, these foundations 
were catching up in trading frequency with the Endowed foundations, 
compared to pre-subprime crisis period 2000-2008. (In addition, the 
coefficient for Donative foundations is no longer statistically significant 
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for the latter period, and there is no statistically significant difference to 
Endowed foundations.)
Older foundations change their holdings less than younger ones (negative 
coefficient in both periods; see also Chart 7). This holds for both periods, 
and especially in the later period older foundations changed their positions 
less than young ones. This may be a sign of longer experience on the capital 
markets: old foundations kept relatively still over and after the financial 
crisis turbulence. The influence of the foundation size varies: in 2000-2008, 
the change increased with foundation size (the coefficient is positive but 
very small, as the variable takes large absolute values). However, in 2009-
2013 foundation size is not statistically significantly related to shareholding 
changes. This may be the consequence of all foundations, small and large 
alike, awakening to active position changes in the aftermath of financial 
crisis at the end of 2008. Size does not seem to bring the same advantage in 
experience as age does. Hypothesis 5 can be confirmed whereas Hypothesis 
6 is rejected for the trading part. 
The change-in-ownership indicator is suited for the purpose of looking 
into passiveness and long-term involvement of foundations as investors: it 
will detect any small change (at or above 10 percent). The change indicator 
omits the relative value weights of changes in ownership and detects “closet 
activeness” where a foundation is a long-term block-owner in one company, 
but an active trader in other stocks, which remains invisible when examined 
with the more commonly known portfolio turnover measure. In the 
western world, most foundations are portfolio investors who hold several, 
if not numerous equity positions. Looking from the listed companies’ 
perspective, it is not interesting whether their shareholder happens to 
be an evergreen owner in some other company; they are interested if the 
shareholder can be expected to be a long-term owner in their company. 
For that, the change indicator gives change statistics that are not weighted 
by values but calculated uniformly for all sizes of investments, giving 
companies information about their foundation owners.
Finally, we refer to our discussion in Section 2.2 about long-termism. 
We noted the concern that the third sector’s likely motive for eternal 
preservation of endowed assets may decisively differ from the normal first 
sector value-creating motive. If investment decisions are not driven by 
economic interests, the long-term investment horizon alone does not make 
an investor beneficial to the capital markets. There is also a fundamental 
difference between a “laissez-faire” passivity towards trading, and a 
conscious and analysed decision not to trade. As long as we do not know 
the true thinking behind long ownership periods, general inferences about 
benefits of long-termism remain uncertain. 
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4.4 Quality of governance and investment style in 
foundations
We now turn to our Hypothesis 7 and test if foundation governance is 
associated with foundation investment style. We first test the association 
between a foundation’s governance and the allocation of its portfolio. Table 
31 shows the regression results. 
Foundation governance index  
and equity portfolio allocation 
(Active Share)
A B C
Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig. Exp β Sig.
FGI -0.007 0.098 -0.009 0.097 -0.011 0.090
Foundation age 0.000 0.485 -0.001 0.124 -0.001 0.246
Foundation size (financial investments) -0.034 <0.001 -0.026 <0.001 -0.018 0.005
Constant 1.092 <0.001 0.987 <0.001 0.848 <0.001
   
Method OLS  OLS  OLS  
N 517  370  263  
R2 0.213  0.076  0.049  
Adj. R2 0.209  0.068  0.038  
Table 31. The results of an Ordinary Least Squares regression of diversification 
of a foundation’s equity portfolio as a function of foundation governance quality. 
In column B, only foundations with an equity portfolio larger than 250,000 euros 
are included, and in column C, only Endowed foundations with an equity portfolio 
larger than 250,000 euros are included. Active Share is the portfolio’s deviation 
from the market index weights, see Appendix 3. Active Share is calculated here 
on the basis of industry deviation: how much the portfolio’s industry breakdown 
deviates from the industry sector breakdown of the stock market. The higher 
the Active Share ratio, the more concentrated (less diversified) the portfolio. 
Active Share takes values between 0 and 1 and can roughly be interpreted as a 
percentage of portfolio deviating from market industry breakdown. The governance 
quality is measured with a sum of provisions in foundation rules that concentrate 
power to the board; the higher the index, the less openly governed the foundation 
is, see Section 4.1.1 in the first essay of this book. Foundation age and size are 
control variables, with size measured through 10 truncated size categories, see 
Appendix 3. Note that financial investments include all asset classes, not only 
equity. Values are corrected to market values. 
 The results are ambiguous: in column A, governance index is weakly 
significant (ρ<0.10) in determining level of Active Share, and its 
coefficient is close to zero. Foundation age has no statistical significance 
whereas foundation size is highly significant. All coefficients are close 
to zero. However, coefficient of determination R2 is 0.21 and total model 
significance ρ < 0.01. The coefficient signs suggest that a) less openly 
governed foundations (high FGI) would have higher diversification (low 
Active Share) than less openly governed ones, and b) larger foundations 
would have higher diversification (low Active Share). 
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When we test the model with foundations whose equity portfolio is 
larger than 250,000 euros in column B, we obtain slightly better statistical 
significance but R2 deteriorates to 0.07. The coefficients of the explanatory 
variables remain similar to column A. The Age variable has a negative 
coefficient, suggesting that older foundations have a lower Active Share, e.g., 
higher diversification. Finally, in column C we test the effect of governance 
within the group of Endowed foundations; our results do not change much, 
and the explanatory power decreases.
With some caution we suggest that open governance does not seem to be 
related to the allocation of a foundation’s equity portfolio, contrary to our 
Hypothesis 7. 
We also hypothesized about the association between governance and 
trading activity. We tested this by regressing (separately) our measures of 
trading activity on foundation governance index, and further on age and 
size. 
With both outcome variables, we divided the period in sub-periods (2000-
2003, 2000-2007, 2004-2007, 2009-2013, and 2010-2013) and regressed 
the sub-period outcome variable on our explanatory variables. We also 
regressed each single year’s turnover or change indicator on explanatory 
variables. We did not detect any statistically significant relation between 
the active trading of various owned stocks (measured by turnover or the 
change indicator) and the quality of governance (measured by foundation 
governance index). 
We thus reject the latter part of our Hypothesis 7, and conclude that 
foundation governance is not statistically related (as far as we detected 
with our rudimentary tests) with portfolio turnover or propensity to alter 
single stock holdings. We conclude noting that foundation governance does 
not seem to be strongly related to portfolio allocation, either, and reject 
Hypothesis 7 based on our admittedly limited model. 
4.5 Observations on favorite stocks
Our data allows us to observe which stocks have been the largest 
components of the foundations’ equity portfolios. We calculate the yearly 
aggregate holdings of all stocks, in euros, and rank the stocks by the euro 
value owned226 in aggregate. A clear preference for “blue chip” stocks 
emerges from the data. 
226 Another way to measure “favorites” would be to see how many foundations owned each 
stock. This would correct the value bias caused by many legacy holdings in foundations 
who have held significant holdings in single stocks during our sample period 2000-2013 
(e.g., Kone, Huhtamäki, Stockmann). This has been examined by Ahdekivi (2014) and the 
same stocks emerge as favorites, measured by number of foundations holding the stock. 
At the end of 2013 the most popular stocks were held by some 250 foundations and each 
top ten company had 200 foundation owners or more (N=472 in 2013). 
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Chart 8. The ranks of seven most favored stocks in foundations’ equity portfolios 
in 2000-2013. Rank 1 is the most favored stock in a given year. Foundations 
N=530, stocks N=146. Ranking was done by listing the aggregate euro-values of 
each stock held each year by the total foundation sample base. Stocks were then 
sorted in value order, with the largest stock holding ranked with 1, second as 2 
and so forth. The ranks 8-10 have risen into top ten only in the later years of the 
sample period, and are thus not included in the graph. We then calculated the 
average of these ranks over the years 2000-2013, and ranked the final top ten on 
the basis of that average. 
Stock Industry
Stockmann Retailing
Nokia Telecommunications
UPM-Kymmene Forest industry
Sanoma Media
Wärtsilä Engineering
Huhtamäki Packaging
Kone Engineering
Nordea Finance
Metso Engineering
Fortum Energy
The top seven of the ten most popular stocks have been in the top ten 
during the whole of our sample period, 2000-2013. All seven are large 
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cap companies and have been listed for decades227. The share of top ten 
favorites in foundations’ portfolios is large, but has decreased from 91 
percent in 2000 to 69 percent at the end of 2013. We found that foundations 
have mainly held to their stockholdings, both in case of downturns (Nokia 
in 2000-05, Stockmann 2006-13) as upturns (Kone). Nokia’s business 
downturn is strongly reflected in its loss of favorite position in foundations’ 
portfolios from 2008 onwards, and the same applies to Stockmann share in 
the recent years 2011-13.
We were also interested to know whether foundations have altered their 
preferences when stock prices of the favorite stocks have changed. The 
values of ownership have varied, but does this variation come from the 
share price or from changes in ownership? We examined the holdings of 
favorites by foundations and compared it to the stock price development. 
All charts are included in Chart 9, but we illustrate our point by one general 
graph of selected cases. 
Chart 9. Example of divergence between the aggregate value of stocks held by 
sample foundations, and the stock price of the share. Ownership indicates the 
total value of shares held by foundations. Share price is the price quoted on the 
Nasdaq Helsinki Stock Exchange. All values are indexed to 100 at the beginning 
of the sample period, 31 December 2000. 
227  With the exception of Fortum which was listed in 1998. 
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From Chart 9 we can see that increase in Fortum ownership exceeded 
its share price development. Fortum was a favorite stock even though its 
share price did not quite live up to the highest expectations. In contrast, 
the ownership of Kone shares did not increase as fast as Kone share price; 
foundation investors did not fully detect the winner in the 2000s. Wärtsilä 
ownership and value moved quite much in unison. Metso ownership 
increased more than Metso share price. 
Similarly (but not depicted in the chart), we found that Stockmann 
and Nordea holding increases faster than the share price, indicating that 
foundations actively increased owned number of shares. Stora Enso and 
Orion were popular stocks whose ownership did not quite follow their 
share price. 
We note the anecdotal evidence of a persistent habit of foundations to 
invest in dividend-paying stock in Finland. Hansmann (1990, page 11) 
reports preference in university endowments for cash yields and spending 
rules limiting the charitable use of funds to such cash yields. He notes: “Such 
a rule tends to accumulate the real value of endowment over time even 
without the addition of further funds.” Such spending rules were prevalent 
in the US in the 1960s. Since then, a more liberal spending strategy has 
been adopted in many universities228, and the public debate has shifted 
towards the need for university endowments to limit their endowment 
accumulation, often leading to the setting up of a spending rule related to 
some measure of the total endowment yield (and not only cash yield). The 
discussion about the rationale for the endowment accumulation continues 
(see, e.g., Olkowski (2015), Weisbrod and Asch (2010)). 
In Finland, our sample period shows preference for dividend-paying 
stocks (as opposed to growth stocks). This may be an outcome of the 
perceived (but perhaps not actual) threat of unfavourable tax treatment. 
The Finnish tax regime is discussed in Section 4.2: extremely active 
trading may be seen as professional investment income, but as a general 
rule, the investment activities of foundations do not constitute a business 
activity229. Another reason may be the simplicity of dividend income: it is 
easy to limit a foundation’s spending to the yearly dividends; total returns 
are more difficult to follow230. In our admittedly short sample period (13 
years) though, investing in dividend stocks did not accumulate foundation 
wealth. Three of the favorite dividend stocks in foundations’ portfolios in 
the beginning of the period lost in market value and cut down their dividend 
payments (Nokia, Stockmann and Sanoma) during the sample period. 
228 A certain level of spending is also required by the US taxman if foundations wish to hold 
the tax exempt status.
229 See Verotoimisto The Finnish Tax Authority (2002).
230 There are no requirements as to the level of yearly charitable spending by tax exempt 
foundations in Finland. Therefore a foundation is not obligated to follow its yearly 
total return or accumulation of net asset value, and simple rules such as “we distribute 
only the dividends received” are possible. Dividends are not treated differently as such: 
foundations do not pay taxes on either capital gains or dividend income.
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There are two-level lessons to learn from both the American debate and the 
domestic experience: firstly, that it is not an absolute virtue to accumulate 
funds (for instance, through limiting charitable use to cash yields or less), 
and secondly, that many foundations should consider separately objectives 
for investment returns on one hand, and for dividend and other investment 
cash flows on the other hand231. 
4.6 Summary of hypotheses and results
We summarize our empirical findings in Table 32 below. 
Summary of hypotheses and empirical results
Hypothesis  Result
1
Foundations allocate their equity portfolio actively and do not 
diversify their equity portfolios on the basis of market index. 
Confirmed
2
Foundations are, on average, relatively passive traders, with 
a yearly equity portfolio turnover significantly below one.
Confirmed
3
Foundations are, on average, relatively long-term 
shareholders, with an average holding period of more than 
one year.
Confirmed
4
Endowed foundations diversify more and trade more 
frequently than foundations financed by other sources. 
Confirmed
5
Old foundations have a less active share allocation in their 
portfolio, and their portfolio turnover is higher than in young 
foundations. 
Confirmed
6
Large foundations have a less active share allocation in their 
portfolio, and their portfolio turnover is higher than in small 
foundations. 
Confirmed concerning 
allocation. Not confirmed 
concerning trading.
7
Openly governed foundations diversify more and their 
portfolio turnover is higher than in foundations that are less 
openly governed. 
Not confirmed 
Table 32. Summary of hypotheses about the determinants of foundation equity 
ownership patterns and trading, and empirical results.
We confirm Hypothesis 1 with our finding that the average Active 
Share for all foundations is 59 percent, indicating a relatively high active 
allocation according to Cremers and Petäjistö (2009) (see Table 26). 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by our finding that foundations’ yearly 
portfolio turnover has mostly been low during our sample period 2000-
2013: at or below 20 percent for most years and most foundations, except 
for one year (see Chart 4). The overall average for all sample foundations’ 
average turnovers and over all sample years is 12 percent, which is low 
231 According to information theoretic approach, dividend payment may signal good outlook 
for a company. However, if foundations were relying on information aspects, at some 
point analysts’ reports and decline in market value should have some signaling effect on 
their decisions, too. Ownership of shares is, however, quite sticky.
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comparing to previous findings on other investor types’ turnover (see Table 
20). 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed with our data showing changes in stock 
ownership, per single shares and per foundation. The average term of 
holding a position unchanged is 3.6 years and the median is 3 years, within 
our sample period where the maximum holding period is 13 years232. We 
can say that if a foundation remains an owner for longer than one year, it 
will typically own the stock for 3.6 years (see Section 4.3). Considering that 
we only include positions which have not changed233, we estimate that the 
average term of ownership may actually be longer than this. 
A foundation’s source of finance is statistically significantly associated 
with the foundation’s active diversification level (measured by Active Share). 
This confirms our Hypothesis 4 (see Table 27). Endowed foundations’ Active 
Share is lower than that of the other types of foundation. Thus Endowed 
foundations are on average more diversified, or allocated along the market 
index allocation, than other types of foundation. We also investigate if the 
allocation differences between foundation types persist when controlling 
for age and size. They do: the measure of statistical significance, ρ, remains 
below the 0.05 level for all foundation types, implying that the foundation 
type has a bearing on the activity of diversification. Further confirming 
our Hypothesis 4, we find that Endowed foundations have a statistically 
significant, higher turnover that other types of foundations (see Table 29). 
Moreover, Endowed foundations change their direct shareholdings more 
frequently than foundations financed by other means (see Table 30). 
Concerning Hypothesis 5 about the impact of the age of the foundation, 
we note that the Active Share of foundations’ portfolios decreases as a 
foundation grows older; older foundations concentrate their holdings less 
than young foundations. In other words, older foundations allocate their 
equity holdings closer to the index breakdown than young foundations. 
Foundation age seems to reduce turnover. Thus we confirm Hypothesis 5 
concerning foundation age.
Concerning Hypothesis 6 about foundation size, we note that Active Share 
decreases as size grows; large foundations allocate their equity holdings 
closer to the index breakdown than small foundations. Foundation size 
is not associated with trading frequency (see Table 28). Thus we confirm 
Hypothesis 6 only for allocation and not for trading: foundation size is 
associated with portfolio allocation but not with trading activity.
Hypothesis 7 is rejected. The results are ambiguous as either statistical 
significances or explanatory powers are not strong (see Table 31). Our 
232 Many foundations have owned same stock from early 1900s, so in any foundation equity 
portfolio time series data set this problem will persist: averages do not catch the longest 
ownership periods. In our data, there were 324 holdings that remained intact for the 
whole sample period 2000-2013.
233 Excluding thus positions that have increased by, say, 15 percent each year, or that have 
been halved but have nevertheless remained substantial. These too are long-term 
holdings, and thus our data is biased downwards.
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model for all sample foundations tested if firstly, (1) less openly governed 
foundations (high FGI234) would have higher diversification (low Active 
Share) than less openly governed ones, and secondly, (2) within this FGI 
model, larger foundations would have higher diversification (low Active 
Share) and older foundations have higher diversification (a lower Active 
Share). When we test the model with foundations whose equity portfolio is 
larger than 250,000 euros, or with only Endowed foundations, the model’s 
explanatory power decreases. Concerning governance quality and trading 
activity, we did not detect any statistically significant relation between 
active trading of various owned stocks (measured by turnover or by the 
change-in-ownership indicator) and quality of governance (measured by 
FGI). We thus reject the latter part of our Hypothesis 7 and conclude that 
foundation governance is not statistically related (as far as we detected 
with our rudimentary tests) with foundation turnover or propensity to alter 
single stock holdings. We conclude noting that foundation governance does 
not seem to be strongly related to diversification, either, and are inclined to 
reject Hypothesis 7 based on our admittedly limited model. 
234  FGI is foundation governance index, developed in the first Essay of this book, Section 
4.1.1.
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5. Conclusion and discussion
In this Essay we argue for the need to better understand the investment 
behavior of various investor types. In a world of winding ownership chains 
through asset management, increasing short-term signaling, and increasing 
sensitivity to market malfunction, the regulators need to understand 
the behavior of market participants. However, empirical evidence on the 
investment behaviour of many relevant investor groups is scarce. In this 
Essay we study one distinct investor group, the foundation investors, and 
present empirical evidence on their equity ownership style. 
We report findings that overall, foundations are active risk-takers in the 
sense that they can carry equity risk by not diversifying towards the market 
index industry breakdown. Foundations turn out to be infrequent traders, 
with relatively low equity portfolio turnover. If they decide to own a stock 
for longer than one year235, they remain owners for 3.6 years on average 
(in our 13-year sample period). In addition, the majority of their single 
shareholdings stay intact from year to year. Foundations do not adjust their 
positions frequently.
Even though discussion on short-termism is gaining more nuanced 
tones (see The Economist (2015)) and short-term signaling may not 
be as rampant as suggested, the calls for owners, who own stock for 
longer than one year and who take interest in the company’s outlook and 
strategy, are valid. Foundations show two investor characteristics which 
match this predicament. Firstly, our findings confirm the common belief 
that foundations are investors who do not need to change their positions 
frequently. They can remain invested in an unchanged equity portfolio 
through market turbulence, making them a valuable market participant in 
times of market failure. Foundations seem to fit the long-termist investor 
type, as their ownership period of single equity stocks is relatively long. 
Secondly, our findings about the active allocation of the equity portfolio 
to relatively few holdings suggest that at least some foundations can 
235 Our data includes only yearly observations which complicates estimating overall 
ownership period; see Footnotes 223-225.
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concentrate holdings to core holdings that they follow for years. Compared 
to pension funds, foundations are active risk takers, whereas pension 
funds seem to stay close to reference indexes. Although our study did not 
examine shareholder activism, we claim it is likely that some foundations 
do participate in corporate decisions in their core portfolio companies, if 
their holdings are heavily concentrated into such blockholdings or if a block 
is large in value236.  
The source of finance of a foundation is associated with the foundation’s 
active risk taking and diversification policy, as well as with trading activity. 
Endowed foundations emerge as the most sophisticated investors, with 
higher diversification levels and more trading frequency. Endowed 
foundations also learned from the stock market downturn in the early 
2000s and adjusted their diversification thereafter more rapidly than other 
foundations. 
Foundation age and size are related to foundation equity portfolio 
allocation: older and larger foundations take less active allocation risk, i.e., 
diversify more. However, only foundation age is statistically significantly 
associated with trading activity and foundation size is not. Older 
foundations trade less frequently than younger ones.
Our results confirm the belief that the investment behavior of non-
profit investors differs from other investors’ behaviour and forms its own 
identifiable investor type. This makes non-profits a valuable complement 
to the capital markets. They bring long-term investment capability and 
risk appetite to markets which increasingly seek to avoid short-term 
malfunctions due to all investors behaving in the same direction. As non-
profit investors are not subject to quarterly reporting obligations, and do 
not need to signal about their financial success, they are relatively little 
constrained or motivated by short-term interests. This increases the 
balancing role of non-profits on the capital markets. At the same time, some 
attention should be paid to the concern that the third sector’s motivation 
of eternal preservation of endowed assets may decisively differ from the 
normal first sector value-creating motivation.
With our evidence, one owner group is now somewhat better known, and 
our findings offer a reference point to other owner types237. Similarly, we 
contribute to the general non-profit research, where the main research 
focus has been on charitable work or on the behavior of foundation-owners 
of businesses, while the understanding of non-profits as economic agents, 
not to mention portfolio investors, has remained almost non-existent. 
Finally, to our knowledge no researcher has investigated holding periods of 
236 We interviewed 16 largest foundations and learned that many of them participate in, e.g., 
choice of board members or strategy discussions in companies in which the foundation 
owns a significant block.
237 One constant endeavour in our research has been to find evidence about other investors’ 
trading or allocation activity, in order to be able to answer the question “trades/diversifies 
much – compared to whom?”.
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single shareholdings over time, even though studies on portfolio turnover 
are numerous. These two measures offer slightly different views to the 
trading activity versus ownership span of institutional investors.
There are evident limitations to our conclusions. We have yearly data on 
domestic listed shares held, and no trading or cash flow data of these equity 
investments. Our assumption that a share held at the end of several years 
has not been traded during these years may be too simplifying. Similar 
simplifying assumptions were necessary when adjusting portfolios for 
share issues and splits. While we remain confident that our data is sufficient 
to give an understanding of foundations’ behavior, we would welcome a 
more thorough treatment of non-profits as an investor group in subsequent 
research where more detailed trading data is available. 
Our data does not permit us to observe the yields of portfolios. We have 
only yearly observations on shares held. We do not have data about the 
amount of dividends, the value of pre-emptive rights, or the price at which 
shares have been bought or sold during a year. Thus we do not have even a 
rudimentary knowledge about the yields attained by foundations as equity 
investors. 
Furthermore, our analysis does not tell much about the success of 
foundations’ investment activities as a whole. Firstly, our data is limited 
to direct shareholdings, excluding thus other equity instruments such 
as equity funds, private equity investments and direct shareholdings in 
non-listed companies. Secondly, other asset classes such as fixed income, 
real estate or cash are not in the data. We cannot analyze the success of 
allocation between asset classes. However, the portion invested by sample 
foundations into equity is estimated to be some 62 percent of aggregate 
investment asset value, majority of it domestically and into listed shares. 
Thus our sample of direct listed domestic equity holdings may be to some 
extent representative of the investment style of foundations.
There are several policy implications in our research. Firstly, foundation 
investors enjoy unique investment time horizons and risk preferences that 
complement those of other investor types on the capital markets. This is 
beneficial for the resilience of the capital markets, especially in times of 
short-term shocks. Thus the regulators should understand and encourage 
foundations’ investment activities. 
Secondly and following from above, governments should consider tax 
rules or – more generally - the granting of charitable status to a foundation 
independently from the foundation’s investment activity. Regulatory status 
interpretations or tax rules should not limit trading or risk diversification 
efforts in foundations. The taxman should consider the sophisticated 
investment management as a natural core operation of foundations. Even if 
foundations are not financial institutions, managing financial assets such as 
donations, endowment or operative income is an unavoidable, growing part 
of their operations and should be considered such. Tax treatment should 
not depend on spurious interpretations about the nature of a foundation’s 
investment activity. 
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Practical implications of this study are the following. Foundations 
and general public alike should acknowledge investment operations as 
a routine operation in charities. In foundations, more discussion and 
managerial time could be allocated to the philosophy guiding investments 
and endowment use, and to the efficient investment management. Further 
diversification of portfolios, both to a wider asset, industry and geographic 
base, could be actively considered. The general public should pay attention 
to the management of foundation assets as part of the overall efficiency 
of a foundation. Perception of overall efficiency affects donors’ decisions 
to donate to charities, and more generally, the public opinion about 
foundations affects governments’ benevolence towards the third sector.
Future research ideas are numerous. Foundations’ holdings in all asset 
classes is of great interest, if detailed information about full balance sheet 
composition can be collected. A longer time series of holdings would 
be beneficial, especially because foundations do not alter their rules, 
management, modus operandi or mission very frequently. Over a longer 
period of time we could observe how foundations adjust their investment 
policies and which events are likely to drive such change. 
On a more general note, more accurate evidence about homogeneously 
motivated investor groups could be reached by inspecting clearly defined 
and carefully sampled investor types in more detail than official statistics 
can offer. In practice, this would most likely mean concentrating on one 
investor type sample at a time. 
Finally, event studies around significant publications (mergers, issuance) 
in companies where foundations hold blocks would be informative, as well 
as event studies around foundation legislation changes. 
We view this Essay as an important step in a broader effort to understand 
non-profits as economic agents. As defined in the Introduction of this 
book, foundations are “chests of funds” that are set aside for carrying out 
a charitable mission. It follows that their behavior in managing such funds 
must be a core function of the foundation. Our new empirical evidence about 
such behaviour, as well as our newly developed approaches to evaluate the 
nature of foundations financed through different means and our measure 
of the persistence of ownership of single shares in a portfolio, will allow 
researchers to investigate foundations, as well as other investor types, from 
a practical and meaningful perspective.
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Appendix 1. Sampling of data
Data is based on the Finnish Ministry of Justice sampling of Finnish 
foundations. The data was prepared for the needs of legislation redrafting 
in 2015. There were 964 foundations in the Ministry of Justice sample. The 
sample was selected by:
• Taking every fourth foundation in the Register in 2011. The 
foundations are ordered by their registration year, so the 
sample covers foundations founded between 1930 and 2010, 
otherwise random in their characteristics. This resulted in 699 
foundations;
• Adding the members of a leading association in foundation 
field, Council of Finnish Foundations. This resulted in 120 
foundations in all (some of which were already in the sample); 
and
• Adding the largest foundations by balance sheet total, equity or 
debt capital or by operational result.
• Adding those foundations that had answered to the Ministry of 
Justice interview in 2011. These were some 600 in total, many of 
which were already in the database.
After receiving this original data from the ministry, the researcher did the 
following:
• Adding significant associations or funds that have historically 
organized as such legal entities but who consider to be 
foundations-in-character. A sign of this is their membership and 
active participation in the Council of Finnish Foundations (as 
it happens, some “foundations” are also in the Register even if 
they are legally funds or associations). There were 22 such cases. 
These will all be called “foundations” in the study. At this point 
the sample included 964 foundations.
• Cleaning away foundations where either the rules were unclear 
or financial information was not adequately available. This 
brought the number of foundations in the sample down to 871. 
• Adding randomly selected foundations into ICNPO-categories 
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that had small samples (around a dozen entries): Environmental 
(category 5), International (9) and Religious (10) foundations. 
In all, 20 such additions were made, thus the relative size of the 
categories was not distorted but the statistical significance of 
some categories was improved.
This resulted in a sample of 891 foundations. 
We reviewed this database and screened financials to catch irregularities. 
Mistakes were corrected by checking the original filings in the company 
registrar. The 200 largest sample foundations were checked each against 
their own filing, and market values of investments for the 200 largest 
foundations were collected by hand. These 200 largest foundations 
represent 95 percent of sample foundations’ aggregated market value of 
assets at the end of 2012, 92 percent of revenues and 98 percent of financial 
investments. Fourteen largest foundations were also interviewed to get 
accurate data about their non-listed holdings and to increase general 
understanding of foundations’ allocation policies and bookkeeping. 
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Appendix 2. Foundation financial 
statements
According to the Finnish GAAP, foundations report in their profit and loss 
statement 
1. Operations: revenue, costs and net income
2. Investment activities: revenue, costs and net income
3. Donative activities: revenue, costs and net income
4. General support received (=public sector support)
5. Total net profit for the period
6. Grants made are reported separately. 
We base our categorization of different sources of income on the profit and 
loss statement. We calculate and use the average for 2010-2012 for each 
relevant item. We then look at 
a) Net income from four main income sources for each foundation, 
and their share of total net income of the foundation.
b) Gross income from four main income sources for each 
foundation, and their share of total revenues of the foundation.  
We emphasize the alternative a). In foundations where operations are 
loss-making the net income actually secures the going-concern of the 
foundation. Example: 
Foundation operates a cheap-food kiosque and has an endowment of 10,000 
euros. The operative revenue from food is 1000 euros, but the net loss from 
selling food is -100 euros. This is covered from endowment yield. Is the 
foundation financed by operations or endowment? We have categorized 
it into Endowed foundations as the continuity of the foundation work 
(making food accessible to all) is made possible by the endowment.
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However, in some cases where all income is scarce or it seems that all the 
years 2010-2012 have been exceptional we have used also gross revenue 
information to judge and categorize a foundation. 
Balance sheet includes, e.g.,
• Tangible and intangible assets
• Long-term Investments
• Securities (not classified as long-term holding)
• Cash and marketable securities
• Debt.
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Appendix 3. Data on foundations’ 
equity ownership and calculation 
of ratios
Data was obtained from Euroclear Finland, the book entry system registrar 
of securities trading. Euroclear Finland maintains the infrastructure 
for issuance and trading on the Nasdaq Helsinki Exchange, the leading 
securities market exchange in Finland. It keeps records of all transactions 
on the Helsinki Exchange and the ownership of book-entry-form equities 
by all domestic investors. The book-entry share form is obligatory for all 
listed companies, and voluntary for other limited liability companies; some 
have adopted it instead of printed paper share certificates. 
Equity ownership data was requested for a random sample of 872 Finnish 
foundations (see Appendix 1 about the collection of the sample). Of these, 
530 turned out to have had listed equity ownership during the research 
period. Data includes all shares in an investor’s portfolio at 31 December 
of each year. The years included in the data are 2000-2013, which makes 
fourteen observations points.
Details include share issuance reference (exact code for the security), name 
of the issuer, ISIC-industry code for the issuer, Nasdaq Helsinki Exchange 
industry category for the issuer, number of shares held, share price and 
date of ownership. There are 62,689 single shareholding entries (rows) in 
the years 2000-2014 and the number of original data cells is over 752,000. 
Share price is the actual closing price on the date of ownership. We also 
calculate the value of each owned share lot by multiplying the number of 
shares by the share price. 
Data on investors’ portfolios was available as strictly anonymized. Thus we 
had to change some foundation characteristics into non-identifiable ranks. 
For instance, all exact financial values were ranked into 20 size categories, 
with 20 representing the largest figures and 1 the smallest. We could use the 
new ranks as a scale variable (in some instances it is similar to logarithmic 
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alteration), and in some cases we use each rank’s average original euro 
value as the value for all foundations in that category. We lose some 
accurateness of the financial data, but maintain the rough scale distances 
between different ranks. Furthermore, we had to convert foundation exact 
age into a decade when the foundation was founded; we created a rough age 
equivalent by deducting the decade from the year 2012, obtaining a right 
age with an error marginal of plus or minus five years. These alterations 
apply when we refer to foundations’ financial investments, revenues or age 
in the second paper (“Are non-profits active equity investors?”).
To calculate some of our variables, we make the following corrections to the 
data. We first correct share splits and bonus issues (“free shares”) in the 
ownership history, to obtain a split-adjusted number of shares held. There 
were 86 such issues between the year end of 2000 and the year end of 2013 
on the Helsinki market. In addition, we made corrections due to unification 
of share classes or change of company name (there were 8 cases). 
Concerning share issue with pre-emptive rights238 for old shareholders, 
we had two alternative philosophies for our research purpose. We seek to 
understand whether an investor is “passive” or “active”. What constitutes 
activity in case of a share issue, and what is a “neutral” act from an investor?
1. It is neutral not to take part in share issues. The portion of an 
investor’s portfolio invested into a share remains the same. The 
allocation of the investor does not change.  
2. It is neutral to take part in share issues for the pro-rata amount 
of one’s previous ownership. The relative ownership in the 
company remains the same, however the allocation to that 
particular share increases in the investor’s portfolio.  
Following these two philosophies239, we calculated our ratios with two 
datasets. For philosophy 1, we used the split-corrected ownership data 
as such. No corrections for rights issues were made, as we consider it to 
238 Only rights issues influence the value of shareholding in a company. Share issues with 
no pre-emptive rights are priced at (or close) current value and are thus neutral to old 
shareholders. In case of rights issues, a part of company value is attached to the issue 
rights. Thus participation by the old shareholders requires less capital input, and may be 
an encouragement to them. 
239 There is a third philosophy that could be considered neutral. Investors might invest 
“cash-neutrally”: selling enough rights to finance the subscription with the remaining 
rights. No new cash is needed as the subscription of new shares is financed with sale 
of rights. We discarded this option for two reasons: such neutral number of subscribed 
shares is complicated to calculate and would require rights’ market prices; and given the 
complicated calculation, we had strong anecdotal evidence that foundations do not make 
sophisticated calculations so as to neutralize their cash flow. They simply subscribe or do 
not, based on their view on the company. 
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be “neutral” not to subscribe shares in share issues. Those investors who 
showed increased numbers of shares after a rights issue were thus deemed 
to having made active investment decisions in their portfolio. 
For philosophy 2, we corrected ownership history by rights issue multiple 
for each company and rights issue. There were 51 rights issues between the 
year-end 2000 and the year end 2013 on the Helsinki market. After such 
correction, investors who had invested their pro-rata share in rights issues 
showed “neutral increase” in holding, whereas investors who did not take 
part in share issue were deemed to have decreased such shares. 
To summarize, we used varying datasets to calculate our variables: 
• Investor’s diversification (Active Share) is calculated from share 
allocation values, with actual number of shares and actual share 
price at the year end. No adjustments are made to data.  
• Investor’s trading activity is calculated with either philosophy 
1 (only splits, bonus issues adjusted) or 2 (also rights issues 
adjusted). 
Calculation of portfolio turnover
We calculate the yearly portfolio turnover for each foundation as one-half 
the yearly sales turnover plus one-half the yearly purchase turnover. 
At the end of each year in our sample period, we identify all single stocks 
held by each foundation at the end of the previous year from our Euroclear 
data. We then calculate the difference in held number of shares between 
positions at two consecutive year ends. Each single stock holding may show 
either sales (held number has decreased), purchases (number increases) or 
no change (number intact). All changes are calculated as absolute numbers. 
Turnover is calculated as the number of shares sold or purchased, times the 
beginning-of-year price per share, divided by the total beginning-of-year 
market value of the foundation’s portfolio. This ratio is then divided by two, 
to have an intuition of “how much the portfolio has changed”: 
If a foundation sells all shares in his portfolio and purchases new stock with 
the proceeds, the turnover amounts to 100 percent, because sales is – 100 
percent of the previous year’s value and purchases are + 100 percent. Both 
are turned into absolute values and summed up, making 200 percent. This 
is divided by two, to arrive at an intuitive ratio of “100 percent turnover 
of portfolio”.
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Note that turnover can take indefinite values as purchases can multiply the 
value of a portfolio. 
There are 13 time series data points for Turnover because it is measured as 
a change from the previous year, with the first change occurring in the year 
2001.
Calculation of Active Share
We calculate Active Share on the basis of deviation from market index 
industry breakdown, as follows:
Portfolio’s Active Share = ½  ∑│wf - Wx │   , 
for each foundation (N=530) and for each stock held,
where wf  is the weight of an industry in foundation’s portfolio, and Wx is the 
weight of an industry in the stock exchange general index.
The Active Share has values between 0 and 1 by definition, and is intuitively 
the percentage deviation from market index of a portfolio. More accurately, 
Cremers and Petäjistö (2009) describe: “The long-short portfolio represents 
all the active bets the fund has taken. Active Share measures the size of that 
long-short portfolio as a fraction of the total portfolio of the fund.”
Calculation of Change-in-ownership –indicator
                                Number of shares held
Investor Share 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
573 Company 1 6521 6521 6521 6521 6521
638 Company 1 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
822 Company 1 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
822 Company 2 1160 1160 1160
822 Company 3 720 720 720
1019 Company 1 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 245 245 245 245 245
1019 Company 2 4500
1019 Company 3 1800 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 800
1019 Company 4 24000 24000 12000 8000 8000 8000 8000 6000 6000 6000 3000 3000 3000 2400
1019 Company 5 9600 9600 6000 6000 6000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 2400
1019 Company 6 3500
1019 Company 7 2400 2400 1500 1500
1019 Company 8 4000 4000 3000 3000 3000 2500 2500 2500 2500 2000
1019 Company 9 1000 1250
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In our data there are 9845 share ownership rows for foundations (by 530 
non-profit investors in 2000-2013). They specify the timeline of ownership 
of each share owned by each foundation. We identify changes of more than 
10 percent to the previous year’s ownership. If such change has occurred, 
the indicator for that investor and for that stock is 1, otherwise 0. 
Acquisition of shares not previously held is considered a change, thus 
a 1. Sale of all shares is also considered a change, thus a 1. However, the 
years when the investor has not been owning one specific share are not 
interpreted as a zero but are considered to be non-events (empty data): 
absence of investment in most shares in the market (such as some rows 
showing blanks in Table above) cannot be interpreted as “stability” of 
investment strategy. Only the years where the investor has either acquired, 
held or sold all shares matter in our change-data. We get all yearly changes 
per each stock and each investor, and calculate the averages of time series 
of zeroes and ones, which gives us the number of years with occurrence of 
change.
We also aggregate change-in-ownership at foundation level. We calculate 
the portion of ones to the number of shares held by the foundation to see 
how many shareholdings changed in a given year in a foundation’s portfolio. 
We also calculate average of such portion over the years 2000-2013.
There are 13 time series data points for change indicator because it is 
measured as a change from previous year, with the first change occurring 
in the year 2001.
                                Change-in-ownership -indicator
Investor Share 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
573 Company 1 0 0 0 0 1
638 Company 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
822 Company 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
822 Company 2 1 0 0
822 Company 3 1 0 0
1019 Company 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1019 Company 2 1 1
1019 Company 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1019 Company 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1019 Company 5 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1019 Company 6 1 1
1019 Company 7 0 1 1 0 1
1019 Company 8 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1019 Company 9 1 1
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Increasing amounts of wealth are being 
accumulated in non-profit foundations. 
This book examines these foundations 
as economic agents and investors.  
The first essay offers insights into their 
governance: the source of financing 
of a foundation is associated with the 
governance choices.  The second essay 
profits from broad data about their 
equity portfolios; empirical results 
show that foundations are long-term 
investors that can deviate from the 
market index allocation. Foundations 
profit from lack of regulation of their 
investments, as well as from the absence 
of signaling pressure. This renders them 
an important element in the varied 
investor base on the equity markets. 
